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I. INTRODUCTION
The past decade has witnessed a remarkable transformation in
the implementation of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA" or
"Act").' The statute has grown beyond its roots as a resource
management law relying primarily on interagency consultation
and prohibitive policy. Today, the statute's most visible compo-
nent is a permit program for private landowners who seek to
modify habitat that might harm threatened or endangered ani-
mals. This shift from a resource management to a regulatory
paradigm reflects an important convergence between traditional
conservation law and more recent pollution control law of the
past thirty years.2
While this transformation has been, on the whole, a salutary de-
velopment in environmental law generally and a boost for endan-
gered species protection in particular, it has not realized its full
potential. Because the recent developments have focused almost
exclusively on the incidental take permit provision of ESA Section
10(a), their ability to promote comprehensive conservation plan-
ning has been limited to the terms of that section. This article
proposes a further shift in focus from Section 10(a) to Section 4(d).
Such a shift, while not forsaking the progress of the past decade,
would promote greater borrowing from the successes of pollution
control law and achieve more in species conservation. Most nota-
bly, greater reliance on 4(d) rules would harness the partnership
of cooperative federalism to promote species recovery.
Section 4(d) of the Act allows the federal government to issue
special rules for the recovery of certain species listed as threatened
with extinction. These "4(d) rules" can tailor the otherwise broad,
ill-defined prohibitions against harming protected species to fit
the particular circumstances of a species, ecosystem, or region.
Although seldom used creatively in the past to customize prohibi-
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 153 -1544 (1994).
2. The characteristic differences between the resource management and pollution control
strands of environmental law are explored in greater depth in Robert L. Fischman, The
Problem of Statutory Detail in National Park Establishment Legislation and its Relationship to Pol-
lution Control Law, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 779, 784-786 (1997); and David J. Hayes, Cross-
Pollination, ENVTL. F., July/Aug. 1998, at 28. Professor Tarlock makes a similar distinction
in describing the dual objectives of current environmental protection policy as conserving
biodiversity and reducing pollution risks. A. Dan Tarlock, Biodiversity Federalism, 54 MD. L.
REV. 1315, 1315 (1995); A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodiversity: What Is Its
Niche?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 555,555-557 (1993).
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ions or establish permit standards, there are emerging signs that
Section 4(d) shows promise to become the flagship ESA program
of the next decade. This article explores those signs in the context
of the peculiar history of efforts to conserve threatened and en-
dangered species. It also promotes the use of the "4(d) rule" as a
substantial improvement over the existing tools that currently
dominate ESA implementation to achieve the goal of the Act,
which is recovery of species -and the ecosystems on which they
depend.3
Endangered species protection grew out of the federal conserva-
tion law tradition of active agency management of public re-
sources, intergovernmental coordination, and prohibitions de-
signed to protect public investment and values. As ESA
implementation has come to rely more on permits to restrict pri-
vate economic activities that inflict environmental harms, it has
come more to resemble conventional pollution control.
However, an important gap remains between the two branches
of environmental law. Pollution control permits are almost uni-
formly designed to ensure aggregate (albeit halting) progress to-
ward ultimate statutory goals, such as air quality that does not
impair public health or water quality that supports recreation and
fisheries. In contrast, the ascendant ESA permit program under
Section 10(a), as implemented, fails to build toward the ultimate
aim of the Act, recovery of species so that they are no longer on
the brink of extinction. In this article, we advocate a shift in em-
phasis in ESA implementation to a new kind of permit program.
This program, authorized under Section 4(d), requires agency im-
plementation that ensures progress toward recovery.4
A permit program that promotes recovery not only brings im-
plementation of the ESA into line with the pollution control pro-
grams that characterize the modem era of environmental law, it
also directs the attention of agencies and the public toward the
important conservation challenges. In the coming decades, ap-
proaches to conserving biological diversity that merely mitigate
harm or abate damage will increasingly reveal themselves inade-
quate.5 Restoration and recovery will be the hallmarks of any suc-
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
4. See discussion infra at V(A), VI(A)(2).
5. This is proving to be the case in the area of wetlands conservation. A recent National
Academy of Sciences panel found the federal mitigation program inadequate even to pre-
vent net loss of wetlands in the United States. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
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cessful biodiversity strategy.
The conservation strand of environmental law has been slow to
borrow the more successful innovations of the pollution control
strand.6 The history of the development of ESA programs illus-
trates this lag, but also reveals an excellent opportunity to fill a
key need for more comprehensive conservation planning. Section
II of this article reviews the science and circumstances that give
rise to this need. It briefly covers the extinction concern in the
broader context of biodiversity. Section III outlines the basic pro-
visions of the ESA that form the foundation for the programs of
implementing agencies.
In this article, we distinguish between the ESA itself (the statute)
and the ESA program, which includes the implementing regula-
tions, handbooks, interpretations and practices of the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service ("FWS") and the National Marine Fisheries
Service ("NMFS"). Like the innovations of the past decade, future
progress in meeting the goal of endangered species protection is
more likely to originate in imaginative agency experimentation
than in congressional legislation. Section IV of the article outlines
the evolution of the ESA program from the traditional conserva-
tion paradigm of interagency coordination and prohibitive policy
to the current paradigm of permitting, which is closer in spirit to
the pollution control strand of environmental law. Section IV
shows how further adoption of the successful tools of pollution
control law (especially cooperative federalism), through the use of
ESA Section 4(d), would prompt greater progress and respond to
the legitimate criticism of the current approach. Section IV also
discusses the lesser-known aspects of the ESA that are beginning
to encourage closer cooperation between the Services and the
states.
Section V describes the basic mechanics of ESA Section 4(d) and
illustrates its application through two case studies: Natural Com-
munity Conservation Planning for the coastal California gnat-
catcher, and the still-emerging Washington state response to pa-
cific salmon (and bull trout) conservation in the urban areas
around Puget Sound.7 These examples highlight the nascent po-
COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER AcT (2001).
6. Though there are reasonable explanations for this split in strategy, outlined by Tar-
lock, supra note 2, this article focuses on the advantages of selective borrowing from the
pollution control experience.
7. Though the West Coast salmon rule itself applies more broadly to habitat in several
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tential of Section 4(d) to usher in a new era of recovery through
cooperative federalism.
Finally, Section VI develops in greater detail the path to con-
structive use of Section 4(d) to recover more effectively species on
the brink of extinction. This section examines the strengths of
employing Section 4(d) as a vehicle for comprehensive conserva-
tion planning. The comparison of Section 4(d) with the 10(a) per-
mit program confirms the promise of recovery through coopera-
tive federalism. It also highlights the programmatic limitations of
the current emphasis on incidental take permits. In addition, Sec-
tion VI addresses some weaknesses of the new approach. The ar-
ticle concludes with recommendations for building an effective
4(d) program.
So much has been written and debated over the past five years
about habitat conservation planning and incidental take permits
that it is easy to forget that the current focus on this aspect of the
ESA program is not an endpoint, but it is just another stage in the
development of a controversial but essential program. This article
suggests that it is time to look beyond the Section 10(a) debates
and toward the next era of biodiversity policy. The next era will
certainly need to respond more potently to the challenge of the ex-
tinction crisis in a nation of fragmented ecosystems. The allitera-
tive hallmarks of the new era of ESA implementation that we ad-
vocate are: cooperative, customized, comprehensive conservation. The
cooperative transformation will enlist the land use planning and
control programs of state and local governments. The customized
transformation will tailor incentives and restrictions on activities
to meet the specific needs of species in the area. The comprehensive
transformation will apply habitat protection to an area large
enough to enable flexible land use trade-offs and provide a net-
work of reserves. The conservation transformation will recover,
not simply maintain, species on the brink of extinction so that they
no longer need the intensive care tools of the ESA.
II. THE EXTINCTION PROBLEM
Although states began addressing the decline in game species in
states, we will focus on the Washington response because it comes dosest to the model we
propose for future innovation in the ESA program. Also, Seattle is the largest metropolitan
area affected by the rule. See infra note 342.
[Vol. 27:45
20021 Cooperative Federalism and the Endangered Species Act 51
the nineteenth century, the federal government did not take sig-
nificant measures to prevent extinctions until the early 1900s.8
Even then, the focus of conservation law remained on hunting,
trapping, and other direct means of killing animals. The first sig-
nificant program for protecting the habitat on which species de-
pend was the system of wildlife refuges, initially established via
executive action under Theodore Roosevelt and then expanded by
Congress. 9 Land acquisition and public land management re-
mained the principal federal tools for preventing habitat destruc-
tion and species extinctions until Congress enacted the modem
version of the ESA in 1973.10
The extinction of species is but one manifestation of the larger
contemporary problem of the loss of biological diversity. Biologi-
cal diversity, broadly speaking, incorporates not only the compo-
nents of the natural world, but the interactions among them." In
addition to the variety of species, biological diversity also ex-
presses itself at the ecosystem level in the mosaic of habitats and
natural communities in a region. Genetic diversity refers to the
variation in the gene pool for a population of organisms. Reduc-
tions in diversity at either the ecosystem level or the genetic level
often cause extinctions.
Species extinction is part of the evolution of life and is ubiqui-
tous in fossil records. But, the current era of mass extinction is
special because it is largely caused by human activities and is oc-
curring at a relatively rapid pace.12 The four major anthropogenic
causes of species extinction, in order of their importance in the
United States, are: 1) habitat degradation and destruction; 2) the
8. The groundbreaking federal statute is the Lacey Act of 1900, prohibiting interstate
commerce in animals taken in violation of state law. Ch. 553, § 1, 31 Stat 187.
9. See Robert L. Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge System and the Hallmarks of Modern
Organic Legislation, 29 ECOL. L.Q. (forthcoming 2002).
10. For a review of the history of species conservation in the United States, see THOMAS
A. LUND, AMERICAN WILDLIFE LAW (1980); STEVEN L YAFFEE, PROHIBITvE POUCY:
IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 32-56 (1982).
11. More technically, biological diversity is "the variety and variability among living or-
ganisms and the ecological complexes in which they occur." OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-F-330, TECHNOLOGIES TO MAINTAIN BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY 3 (1987). For a general exploration of the concept, see DAVID TAKACS, THE IDEA
OF BIODIVERSITY: PHILOSOPHIES OF PARADISE (1996).
12 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 39
(1995). The geologic record provides evidence for at least five comparable mass extinctions
during the past 500 million years, which some speculate were caused by meteorite colli-
sions with the Earth. Id. at 25-26.
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
introduction of non-native species and the spread of diseases car-
ried by them; 3) pollution; and 4) overexploitation through hunt-
ing and harvest.13 Because it presents the most difficult conflict
with the rights of private landowners and because it contributes to
the risk of extinction for 85% of imperiled species, 14 habitat degra-
dation and destruction is the greatest challenge for conserving
species on the brink of extinction. In their comprehensive study of
habitat conservation plans, three prominent conservation biolo-
gists succinctly stated the conservation task: "if we want to save
species we must protect a sufficient quality and quantity of habi-
tats."' 5
The quantity, or size, of habitats needed to restore imperiled
species populations may be quite large. For instance, some birds
breed exclusively in tracts of habitat many times the size of their
territory.16 Salmon in the Columbia River basin travel from the
sea to breed in tributaries that fan out over 260,000 square miles.17
Migratory birds and salmon illustrate how some species depend
on different types of habitat in different places at different times.
Furthermore, the minimum area of habitat needed for healthy
levels of populations depends, in part, on the geometry of the
landscape and its quality.18 For instance, blocks of habitat close
together, contiguous, and interconnected are better than blocks far
apart, fragmented, and isolated. 9 For the purposes of under-
standing the discussion in this article, the important principle to
remember about the habitat needs of endangered species is that a
single, protected, park-like reserve generally does not succeed in
13. David S. Wilcove et al., Quantifying Threats to Imperiled Species in the United States, 48
BIoScIENCE 607 (1998) [hereinafter Wilcove, Quantifying Threats]; NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 12, at 35-38. Some sources include pollution as a form of habitat deg-
radation rather than as a separate category.
14. Wilcove, Quantifying Threats, supra note 13, at 607-608 (surveying the threats to all
species covered by the ESA as well as many species identified by the Nature Conservancy
as imperiled).
15. REED F. Noss ET. AL., THE SCIENCE OF CONSERVATION PLANNING: HABITAT
CONSERVATION UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 2 (1997). See also NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 12, at 7,40,94.
16. NOSS ET. AL., supra note 15, at 4.
17. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN 180-181 (1992). For a descrip-
tion of salmon conservation issues generally, see id. at 175-218; Michael C. Blumm & Greg
D. Corbin, Salmon and the Endangered Species Act: Lessons from the Columbia Basin, 74 WASH.
L. REV. 519 (1999).
18. The science of habitat needs for endangered species is discussed in Noss Er. AL., supra
note 15, at 99-110, and NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 12, at 94-110.
19. NOSS Er. AL., supra note 15, at 99-102-
[Vol. 27:45
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recovery. Reserves tend to be too small and lack the necessary
linkages to other habitats. Instead, habitat often must be actively
managed and connected across landscapes in which urban devel-
opment, logging, farming, and other activities occur.20
III. THE ESA FRAMEWORK
In response to the extinction problem, Congress enacted the
ESA in 1973 "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon
which endangered species and threatened species depend may be
conserved." 21 The Act defines "conserve" to mean "the use of all
methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endan-
gered species or threatened species to the point at which the
measures provided [by the Act] ... are no longer necessary." 22 So,
the object of the statute is to list certain species in danger of extinc-
tion and then apply special conservation measures to promote re-
covery of habitats and populations until extinction is not likely in
the foreseeable future.
This section sketches the basic framework of the ESA. It begins
in Part A with a discussion of ESA Section 4, which addresses spe-
cial Service responsibilities for listing and recovering species. Un-
til a species is proposed to be listed as threatened or endangered,
the Act does not safeguard it, no matter how moribund its pros-
pects. The rest of this section describes the statutory restrictions
designed to protect listed species. Although some listed species
occur only outside of the United States, the focus of this article
tracks the focus of the ESA program dealing with habitat degrada-
tion, which is conservation within the United States.23 Part B dis-
cusses ESA Section 7, which imposes three duties on federal agen-
cies. Part C discusses ESA Section 9, which contains more broadly
applicable prohibitions that raise liability concerns for state and
20. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Adaptation of Environmental Law to the Ecologists' Discovery
of Disequilibria, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 887, 890-91 (1994) (discussing the inadequacy of the
"ark" configuration of conservation).
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994). Earlier statutory efforts, in 1966 and 1969, failed to man-
date comprehensive steps to recover endangered species. The history of endangered spe-
cies protection prior to 1973 is ably accounted in MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND,
THE EvOLuTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 193-198 (3d ed. 1997).
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1994).
23. This article, because it is concerned with regulation of habitat-modifying activities in
the United States, does not address those parts of the ESA that deal with species conserva-
tion abroad, international agreements, or the import and export of biological material.
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local governments as well as private citizens. Finally, Part D de-
scribes Section 10, which provides for permits to engage in other-
wise prohibited activities.
A. The Services' Section 4 Duties: Species, Critical Habitat, and
Recovery Plans
The listing of a species as threatened or endangered is the most
important threshold decision in determining whether the protec-
tions of the Act will apply. The ESA divides responsibility for list-
ing between the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce, who
have delegated their power to the FWS and the NMFS, respec-
tively. The NMFS is responsible for most marine species, includ-
ing anadromous fish, such as salmon, that migrate between fresh
and marine waters.24 The FWS is responsible for all other species.
These two listing services are collectively referred to as "the Ser-
vices."25
Although the scope of the Act is limited to the animal and plant
kingdoms, "species" is defined broadly to include subspecies and
"any distinct population segment" of vertebrates that inter-
breeds. 26 Thus, particular runs of salmon, such as the Upper Wil-
lamette spring-run chinook salmon in Oregon, though consisting
of species that are common elsewhere, are eligible for listing be-
cause they constitute distinct population segments that are repro-
ductively isolated from other segments of the species. 27 The isola-
tion may be geographic, or, in the case of salmon runs, it may be
temporal - related to the time when the segment arrives at its
24. Reorg. Plan No. 4 of 1970,35 Fed. Reg. 15,627 (Oct 6,1970), and in 84 Stat. 2090 (1970),
transferred most anadromous and commercial fish conservation to NOAA, under which
NMFS is situated. See also BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 21, at 203 n.49.
25. Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science
Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029 (1997), offers a comprehensive critique of
the Services' listing programs.
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (1994). This article uses the term "species" in this broader, statu-
tory sense rather than the narrower, taxonomic meaning. See EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE
DIVERSrIY OF LIFE 64-69 (1992), for a description of the scientific difficulties involved in
identifying distinct subspecies and populations.
27. Endangered and Threatened Species; Threatened Status for Three Chinook Salmon
Evolutionary Significant Units (ESUs) in Washington and Oregon, and Endangered Status
for one Chinook Salmon ESU in Washington, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,308 (Mar. 24, 1999). But see
Alsea Valley Alliance v. Evans, 161 F. Supp.2d 1154 (D. Or. 2001). The NMFS uses the con-
cept of the "evolutionarily significant unit" to determine distinct population segments. The
National Research Council, in its 1995 study of scientific issues related to the ESA, en-
dorsed this approach. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 12, at 56-65 (1995).
[Vol. 27:45
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breeding grounds.
The Act requires the Services to list species pursuant to notice
and comment informal rulemaking.28 Species may be listed upon
the initiative of the Service or by prompting of the Service through
a citizen petition.29 Species are proposed, and then listed in final
form, as either threatened or endangered. The distinction be-
tween the two categories of listed species is imprecise. The statute
defines endangered species to mean "any species which is in dan-
ger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its
range... ."30 In contrast, a threatened species is "any species
which is likely to become an endangered species within the fore-
seeable future .... "31 So, endangered species have some unquan-
tified greater risk of extinction in the near term. At the time of list-
ing, endangered species usually have "significantly fewer"
individuals and populations than threatened species.32 Most of
the ESA programs, with the significant exception of the Section 9
prohibitions, treat both categories of listed species identically. As
of October 31, 2001, the Services had listed 976 endangered and
273 threatened species in the United States.33
Critical habitat is defined by the ESA as both the 1) range occu-
pied by the species at the time of listing where features occur that
are essential to recovery and which may require special manage-
ment consideration or protection, and 2) areas outside the range
occupied by the species at the time of listing which are essential
for the conservation of the species.34 When a Service lists a spe-
cies, it also must designate critical habitat "to the maximum extent
prudent and determinable." 3 Despite this statutory mandate,
only 148 listed species had designated critical habitat as of April
13, 2001.36 Unlike the listing decision, which is based solely on the
28. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3) (1994).
30. Id. § 1532(6).
31. Id. § 1532(20).
32. David S. Wilcove et al., What Exactly Is an Endangered Species? An Analysis of the U.S.
Endangered Species List: 1985-1991, 7 CONSERV. BIOLOGY 87, 92 (1993).
33. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Threatened and Endangered Species System Box Score, at
http://ecos.fws.gov/tess/html/boxscore.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A) (1994).
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (1994). Designation of critical habitat is not prudent when 1)
the species is threatened by taking or other human activity, and identification of critical
habitat can be expected to increase this threat, or 2) such designation would not be benefi-
cial to the species. 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a)(1) (1999).
36. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Listed Species with Critical Habitat, at
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best scientific information,37 critical habitat also takes into account
economic and other relevant impacts.38 Although critical habitat
is operationally relevant only under the Section 7 federal duties, it
is the subject of much litigation and controversy. The Clinton and
George W. Bush Administrations have argued repeatedly that
designation of critical habitat is a needless and expensive diver-
sion of agency resources with little to no practical benefit to the
species.39 Because this controversy largely concerns obligations
peripheral to the subject of this article, we will not dwell on criti-
cal habitat.
After listing, the Services also are responsible for developing re-
covery plans.40 The plans are prepared by teams which often in-
dude representatives from other agencies and institutions with in-
formation on or interests in the species. These teams are not
subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act but provide public
notice and review of draft plans.41 Recovery plans, which may
cover more than one species linked by common habitat or threat,
contain three elements. First, each plan contains a description of
"site-specific management actions" necessary for recovery. 42
These actions are divided into three priority levels: urgent tasks
necessary to prevent extinction, tasks that forestall significant fur-
ther decline, and long-term tasks required for full recovery. Sec-
ond, the plan must provide "objective, measurable criteria" for de-
termining when the species has recovered.43 Third, the plan
includes estimates of the time and money required to meet recov-
http://ecos.fws.gov/webpage/webpagecrithab.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2001). As of
1999, the FWS had designated critical habitat for 9% of the species it had listed. Notice of
Intent to Clarify the Role of Habitat in Endangered Species Conservation, 64 Fed. Reg.
31,871, 31,872 (June 14,1999), cited in Holly Doremus, Delisting Endangered Species: An Aspi-
rational Goal, Not a Realistic Expectation, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,434, 10,435
(2000).
37. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1994).
38. Id. § 1533(b)(2).
39. See Heather Weiner, Going Through the Motions: Fish & Wildlife Service's Critical Habitat
Moratorium, 15 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE 40-46 (1998); and Bruce Babbitt, Bush Isn't All
Wrong About the Endangered Species Act, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2001, § 4, at 11. On the desig-
nation and use of critical habitat generally, see James Salzman, Evolution and Application of
Critical Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311 (1990).
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1994). Recovery plans are not required where they would not
promote conservation of the species. Id.
41. Id. §§ 1533(f)(2), (4).
42. Id. § 1533(f)(1)(B)(i).
43. Id. § 1533(f)(1)(B)(ii).
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ery and intermediate goals that lead toward recovery.44 The fi-
nancial estimates are daunting. A 1990 Interior Department re-
port estimated the total cost for recovery of listed species to be
$4.6 billion.45 The number of listed species has doubled since that
time.46
Because recovery of listed species (and the habitat on which
they depend) is the goal of the ESA, it is somewhat surprising that
recovery planning has maintained such a low profile among the
Act's programs. Nonetheless, 975 species had recovery plans as of
October 31, 2001.47 Professor Cheever argues that recovery plans
have played an insignificant role in listed species conservation at
least in part because the Services do not regard the plans as bind-
ing, and courts have refused to compel implementation of plans.48
However, courts require the Services to prepare adequate plans.
For instance, courts have remanded recovery plans to the FWS for
failure to provide objective, measurable criteria for recovery that
addressed the factors on which the listing was based.49 Recovery
plans will become more important as the Services shift their pro-
grammatic emphasis from survival maintenance to long-term con-
servation.
B. Duties of Federal Agencies: Section 7
The ESA imposes special procedural and substantive duties on
federal agencies. These duties, contained in Section 7, can be
summarized as conserve, confer and consult. The duty to consult
44. Id. § 1533(f)(1)(B)(iii).
45. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, REP. NO. 90-
98, AuDrr REPORT: THE ENDANGERED SPECIES PROGRAM 11 (Sept. 1990).
46. Compare id. with U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Number of U.S. Species Listings Per Cal-
endar Year, at http://endangered.fws.gov/stats/list~cy.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2001).
47. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, supra note 33.
48. Federico Cheever, Recovery Planning, the Courts and the Endangered Species Act, 16 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVT 106 (2001); Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of Think-
ing About the Endangered Species Act, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 26, 58-59 (1996). In one celebrated
case, a court refused even to bind the National Park Service to act in a way consistent with
the recovery plan for the conservation of the threatened grizzly bear. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v.
Nat'l Park Service, 669 F. Supp. 384 (D. Wyo. 1987). But see Sierra Club v. Lujan, 36 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1533, 1541 (W.D. Tex., Feb. 1, 1993), appeal dismissed Sierra Club v. Babbitt,
995 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1993), reh'g denied (No. 93-8123, Aug. 11, 1993) (requiring the FWS to
develop and implement a recovery plan).
49. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 130 F. Supp. 2d 121, 133-134 (D.D.C. 2001)
(remanding Sonoran pronghorn recovery plan); Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp.
96, 110-14 (D.D.C. 1995), amended by 967 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1997) (remanding grizzly bear
recovery plan).
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dominated the ESA program for its first two decades, and charac-
terized its principal focus on interagency coordination.
The duty to conserve is an affirmative but nonspecific duty for
agencies to use their authorities to carry out programs to recover
listed speciesS° Although courts consistently hold that the duty to
conserve requires some action, or some reason why the agency
has not acted, they seldom set out precisely what it requires or
rely on it as the sole basis for overturning an agency's decision.5'
The duty is not triggered by any particular action and there are no
procedures provided by the Act for its fulfillment. For all of these
reasons, the duty to conserve has not played a prominent role in
the implementation of the ESA. Although some recent cases show
signs of breathing life into the duty to conserve, 2 it currently re-
mains overshadowed by the overlapping, but separate and more
specific, duty of the Services to prepare recovery plans.
The duty to confer plays an even less important role in the ESA
program. This duty, directed toward the protection of species
proposed to be listed, imposes no substantive standards; it is purely
procedural. The duty requires agencies to confer informally with
the relevant Service on any action that is "likely to jeopardize the
continued existence" of any proposed listed species, or result in
the "destruction or adverse modification" of proposed critical
habitat.5 3 The result of the informal discussion, however, is advi-
sory recommendations that are not binding.5 4 Agencies have no
obligation to prevent jeopardy to proposed species, or to withhold
irretrievable commitments of resources to projects during the con-
ferring process.55 Nonetheless, agencies may abide by the advi-
sory recommendations in order to avoid problems if and when the
proposed listing becomes final.56
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (1994).
51. ROBERT L. FISCHMAN & MARK S. SQUILLACE, ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING:
NEPA AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACr 182-83 (3d ed. 2000). See J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1)
of the "New" Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering and Redefining the Untapped Power of Fed-
eral Agencies' Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENVTL. L. 1107 (1995) (describing how the duty to
conserve may be used as a shield by an agency or as a sword by an agency's critic).
52. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 1998); Sierra Club v. Lujan, 36
Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1533 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 1993), appeal dismissed, 995 F.2d 571 (5th Cir.
1993); House v. U.S. Forest Service, 974 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Ky. 1997).
53. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4) (1994).
54. 50 C.F.R. § 40Z10 (1999).
55. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4) (1994).
56. Agencies may also confer with the Service using more formal procedures akin to the
consultation duty. In that case, so long as there is no new significant information or change
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The ESA Section 7(a)(2) duty to consult is so important because,
unlike the other two federal duties, it combines procedural and
substantive requirements. The procedural component is the con-
sultation itself, which requires the agency considering an action
and the Service to engage in a comprehensive, interdisciplinary
analysis of the effects of the proposed action on affected listed
species and critical habitat. The substantive component requires
all agencies to "insure that any action authorized, funded, or car-
ried out... is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
any... [listed] species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification" of critical habitat.5 7 These requirements work to-
gether to establish a strong foundation for conservation. In an
opinion that has come to typify the judicial response to the consul-
tation mandate, the Ninth Circuit stated:
[TIhe strict substantive provisions of the ESA justify more stringent
enforcement of its procedural requirements, because the procedural
requirements are designed to ensure compliance with the substan-
tive provisions. The ESA's procedural requirements call for a sys-
tematic determination of the effects of a federal project on endan-
gered species. If a project is allowed to proceed without substantial
compliance with those procedural requirements, there can be no as-
surance that a violation of the ESA's substantive provisions will not
result. The latter, of course, is impermissible.58
The Services have promulgated joint regulations implementing
the consultation provision. The regulations build on the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")59 experience of interagency
coordination as a means to bring broad, interdisciplinary envi-
ronmental considerations to bear on an agency interested in ad-
vancing its institutional priorities. Like NEPA, the consultation
duty is triggered when an agency prepares to make any discre-
tionary act-including promulgating regulations; granting i-
cences, permits, or grants; and authorizing programs or projects
that modify the land, air, or water. 60 Although an exemption
to the proposed action, the Service will issue an advisory biological opinion that will be
adopted as a biological opinion under the consultation duty when the proposed listing be-
comes final. 50 C.F.R. § 402.10(d) (1999).
57. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (a)(2) (1994).
58. Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 764 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153
(1978)) (rejecting the Forest Service's contention that the procedural requirements of con-
sultation should be enforced flexibly and loosely, and requiring that the Forest Service pre-
pare a biological assessment).
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(d) (1994).
60. 50 C.F.R § 40202 (1999).
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process in the statute allows certain actions to proceed despite the
jeopardy they pose to a listed species, it is rarely invoked.61
The procedural component of consultation begins when an
agency determines that an action may affect a listed species or
critical habitat.62 If the action is a "major construction activity," or
one having similar impacts (such as a permit for a major construc-
tion activity), then the agency must prepare a biological assess-
ment to determine whether formal consultation is necessary.63 A
biological assessment determines whether any listed or proposed
species, or critical habitat, are likely to be adversely affected by the
action.64 If the agency finds that the action is not likely to ad-
versely affect species or habitat, and the Service concurs, then the
process ends with no further requirements.65
If an agency's biological assessment finds likely adverse affects,
or if the agency did not prepare a biological assessment and the
action may affect a listed species or critical habitat, then the
agency must initiate formal consultation with the relevant Service.
The agency provides the Service with information about the pro-
posed action and other descriptions and analyses related to im-
pacts on listed species and critical habitat.66 The Service then re-
sponds with a biological opinion stating whether the action is
likely to meet the substantive component of the consultation duty:
to avoid jeopardy. 67 If the Service believes that the action would
cause jeopardy, then it issues a "jeopardy opinion" containing
reasonable and prudent alternatives (if any) that would not violate
the consultation duty.68 If the Service finds that the action would
not violate the substantive jeopardy standard, then it issues a "no
jeopardy" biological opinion. The Service will issue an incidental
take statement to shield the agency from liability under Section 9
of the ESA for "no jeopardy" actions, and alternatives, that none-
61. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(1) (1994); 50 C.F.R. pt. 450 (1999). The committee authorized to
grant exemptions under the conditions specified by the Act has met only three times and
granted exemptions only twice (for a dam in 1979 and for a set of timber sales in 1992).
FISCHMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 51, at 216-217.
62. 50 C.F.R. § 40214 (1999).
63. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c) (1994); 50 C.F.R. § 402-12 (1999).
64. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1) (1994); 50 C.F.R. § 402-12(a) (1999).
65. 50 C.F.R. § 402-12(k) (1999).
66. Id. § 40214(c).
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3) (1994).
68. Id. § 1536(b)(3).
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theless involve takes of individuals of the listed species.69 During
the time of the consultation process, the agency may not make any
"irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources" that
would limit the ability to create reasonable and prudent alterna-
tives to the proposed action.70
In a controversial set of definitions, the Services have defined
the substantive component of the jeopardy duty in such a way as
to allow agencies to reduce the long-term recovery prospects of
species.7' According to the Services, "jeopardize the continued ex-
istence of" means "to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the
survival and recovery of a listed species in the wild," either directly
or indirectly.72 This definition essentially ties jeopardy to the re-
duction of the likelihood of survival only, since recovery encom-
passes survival. The National Research Council reported in 1995
that "survival and recovery are not equivalent standards, al-
though they are related. Clearly, if a species does not survive, it
cannot recover. It is less obvious, but still true, that any action
that jeopardizes recovery also decreases the probability of long-
term survival." 73 Nonetheless, the Services do establish a lower
population threshold for survival than for recovery in finding that
the impairment of recovery alone, without jeopardizing survival,
does not trigger jeopardy.74 The regulations similarly limit the
adverse modification component of the statutory substantive duty
to alterations that appreciably diminish the value of critical habitat
for both survival and recovery. 75 So, in contrast to the conserva-
69. Id. §§ 1536(b)(4), (o)(2). The incidental take statement specifies: 1) the impact of the
taking on the species (e.g. the amount and extent), 2) reasonable and prudent measures to
minimize the impact, and 3) terms and conditions that must be complied with to imple-
ment the measures. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (1994); 50 C.F.R § 402.14(i) (1999). Liability un-
der ESA § 9 is discussed infra notes 83-108 and accompanying text.
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (1994).
71. Professor Houck's superb analysis of these regulations is the standard reference for
consultation. Oliver Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S.
Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277,315-329 (1993). See infra notes
222-243 and accompanying text.
72. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1999) (emphasis added).
73. NATIONAL REsEARcH COUNCIL, supra note 12, at 91.
74. Michael C. Blumm and Greg D. Corbin provide an example of the lower survival
threshold for jeopardy (as compared with recovery) in their discussion of a NMFS biologi-
cal opinion concerning hydropower operations on the Columbia River that adversely affect
listed salmon. See Blumm & Corbin, supra note 17, at 593-94. See generally supra notes 507-
511 and accompanying text.
75. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1999). However, the Fifth Circuit recently invalidated the regula-
tory definition of destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat, which requires an
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tion duty, which promotes recovery, the duty to avoid jeopardy,
as implemented, merely prevents actions that reduce the likeli-
hood of survival. Many commentators criticize this regulatory
opinion as too lax.76
The relatively permissive definition of the substantive compo-
nent of the consultation duty is one reason why so few federal ac-
tions evaluated in the consultation process result in a jeopardy
opinion. From 1987 through 1995, of the approximately 186,000
federal actions reviewed by agencies for impacts on listed species,
only 2.7% required formal consultation. Of these 5,046 formal
consultations, only 600 received "jeopardy" opinions. Of these
jeopardy opinions, the FWS identified reasonable and prudent al-
ternatives for all but 100 projects. Of these 100 projects, all but 13
were related to timber sales in spotted owl habitat. Reasonable
and prudent alternatives included changes in the timing of con-
struction, modifications to the project's design, adjustments in site
location, and emission restrictions.77
The consultation duty has dominated the commentary and gen-
erated the greatest amount of litigation under the ESA. Consulta-
tion has proven to be an important lever for environmental
groups to force agencies to rethink projects and permits. The Su-
preme Court set the tone of ESA implementation generally, and
fulfillment of the consultation duty in particular, in its 1978 deci-
sion, Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill.78 This dispute, in which
environmentalists sought to block the completion of the Tellico
Dam, was the first of only two ESA interpretation cases the Su-
preme Court would decide.79 The Court famously held that the
appreciable reduction in the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of the listed spe-
cies. Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 245 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 2001) (interpreting
the ESA to require a lower threshold for a finding of destruction or adverse modification of
critical habitat).
76. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 12, at 91-92, see also Dennis D. Murphy,
An Overview of the National Academy of Sciences Report: Science and the Endangered Species Act,
12 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE No. 9, at 8, 9-10 (1995); Houck, supra note 71, at 299-300,
322-23.
77. FISCHMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 51, at 217. See also Houck, supra note 71, at 318
(finding 18 jeopardy-without-alternatives opinions out of 73,500 informal and formal con-
sultations).
78. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
79. Although the Supreme Court has decided standing cases in suits alleging violation of
the ESA, those decisions did not squarely interpret the Act. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.
154 (1997); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). Both decisions, however,
did contain some discussion of the purpose and operation of the biological opinion. That
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purpose of the Act "was to halt and reverse the trend toward spe-
cies extinction, whatever the cost," and that the language of the
duty to consult "admits of no exception." 80 So, even though the
Telico Dam was nearly complete, it would have to be abandoned
because of the jeopardy it would cause to the continued existence
of the snail darter.81 This strict interpretation of the consultation
duty, as part of the policy of "institutionalized caution,"8 2 pro-
pelled Section 7 to the forefront of ESA programs and made it a
flagship environmental responsibility of the federal government.
C. General Prohibitions: Section 9
Like the federal agency duty to conserve, the Section 9 prohibi-
tions themselves are purely substantive. However, unlike the
duty to conserve, they are negative prohibitions, not affirmative
obligations. Also, the general prohibitions apply not only to fed-
eral agencies, but also to all "persons," defined broadly to include
individuals, corporations, and state or federal agencies.83 Many of
the general prohibitions relate to commerce in listed species and
their parts, including delivery, shipping, transportation, and im-
port/export. This part will focus on the prohibitions that relate
more directly to situations where prohibited activities are con-
ducted for purposes other than harvesting listed species or their
products for captivity, sale, trade, or direct use. This part, like this
article, is more concerned with liability for activities that inciden-
tally impact listed species in the pursuit of some other objective,
such as logging, residential development, and recreation.
The ESA itself sets out specific prohibitions only for endangered
species, not threatened species. Unlike the federal duties in Sec-
tion 7, which do not distinguish between threatened and endan-
gered species, Section 9 (through Section 4(d)) gives the Services
discretion to promulgate regulations setting out prohibitions that
apply to threatened species. 84 The ESA gives the Services power
discussion, however, has not been influential in the development of ESA programs.
80. TVA, 437 U.S. 173, at 184. Congress subsequently added the narrowly cabined ex-
emption to the "no jeopardy" consultation standard in 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat.
3751 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(1)). See supra note 61 (mentioning exemption process).
81. Despite the Court's decision, the Tennessee Valley Authority ultimately completed
the dam pursuant to appropriations legislation excepting the project from the ESA.
82. TVA, 437 U.S. at 194.
83. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (1994).
84. Id. §§ 1538(a)(1)(G), (2)(E).
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to issue such "4(d) rules" as they deem "necessary and advisable
to provide for the conservation" of threatened species.85 This dis-
cretion to tailor prohibitions to the specific circumstances of a par-
ticular threatened species provides the flexibility to design a
framework for planning and regulation that is no more stringent
than required by a particular species' recovery needs.
The FWS has promulgated blanket rules extending all of the
Section 9 prohibitions for endangered species to threatened spe-
cies unless the agency issues a specific 4(d) rule applicable to a
particular threatened species.86 The NMFS has not employed this
blanket approach and only prohibits whatever it specifically de-
termines for each threatened species under its jurisdiction.8 7
Nonetheless, the specific rules promulgated by NMFS for indi-
vidual threatened species do include the Section 9 prohibitions for
endangered species, with some enumerated exceptions.8a We will
return to the 4(d) rule after reviewing the statutory prohibitions
for endangered species to provide a basis for comparison.
In contrast to the federal duties, which do not distinguish
among the taxa of listed species, the general statutory prohibitions
for endangered species apply more protectively to animals than to
plants. This disparity grows out of the common law traditions of
real property, wherein plants, such as trees, are considered part of
the fee simple estate. In contrast, a landowner over whose prop-
erty wild animals may roam does not own the animals.89
So, apart from the commercial prohibitions on import, export,
delivery, transportation, and the like, it is illegal to remove, cut,
dig up, or damage or destroy an endangered plant only in know-
ing violation of any state law or regulation, or in the course of any
violation of state criminal trespass law.90 Landowners, therefore,
face no direct ESA liability for destroying endangered plants, only
derivative liability dependent on state proscriptions. Most states,
though, do not restrict the taking of endangered plants. However,
a handful do. In that group of seven to ten states, federal law may
85. Endangered Species Act § 4(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1994).
86. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.31 (for animals), 17.71 (for plants) (1999).
87. Permits for Incidental Taking of Endangered Marine Species, 55 Fed. Reg. 20,603,
20,603-604 (May 18, 1990).
88. These rules are promulgated at 50 C.F.R. § 223 (1999).
89. BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 21, at 225 n.158.
90. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2) (1994).
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be used to enforce the substantive state restrictions.91
On federal lands, however, it is unlawful to "remove and reduce
to possession" or "maliciously damage or destroy" endangered
plants.92 Incidental destruction, though, through grazing, logging,
or some other activity with an aim unrelated to the trampled en-
dangered plant, is not prohibited under the ESA. For all of these
reasons, endangered plant prohibitions seldom trigger contro-
versy or enforcement actions.
The statutory prohibitions protecting endangered animals, on
the other hand, are much broader. They are the basis for much of
the demand for permits and exceptions fueling the recent ESA
programs. The key provision with broad application prohibits the
"take" of endangered animals.93 The Act defines "take" as "har-
ass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or col-
lect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."94 Of these
terms defining take, "harm" and "harass" are the broadest, en-
compassing incidental effects of activities whose principal goal,
such as logging or construction, is sanctioned by law. The FWS
has defined these terms and, though the definition of harass is in
certain respects more broad,95 "harm" has become the pressure
point limiting habitat disrupting activities. Until recently, the
NMFS had not promulgated regulations defining the terms of
take, and proceeded through case-by-case determinations. In 1999,
however, the NMFS adopted a definition of harm modeled after
the one promulgated by the FWS.96
91. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Protecting Endangered Species Without Regulating Private Landown-
ers: The Case of Endangered Plants, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 1, 10-16 (1998). Seven states,
Guam, and the Virgin Islands prohibit even landowners from taking protected species.
Many more states prohibit the taking of protected species without the permission of the
landowner. Id.
92. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2) (1994).
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1994). Importantly, Section 9 also imposes indirect liability
on those who cause a take "to be committed." 16 U.S.C. § 1538(g) (1994).
94. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994).
95. Under 50 C.F.R. § 17.3, harassment, as compared to harm, includes omissions as well
as acts, and requires only the likelihood of injury, not actual injury. See BEAN & ROWLAND,
supra note 21, at 224. This "sleeper" regulation may soon eclipse the harm definition as the
basis for potential liability and incentives to cooperate in ESA programs, such as permits
and comprehensive conservation plans. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Where Environmental
Law and Biology Meet: Of Panda's Thumbs, Statutory Sleepers, and Effective Law, 65 U. COLO. L.
REV. 25 (1993). Steven G. Davison, Alteration of Wildlife Habitat As a Prohibited Taking Under
the Endangered Species Act, 10 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 155 (1995) provides a history of the
harm and harass definitions.
96. Endangered & Threatened Wildlife and Plants, Definition of "Harm", 64 Fed. Reg.
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The FWS defines harm as "an act which actually kills or injures
wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by signifi-
cantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding,
feeding or sheltering."97 A 1995 Supreme Court decision, Babbitt
v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,98 upheld
this definition against a facial challenge.99 The precise meaning of
the regulation, as applied to particular fact situations, was the sub-
ject of debate among the justices in the Sweet Home decision and
continues to be debated by lower courts.10 0 Nonetheless, it seems
clear that harm may "occur indirectly, through a foreseeable chain
of causation." 101
For instance, logging in suitable nesting habitat for the threat-
ened marbled murrelet, in an area where many birds were de-
tected displaying nesting behavior, constitutes prohibited harm of
the bird.102 The Ninth Circuit found that impairment of breeding
by logging habitat does actually injure birds.103 The court also
found that demonstrating past or present harm is not necessary
for injunctive relief under the Act; imminent threat of future harm
can be a basis for an order prohibiting a harm-causing activity.104
On the other hand, the construction of a lounge, restaurant and
hotel development would not harm the endangered Perdido Key
60,727,60,731 (Nov. 8,1999) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 222.102) (2000).
97. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1999). The NMFS definition adds the terms "spawning," "rearing,"
and "migrating" to the list of essential behavioral patterns. 64 Fed. Reg. 60,727, 60,731
(Nov. 8,1999).
98. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
99. Subsequent circuit court decisions have upheld takings prohibitions as applied, but
with dissents. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Gibbs v.
Norton, 121 S. Ct. 1081 (2001); Natl Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C.
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). The recent Supreme Court decision casting
doubt on Congress' commerce clause authority to regulate isolated wetlands raises new
questions about the constitutionality of the broad prohibition on harm. Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001).
100. For a discussion of recent interpretations and applications of the taking prohibition
after Sweet Home, see Michael Bean, The Endangered Species Act and Private Land: Four Lessons
Learned from the Past Quarter Century, 28 EnvtI. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,701 (1998); Murray
D. Feldman & Michael J. Brennan, Judicial Application of the Endangered Species Act and the
Implications for Takings of Protected Species and Private Property, 26 Envt. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,646, 10649-50 (1996). See also Pala v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 73 F.
Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Haw. 1999).
101. BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 21, at 221.
102. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996).
103. Id. at 1067.
104. Id. at 1064.
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Beach mouse.105 A district court found too attenuated the causal
links between the project and the factors which might harm the
mouse. The court determined that the development itself was not
on mouse habitat. Allegations that the development would intro-
duce a significant number of cats, which prey on the mice, re-
quired "an incredible leap of logic."106 In addition, the court held
that the defendant should not be responsible for the maintenance
of an adjacent public park in such a way as to prevent trampling
the dunes essential to the mouse's survival. Even if the develop-
ment would increase use of the public beach, the trampling could
be minimized by the state through boardwalks, signs, and use re-
strictions.107
There is substantial support for prominent ESA commentator
Michael Bean's assertion that taking prohibition decisions reflect
"strikingly different reasoning" and "add up to considerable con-
fusion about the circumstances under which habitat modification"
runs afoul of the law.0 8 However, the burgeoning demand for in-
cidental take permits, described in the following part, illustrates
that there are many situations where habitat modification has a
high enough probability of causing prohibited harm to prompt a
landowner to take mitigating action. This is particularly remark-
able given the rarity of monitoring and enforcement of the taking
prohibition.
D. Incidental Take Permits
Although the prohibitions in Section 9 and Section 4(d) apply to
everyone generally, there are important exceptions. First, as al-
ready mentioned, activities covered by a "no jeopardy" biological
opinion are shielded from Section 9 liability to the extent specified
in the incidental take statement. 09 Second, certain subsistence ac-
tivities by Alaska natives" 0 and certain activities for which the
application of the general prohibitions would cause "undue eco-
105. Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F. Supp. 424 (S.D. Ala. 1992).
106. Id. at 431.
107. Id.
108. Bean, supra note 100, at 10703. Among the cases Bean cites are ones where courts
required more than statistical evidence to link a habitat modification to a harm. See also J.B.
Ruhl, How to Kill Endangered Species, Legally- The Nuts and Bolts of Endangered Species Act
"HCP" Permits for Real Estate Development, 5 ENVrL. LAW. 345 (1999) (reviewing litigation
applying the harm prohibition).
109. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(b)(4), (o)(2) (1994); 50 C.F.R 402-14(i) (1999).
110. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e) (1994).
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nomic hardship""' enjoy narrow exemptions. Third, the Services
issue permits to allow takes incidental to legitimate scientific and
conservation projects.112 Finally, though the statute does not ex-
empt these takes, it does provide a defense for liability stemming
from actions taken to protect a human from bodily harm." 3
The most important exception to the general prohibitions, how-
ever, is the incidental take permit of Section 10(a) that allows take
under prescribed conditions in exchange for a habitat conserva-
tion plan ("HCP")."4 This permit program has been the most im-
portant development in ESA implementation over the past decade
as attention has shifted from federal programs to the private ac-
tivities that impair species recovery. The next part of this article
discusses in greater detail this shift in emphasis. This art sketches
out the basic framework for incidental take permits and HCPs.
The HCP is the part of the permit that has received the greatest
attention because, in part, its name promises a more comprehen-
sive approach to recovery than the federal project modifications
spurred by Section 7. Unfortunately, the incidental take permit
program has not been implemented to realize fully this potential.
To receive an incidental take permit, an applicant must prepare an
HCP that specifies:
1. the impact of the taking;
2. steps to minimize and mitigate the impact;
3. the funding to implement the steps;
4. what alternative actions to the taking the applicant consid-
ered and the reasons why they were not taken; and
5. other measures that the Services may require as being nec-
essary or appropriate for the purposes of the plan.n5
After a public comment period, the Service must decide
whether to issue a permit. Although the Act lists a number of re-
quirements that, if fulfilled, mandate the issuance of a permit, the
Services retain a fair amount of discretion to condition issuance
upon the applicant's acceptance of terms and conditions to carry
out the purposes of the HCP.116 To issue a permit, the Service
must first find that:
111. Id. § 1539(b).
112 Id. § 1539(a)(1).
113. Id. § 1540(a)(3).
114. Id. § 1539(a)(2).
115. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
116. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(v).
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1. the taking will be incidental;
2. the applicant will minimize and mitigate impacts to the
maximum extent practicable;
3. the applicant will ensure adequate funding for the plan;
4. the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the
survival and recovery of the species; and
5. the other measures that the Services deemed appropriate
for the HCP will be met."7
Although a permitting program, Section 10(a) also seeks to fos-
ter "creative partnerships between the private sector and all levels
of government in the interests of protected species and habitat
conservation." 118 Congress created the permit program in 1982 at
the request of a coalition of developers, municipal governments,
and a local environmental organization. These groups had
reached an agreement to allow some harm to the endangered mis-
sion blue butterfly from a new housing development at San Bruno
Mountain, California, in exchange for a habitat preservation and
enhancement agreement.119 Permits covering large-scale devel-
opments, such as the San Bruno agreement, continue to include
HCPs hammered out by multiple parties and involving the public.
On the other hand, many permits cover small areas, an acre or
less. These smaller permits, often for the construction or im-
provement of a single house, are issued with less broad public
participation. 120 Even some large, single-landowner HCPs result
from entirely private negotiations between the owner and the Ser-
vice.'2 ' Although the Act requires an opportunity for public
comment on a permit application,122 it is difficult to inject new in-
formation, interests or ideas once the draft HCP has been negoti-
117. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B).
118. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE AND U.S. NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE,
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING AND INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT PROCESSING HANDBOOK,
Foreward (1996) [hereinafter HABITAT CONSERVATION HANDBOOK].
119. Conference Report on Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 97-835, at 30-32 (1982). See also Albert C. Lin, Participants' Experiences with Habitat
Conservation Plans and Suggestions for Streamlining the Process, 23 ECOLOGY. L.Q. 369 (1996).
The court upheld the San Bruno Mountain permit and HCP in Friends of Endangered Spe-
cies v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1985).
120. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, FRAYED SAFETY NET: CONSERVATION PLANNING UNDER THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 44 (1998) (citing examples).
121. Id. at 43-44 (citing, as examples, the Weyerhaeuser Willamette HCP for 400,000 acres
and the Plum Creek Timber Company HCP for 170,000 acres for timber management).
122. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B) (1994).
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ated.123
The Act provides the Services broad discretion to create re-
quirements for HCPs that may be "appropriate,"124 but the Ser-
vices have limited the standard for approving HCPs to the Section
7 "no jeopardy" definition. 25 Because the Services must fulfill
their Section 7(a)(2) duty to consult before issuing a permit, the
Services' interpretation of the Section 10 permit standard adds lit-
tle to recover species.126 The statutory standard for approving
permits mirrors the regulatory definition of jeopardy with the one
exception that Section 10 does not use the word "both" to modify
"the survival and recovery" that the taking must not appreciably
reduce.127 The Services interpret this standard in their handbook
on habitat conservation planning:
Issuance of a Section 10 permit must not "appreciably reduce" the
likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild.
Note that this does not explicitly require an HCP to recover listed
species, or contribute to their recovery objectives outlined in a re-
covery plan. This reflects the fact that HCPs were designed by Con-
gress to authorize incidental take, not to be mandatory recovery
tools.128
Although the Handbook encourages applicants to develop
HCPs that contribute to recovery, it is not a requirement.129
Courts have accepted the Services' interpretation that the "appre-
ciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery" stan-
dard, like the jeopardy standard, requires only that survival not be
significantly impaired.130 A number of commentators have identi-
fied this survival standard as an important weakness of the ESA
123. John Kostyack, Surprise! ENVrL. F., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 19, 23, 27-28. See the discus-
sion of public participation infra notes 568-82 and accompanying text.
124. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A) (1994).
125. See supra notes 115-118 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 512-516 and accompanying text.
127. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B) with 50 C.F.R. § 40202 (1999).
128. HABITAT CONSERVATION HANDBOOK, supra note 118, at 3-20.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 15 F. Supp.2d 1274, 1279 (S.D. Ala. 1998) (invalidat-
ing two HCPs for inadequate mitigation but characterizing the overall standard as "not
appreciably reduce the likelihood of survival"); Friends of Endangered Species v. Jantzen,
760 F.2d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding the San Bruno Mountain HCP and stating that
the Act's requirement is to "not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival of the
species"). Although the Services have promulgated through notice and comment rulemak-
ing only some provisions of the handbook, courts have begun to rely on it in interpreting
the permit program. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 15 F. Supp.2d at 1282.
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permitting program.131 We explore this issue in greater detail in
Section VI(A)(2), infra.
The other statutory standard that has generated considerable
controversy is the requirement that the permit applicant "mini-
mize and mitigate" the impact of the incidental take "to the
maximum extent practicable." 132 In the first significant judicial
remand of an incidental take permit, an Alabama district court in-
validated two HCPs for high density housing complexes in the
habitat of the endangered Alabama beach mouse.133 The HCPs
required the developers to commit a specific amount of money for
off-site mitigation to acquire and protect habitat for the mouse.
This kind of off-site compensation, often collected through impact
fees, is typical of HCPs dealing with residential development The
court, however, found that the Service "failed to support the level
or amount of off-site mitigation funding with a clearly articulated
analysis demonstrating whether the amount or level of funding is
rationally based on relevant facts."134 In this case, the facts were
particularly bad for the Service because the biological opinion on
the permit expressed concern over the level of mitigation and be-
cause prior HCPs dealing with the Alabama beach mouse incor-
porated mitigation at levels inconsistent with the challenged per-
mits.135
More recently, in the only other judicial opinion to overturn an
incidental take permit, a California district court invalidated an
HCP deal to allow development in the Natomas Basin, adjacent to
Sacramento, while retaining habitat for a listed giant garter
snake.136 Citing the Alabama beach mouse case, the court found
that the HCP failed to comply with ESA Section 10(a)(2)(A) crite-
ria for mitigation and adequate funding. In addition, the court
131. See, e.g., Peter Aengst et al., Introduction to Habitat Conservation Planning, 14
ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE No. 7-8, at 9 (1998); Patrick Parenteau, Rearranging the Deck
Chairs: Endangered Species Act Reforms in an Era of Mass Extinction, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y REv. 227, 293-294 (1998); Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat Conservation Planning: Ad-
dressing the Achilles Heel of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 279, 311-313
(1998).
132. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1994).
133. Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 15 F. Supp.2d 1274 (S.D. Ala. 1998).
134. Id. at 1281.
135. Id. at 1280-1282. In contrast, Friends of Endangered Species v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976
(9th Cir. 1985) (upholding the San Bruno Mountain HCP), found a similar scheme of mini-
mization and mitigation to be adequate where it was the result of long, inclusive negotia-
tions and was unsupported by field studies of the endangered butterfly.
136. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
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found the Service's "no jeopardy" determination to be arbitrary
and capricious because it assumed broader participation in the
plan than the actual, current commitments of the involved juris-
dictions. The court insisted that where mitigation for development
in one jurisdiction depends on habitat conservation in another ju-
risdiction, some form of regional planning is required.137 The
overarching flaw of the Natomas Basin permit, that it relied on
wishful assumptions of future participation and orderly develop-
ment, is common in HCPs. The Natomas Basin and the beach
mouse cases limit the latitude afforded the parties in the permit
negotiation, and help endangered species advocates, who are of-
ten unable to participate in the permit negotiations and must rely
on judicially enforceable standards to advance their interests.
Even more controversial has been the initiatives of the Clinton
Administration to promote more HCPs and incidental take per-
mits. The best known, most important, and typical of these initia-
tives is the "no surprises" policy. This policy provides incidental
take permit holders with long-term security. The "no surprises"
assurance means that no changed circumstance or new informa-
tion about a species covered by the HCP will create any additional
obligation for the permittee through the life of the permit, which
may run up to a century. Therefore, a permittee will not. be liable
for additional land or financial compensation beyond the level of
mitigation that was negotiated in the HCP. The public and the
Services bear the risk of unforeseen circumstances. 138 Defenders
of the policy argue that certainty is among the most important
characteristics of a permit that induces participation in the HCP
program. 39 Opponents counter that, in situations where flexible
adaptive management is more appropriate, the policy freezes into
place untested and largely unmonitored assumptions about biol-
ogy. 140 We explore this controversy in greater detail in Section
VI(A)(4), infra.
137. Id. at 1291. See also John Kostyack, NWF v. Babbitt: Victory for Smart Growth and Im-
periled Wildlife, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,712, 10,715 (2001).
138. Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances ("No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859
(Feb. 23,1998); HABITAT CONSERVATION HANDBOOK, supra note 118, at 3-29.
139. See, e.g., Fred Bosselman, The Statutory and Constitutional Mandate for a No Surprises
Policy, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707 (1997); J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for Adminis-
trative Reform of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVrL. J. 367,397-98 (1998).
140. See, e.g., John Kostyack, The Need for HCP Reform: Five Points of Consensus, 16
ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE No. 3, at 47, 50-51 (1999); Kostyack, supra note 123, at 19; Par-
enteau, supra note 131, at 293-301; Sheldon, supra note 131, at 319-320.
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IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ESA PROGRAM: CONVERGENCE WITH
POLLUTION CONTROL LAW AND THE ROLE OF COOPERATIVE
FEDERALISM
Describing the ESA itself only tells part of the story of federal
endangered species protection law. The programs the Services
adopt to implement the Act and the relative priorities placed on
various authorities in the Act determine how well words on paper
translate into real conservation. This section describes how the
most prominent programs under the ESA have evolved. Part of
that story is a movement from the traditional tools of resource
management to the approaches of pollution control. Cooperative
federalism, a prominent feature of pollution control law, is an
emerging important feature of the ESA program.
A. Trends in Implementation: Toward the Pollution Control
Paradigm
The first era in the development of the ESA program focused on
prohibitions and interagency consultation. Best symbolized by the
first of the two U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
ESA, Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,141 this era concerned itself
with the construction of the ESA Section 7 duties of federal agen-
cies. Echoing NEPA impact analysis in its concern with evaluat-
ing the effects of proposed federal actions on listed species, this
initial period culminated in the "train wreck" of federal timber
sales in the Pacific Northwest habitat of the threatened northern
spotted owl. Of course, the Services principally charged with im-
plementing and enforcing the Act also spent considerable time
and resources building the technical and regulatory framework to
support the basic tasks of listing species and planning for species
recovery. But, consulting with "action" agencies on the likelihood
of jeopardy emerged as the quintessential manifestation of the
ESA program.
Unlike its companion in environmental analysis, NEPA, the
ESA operated most powerfully through the substantive duty of
federal agencies to avoid jeopardizing the continued existence of
listed species. In his landmark study of the earliest years of the
ESA, Professor Steven Yaffee could concisely sum up the gist of
141. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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the statutory program as "prohibitive policy." 142 Yaffee's term
neatly captures the thrust of the TVA v. Hill opinion, which found
the proscription against jeopardy to "admit to no exception." 143
This focus on federal compliance limited the attainment of spe-
cies recovery because many of the threats to the continued exis-
tence of species were neither authorized, funded, nor carried out
by federal agencies. Though the federal compliance focus reached
private activities that required federal licenses or some other kind
of discretionary agency approval, most habitat degradation con-
tinued to occur on private lands outside the reach of the Section 7
and jeopardy standards. Also, because land use regulation is pri-
marily a function of state and state-enabled local government,
most land development rules and incentives were outside the
reach of the flagship ESA program. In 1994, the General Account-
ing Office highlighted the importance of privately owned habitat
when it reported that over 90 percent of listed species had some or
all of their habitat outside of federal lands.' 44
Moreover, prohibitive policy is awfully strong medicine. Strin-
gent adherence to the policy risked political backlash in Congress.
Certainly, one of the reasons for the shift away from prohibitive
policy in 1993 was the inauguration of an administration that
sought to keep Congress from weakening the Act. Also, where a
statute provides little space for agencies to back away from draco-
nian regulation, the targets of regulation have "powerful incen-
tives to fight regulation wherever they can."145 The embattled
agency, then, has a similarly great incentive to avoid implementa-
tion or enforcement that will unleash another hostile response. 46
142. YAFFEE, supra note 10.
143. TVA, 437 U.S. at 173. Another frequently used characterization of TVA's stringent
interpretation of the ESA is that "[tihe language, history, and structure of the [Act] indi-
cates beyond doubt that Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest
of priorities." See, e.g., Loggerhead Turtle v. Council of Volusia County, 148 F.3d 1231,1246
(11th Cir. 1998) remanded to 92 F. Supp.2d 1296 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (citing TVA, 437 U.S. at
174).
144. U.S. GENERAL ACCOuNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: INFORMATION ON
SPECIES PROTECTION ON NONFEDERAL LANDS (GAO/ RCED-95-16) 1, 4-5 (1994). The report
also found that 66% of listed species have over 60 percent of their total habitat on nonfed-
eral lands. Id. at 1. The largest nonfederal landowner category is privately owned land. Id.
at 6. For a general description of the private land endangered species conservation prob-
lem generally, see Bean, supra note 100; J.B. Ruhl, The Endangered Species Act and Private
Property: A Matter of Timing and Location, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 37 (1998).
145. Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 630 (1991).
146. Id.
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Therefore, the Services have been reluctant to declare outright
opposition to proposed federal actions. Due to the Services' rela-
tive political weakness compared to the action agencies 147 as well
as their desire to negotiate compromises, the invocation of prohi-
bition through jeopardy opinions remains exceedingly rare. Pro-
fessor Cheever adds that:
The relative prominence of the Act's prohibitive mandates in the
eyes of scholars, courts, and the public prevents it from educating
people about the need for species preservation. When discussion fo-
cuses on whether Section 9 prohibits logging in the Pacific North-
west or Section 7 prevents construction of a federal dam, the under-
lying justification for the Endangered Species Act-that prudence
dictates that we preserve the biological diversity on which we de-
pend-is obscured.148
As an antidote to the prohibitory focus of the ESA, Cheever
urges a shift in focus to the recovery mandates of the Act. While
Cheever does not identify the 4(d) rule as a vehicle for this change,
he has identified the existing, but largely dormant, principle of the
ESA that needs to be awakened. Though underscored by the
stated congressional purpose of the act,149 the Section 4 recovery
plan mandate,15° and the Section 7 duty to conserve,' 5' the Services
have lost sight of the recovery objective and have implemented
programs that fail to make progress toward recovery.
Beginning in 1993, the Clinton Administration ushered in a new,
more flexible, permitting era that transformed the implementation
of the ESA. Recall that Congress amended the ESA in 1982 to
provide incidental take permits and endorse a negotiated conser-
vation and land development plan in San Bruno Mountain, Cali-
fornia. Up until 1992, the Services had issued only 14 permits.152
Then, in the first three years of the Clinton Administration, the
Services issued about 100 permits. 5 3 By 2001, the Services had
approved 379 habitat conservation plans in 524 incidental take
147. See JEANNE NIENABER CLARKE & DANIEL McCOOL, STAKING OUT THE TERRAIN:
POWER AND PERFORMANCE AMONG NATURAL RESOURCE AGENCIES 119-125 (2d ed. 1996).
148. Cheever, The Road to Recovery, supra note 48, at 28 (footnote omitted).
149. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
150. Id. § 1533(f).
151. Id. § 1536(a)(1).
152 HABITAT CONSERVATION HANDBOOK, supra note 118, at L
153. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, The HCP Approach (1999) at
http://endangered.fws.gov/esb/95/hcpapp.htnl (last visited Nov. 10, 2001) reprinted from
William Lehman, Reconciling Conflicts Through Habitat Conservation Planning, XX ENDAN-
GERED SPECIES BULLETIN.
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
permits covering approximately 20 million acres and protecting
200 listed species.5 4 Two hundred more plans are currently in
development.'55  The second of the two U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sions interpreting the ESA, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Com-
munities for a Great Oregon,5 6 which upheld the Fish and Wildlife
Service's definition of certain forms of habitat modification as
prohibited takes (needing permits), symbolizes the focus of this
era.
Murray Feldman and Michael Brennan have characterized the
shift from TVA to Sweet Home as a movement in emphasis from
individual species and specific projects to multi-species habitat
conservation.5 7 Their observation reflects the insight that Sweet
Home's importance lay not so much in defining the precise pa-
rameters of a harm to an individual of a listed species that might
constitute a prohibited taking. Rather, its significance was endors-
ing the regulation that forces sponsors of habitat altering activities
to apply for permits from the Services. 58 However, Feldman and
Brennan overstate the multi-species aspect of the shift represented
by Sweet Home. Certainly, the Services prefer multi-species, com-
prehensive, large-area habitat conservation plans to serve as the
basis for permits. But, the Services are largely limited to reacting
to permit applications. The fact of the matter is that few permits
provide multi-species habitat conservation.15 9 So, while a shift to
multi-species habitat conservation is a desirable goal, the inciden-
tal take permit program is a weak vehicle for reaching that desti-
nation. Furthermore, the standard for approving incidental take
permits is not conservation, or recovery, but the absence of a like-
lihood of appreciably reducing the species' survival.
We must be careful not to overstate Sweet Home's importance
154. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Habitat Conservation Plans, at
http://ecos.fws.gov/hcp-report/hcp-summary.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2001); U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, Endangered Species Habitat Conservation Planning, at
http://endangered.fws.gov/hcp/index.htn1 (last visited Nov. 10, 2001).
155. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, supra note 153.
156. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
157. Murray D. Feldman & Michael J. Brennan, Judicial Application of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act and the Implications for Takings of Protected Species and Private Property, 26 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,646, 10,648-49 (1996).
158. At roughly the same time, the new EPA stormwater construction permit program
encouraged developers to seek HCP approval so that they could more easily fulfill the
stormwater permit requirements. Ruhl, supra note 108. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.26 (2001).
Stormwater permitting is now an important driving force behind the increase in HCPs.
159. See infra note 525 and accompanying text.
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while recognizing its significance in symbolizing the shift in the
focus of the ESA program. While Sweet Home may have stiffened
the burden of proof for proving causation in a harm claim under
Section 9, it certainly strengthened deference to Service determi-
nations of what constitutes a harm. In HCP negotiations, the post-
Sweet Home Service, in the absence of contradictory information,
could insist on a bottom line, such as ten acres of disturbance,
above which habitat degradation would rise to the level of a take.
Sweet Home did, however, reflect the transformation in the way
the Services viewed the Section 9 prohibition against take. In the
earlier era, the prohibition usually represented a threshold activi-
ties could not cross. In the permitting era, the prohibition became
the incentive for people to come to the Service and propose habi-
tat conservation plans in order to engage in activities resulting in
incidental take. Viewed from this perspective, implementation of
the ESA shifted to a pollution control model.160 Just as the Clean
Water Act prohibition on the "discharge of any pollutant"161 oper-
ates primarily as a basis for requiring dischargers to conduct their
activities in accordance with permits, the ESA prohibition against
take became a basis for closer regulation of habitat degradation.
Similar to the manner in which the discharge prohibition func-
tions as a tool primarily to control rather than eliminate the addi-
tion of pollutants to water (though elimination is a stated objective
of the Clean Water Act),162 the take prohibition now functions as a
tool to control habitat degradation rather than prevent it.
The important gap in this analogy between the ESA and a clas-
sic pollution control statute is that there remains in the ESA a lar-
ger disparity between the capability of the permitting program
and the ultimate goal of the Act, recovery of the ecosystems upon
which listed species depend.163 In the Clean Water Act, the dis-
parity between permitting and eliminating discharge slowly
closes as technology-based effluent standards set zero discharge
limits unless they are not economically feasible. Also, ambient
water quality standards are designed to promote incremental im-
provements over time, which may further reduce discharges. 164 In
160. J.B. Ruhl has made a similar observation. See Ruhl, supra note 108.
161. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994).
162 Id. at § 1251 (a) (1).
163. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
164. One must be careful to avoid comparing the ESA program, in practice, to the Clean
Water Act program, in design. In practice, the water program has struggled to promote
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the ESA, the Services do not require incidental take permits to
make progress toward recovery.165 The incidental take permit re-
quirements are more oriented toward mitigating harm to species
than toward improving their status. This is one important reason
why the next step in the development of the ESA program should
be the adoption of permit standards that demand progress toward
species recovery.
B. The Role of State and Local Government Cooperative
Federalism
Another weakness of the ESA program revealed by comparing
it to pollution control law is the lack of cooperative federalism. Since
1970, pollution control legislation has given states an important
role in implementation.166 States typically are responsible both for
issuing permits (e.g. Pollutant Discharge Elimination System per-
mits for water pollution control)167 and designing comprehensive
plans (e.g. state implementation plans to reduce air pollution)68
under guidelines set by the federal government. States and locali-
ties that fail to meet the federal minimum standards may not re-
ceive authority under federal law to create a plan or run a pro-
gram that qualifies for the benefits under the federal statute.169
incremental improvements over time. See ROBERT W. ADLER ET. AL, THE CLEAN WATER Acr
20 YEARS LATER (1993); OLIVER HoUcK, THE CLEAN WATER AcT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW,
POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION (EnvtL L. Inst. 1999); Oliver Houck, Of BATs, Birds, and B-A-
T, The Convergent Evolution of Environmental Law, 63 MISS. L.J. 403 (1994). But, the Clean
Water Act program is nonetheless more highly evolved than the ESA program in maintain-
ing incentives for and achieving some continual progress toward statutory goals.
165. HABITAT CONSERVATION HANDBOOK, supra note 118, at 3-20.
166. For descriptions of how cooperative federalism works in pollution control law, see
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 6.02 (Sheldon M.
Novick ed., 2000) [hereinafter LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION]; ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW INSTITUTE, SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.2(A) (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al.
eds., 1993); David Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a "Reinvented"
State/Federal Relationship: the Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. L. REV 1, 30-44
(2000); Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots & Contemporary Models,
54 MD. L. REV. 1141,1174-78 (1995).
167. The statutes and their permit programs that dominate this area are the Clean Air
Act, especially Title V permitting, 42 U.S.C. § 7661-7661(0, CAA §§ 501-507; the Clean Wa-
ter Act, especially NPDES permitting, 33 U.S.C. § 1342, FWPCA § 402; and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, primarily solid waste disposal permitting, 42 U.S.C. §§
6941-6949(a). States operate their qualifying programs under comparable state laws.
168. See infra notes 468 - 489 for a discussion of state implementation plans.
169. Several states have never received EPA authorization to run permit programs under
federal pollution control statutes. LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 166, §
6.02[1] n.8. However, the EPA has never withdrawn authorization from state programs,
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The federal government must then operate the program directly
or develop the plan for the state. The federal government contin-
ues to possess independent enforcement authority even in states
that have authorized programs.170
States and local jurisdictions have several incentives to work
with the federal government to seek federal authorization for
these pollution control programs. First, although they do not en-
joy unbounded discretion under federal oversight, states do gain a
fair amount of leeway in tailoring the program to their particular
needs and goals. Second, through grants and cooperative agree-
ments, participating states can get federal money."" Finally, the
constituents of state and local governments frequently prefer to
deal directly with their local governments than with federal agen-
cies. Likewise, these state and local governments generally be-
lieve themselves to be less bureaucratic and more responsive to
the needs of their area than the federal agencies.
For these reasons, despite its sometimes messy and redundant
administrative framework, cooperative federalism has proven to
be one of the most enduring characteristics of pollution control
law over the past three decades. Nonetheless, the ESA program
has yet to realize the potential of cooperative federalism.172 Our
recommendations for the implementation of the Section 4(d) pro-
gram aim to enlist the strengths of cooperative federalism to re-
cover species.
once approved. Id. at § 6.02[3]. On the other hand, the EPA has intervened (albeit reluc-
tantly) to write federal implementation plans for states that have failed to submit adequate
state plans for controlling air pollution. See, e.g., id. at § 11.02[4][b] [iii] n.184.
170. LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 166, § 6.02[3]. Recent litigation
explores the limits of this authority. See Harmon Indus. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir.
1999) (RCRA does not allow the federal government to "overfile" an enforcement action on
a matter that the state and the polluter have resolved through a consent decree).
171. In the case of the state implementation plan program of the Clean Air Act, states
may lose federal highway grants if they fail to fulfill their role in the cooperative frame-
work. 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1) (2001).
172. Professor Tarlock has noted that the decentralized and site-specific character of
biodiversity protection calls for local controls on land use. Tarlock, Local Government
Protection of Biodiversity, supra note 2, at 557-558. See also Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing
Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996) (summarizing the merits of central
and decentralized control of behavior to achieve environmental goals); Richard B. Stewart,
Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National
Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1210-1222 (1976) (seminal article reviewing
federalism issues in environmental law); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional
Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 664-673 (2001) (analyzing the
structure and importance of cooperative federalism).
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1. ESA Section 6: Cooperation with States
Section 6 of the ESA requires the Services to "cooperate to the
maximum extent practicable with the States."173 Like most federal
pollution control statutes, which allow a state law to operate if it is
more stringent than the federal program, the ESA does not pre-
empt a state taking prohibition that is more protective than the
federal rule.174 Section 6 contains programs to funnel manage-
ment authority and funds to states that develop programs, regula-
tions, and reserves for listed species. Though these programs
have played a relatively minor role in ESA implementation com-
pared to the similar cooperative federalism programs in the pollu-
tion control area, the ESA authorization is strikingly strong.175
For instance, as Michael Bean and Melanie Rowland point out,
the Service is required to approve any state conservation program
that meets the statutory criteria.1 76 The statutory criteria are al-
most exclusively focused on the existence of authority for a state
agency to act under a program rather than the state agency's ac-
tual track record in implementation.177 Approved programs be-
come cooperative agreements between the state and the Service.
States are eligible to receive federal funding to cover up to 90 per-
cent of the cost of an approved cooperative agreement.178 In re-
cent years, federal funding for Section 6 programs has risen stead-
ily in both absolute terms and as a percentage of the total FWS
budget.179 Also, a qualified state employee acting under a coop-
erative agreement may, under certain conditions, take a listed
173. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(a) (1994).
174. Id. § 1535(c), (f). These more restrictive state laws would not bind federal agencies,
however, under the principles of intergovernmental immunity. See Kleppe v. New Mexico,
426 U.S. 529 (1976).
175. BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 21, at 268-69.
176. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c) (1994). See BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 21, at 268-69.
177. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c) (1994). This troublesome focus on authority rather than actual
implementation has emerged as a problem with the EPA's approval of state programs un-
der pollution control statutes. Markell, supra note 166.
178. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(d)(2) (1994).
179. The appropriation for § 6 programs rose from $6,671,000 (approximately 1% of the
total FWS budget) in 1990, to $9,000,000 (approximately 2% of the total FWS budget) in
1993, to $14,000,000 (approximately 2% of the total FWS budget) in 1998, to $23,000,000
(approximately 3% of the total FWS budget) in 1999. Pub. L. No. 101-512, 104 Stat 1918
(1990); Pub. L. No. 103-138, 107 Stat 1382-1383 (1993); Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-
236-237 (1998); Pub. L No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-139-140 (1999). These figures do not
include earmarked appropriations for particular state conservation efforts, such as the
Washington salmon recovery strategy. See infra note 393 and accompanying text.
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species covered by the agreement without risking Section 9 liabil-
ity.180
However, despite some conflicting statutory language, 81 federal
ESA take prohibitions continue to preempt more permissive state
rules even if the state rules are part of an approved cooperative
agreement. 182 And, unlike the pollution control cooperative
agreements, the ESA has no provision to allow states to take over
a federal permit program, i.e. ESA Section 10. Nonetheless, Sec-
tion 4(d) can be employed to allow states to create new (and use
existing) permit programs to meet the recovery goals of the Act,
while obviating the need for citizens to apply for federal Section
10 permits. We explore this method of employing the 4(d) rule in
the following sections of this article.
The Services are accustomed to working with state natural re-
source and game or fish departments under Section 6. The de-
mands of comprehensive habitat conservation will impel the Ser-
vices to turn to local land use jurisdictions for cooperative
partnerships. This will open the Section 6 coffers to a new con-
stituency.
2. State and Local Governmental Indirect Liability
In addition to the statutory inducements for states to engage in
cooperative management of listed species protection, there is also
an emerging line of case law that provides a strong impetus for
the states to seek a cooperative program with the Services. States
and agents of the state, such as state agencies and municipal gov-
ernments, may be indirectly liable for the private takes resulting
from government-authorized actions. 8 3 Government units may
also be liable under Section 9 for inaction, where it causes a take
"to be committed." 184 Therefore, a state has an incentive to coop-
erate with federal programs if it will receive in exchange some
180. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.21(c)(5), 17.31(b) (1999).
181. Compare 16 U.S.C. §§ 1535(g)(2)(A) and 1533(d) with 16 U.S.C. § 1535(0. See discus-
sion infra notes 237-240 and accompanying text.
182. Swan View Coalition v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923 (D. Mont. 1992); United States v.
Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. Cal. 1992); BEAN & ROWLAND, supra
note 21, at 269-270; Christine Golightly, The Oregon Coastal Salmon Restoration Initiative: A
Flawed Attempt to Avoid ESA Listing, 7 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 398,449-51 (1999).
183. See generally Shannon Petersen, Endangered Species in the Urban Jungle: How the ESA
will Reshape American Cities, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 423 (2000).
184. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(g) (1994); United States v. Town of Plymouth, 6 F. Supp.2d 81, 90
(D. Mass. 1998).
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shield from this indirect Section 9 liability.
The ESA Section 9 prohibitions apply to persons, and so may
4(d) rules. The Act defines "person" to include "any officer, em-
ployee, agent, department, or instrumentality of the Federal Gov-
ernment, of any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a
State; [or] any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a
State."185 Although the Eleventh Amendment bars a citizen suit
against a state, 8 6 the federal government can enforce take prohibi-
tions against a state. Or, citizens can obtain declaratory and in-
junctive relief against a state official in his or her individual capac-
ity.187
The leading case analyzing Section 9 indirect governmental li-
ability for states, Strahan v. Coxe,l88 may be seen as a harbinger of
the next era of ESA programs that rely on cooperative federalism.
In Strahan, the First Circuit found Massachusetts state officials li-
able for issuing giflnet and lobster pot fishing licenses which au-
thorized practices that resulted in prohibited takes of the endan-
gered northern right whale. The whales become entangled in
fishing and lobster gear during certain times of year in waters off
the coast of Massachusetts, within the three mile jurisdiction of
the state.189 Clearly, a person operating fishing gear that foreseea-
bly injures or otherwise takes an endangered whale is liable under
Section 9. In addition, the court held that Section 9 extends liabil-
ity to governmental "third parties that allow or authorize acts that
exact a taking and that, but for the permitting process, could not
take place." 190
In justifying its extension of the ESA prohibitions to state per-
mitting officers, the court argued that this form of third-party, in-
direct liability falls within the common law tradition of proximate
cause used to help interpret the Act.191 Additionally, the court
cited Sweet Home to establish the interpretive rule that "take"
185. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (1994).
186. U.S. CoNST. amend. XI.
187. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 166 (1st Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 830, 978 (1998) (allowing a citizen suit against the Secretary of
the Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs and other state officials for
violation of the ESA).
188. 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 830, 978 (1998).
189. Id. at 158-159.
190. Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d at 163.
191. Id. at 163.
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should be defined broadly.192 In defining the scope of indirect
governmental liability, the court distinguished driver's licenses
from the fishing licenses at issue in the case:
[W]hereas it is possible for a person licensed by Massachusetts to
use a car in a manner that does not risk the violations of federal law
suggested by the defendants, it is not possible for a licensed com-
mercial fishing operation to use its gilInets or lobster pots in the
manner permitted by the Commonwealth without risk of violating
the ESA by exacting a taking .... Where the state has licensed an
automobile driver to use that automobile and her license in a man-
ner consistent with both state and federal law, the violation of fed-
eral law [e.g., using a car to rob a federally insured bank] is caused
only by the actor's conscious and independent decision to disregard
or go beyond the licensed purposes of her automobile use and in-
stead to violate federal... law.... In this instance, the state has li-
censed commercial fishing operations to use gillnets and lobster pots
in specifically the manner that is likely to result in a violation of fed-
eral law. The causation here, while indirect, is not so removed that
it extends outside the realm of causation as it is understood in the
common law.193
As if to highlight the importance of this distinction, the same
court, in an unpublished opinion, later dismissed the same plain-
tiff's claim that the U.S. Coast Guard was liable for takings by pri-
vate vessels that received "certificates of documentation and in-
spection."194 Federal law requires the Coast guard to issue these
certificates to vessels meeting certain statutory criteria, none of
which relates to environmental concerns. The court, explicitly dis-
tinguishing the above-quoted passage from Strahan, found the cer-
tificates to be analogous to the licenses for automobiles and driv-
ers.195
Holding the government liable under the ESA for the use of
regulatory authority in a manner that authorizes others to violate
provisions of the Act had precedent. In 1989, the Eighth Circuit
held that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") vio-
lated Section 9 in registering pesticides containing strychnine.196
Application of the strychnine pesticides resulted in takes of listed
192. Id. at 162 (citing Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communites for a Great Oregon,
515 U.S. 687,703-04 (1995)). See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
193. Id. at 164.
194. Strahan v. Linnon, No. 97-1787,1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16314, at *14 (1st Cir. 1998).
195. Id.
196. Defenders of Wildlife v. Adm'r, 882 F2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989). The EPA registers
pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-
13 6 y (2001).
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species that were not the targets of the pesticides but that ate poi-
soned carcasses. The EPA itself neither applied nor distributed
the pesticides, but the court held the agency liable nonetheless be-
cause the pesticides may be used legally only if registered. The
court held that this connection between the poisoning and the
agency regulation was clear enough to trigger Section 9 liability.197
In reaching its holding, the court cited an earlier case where the
FWS violated Section 9 by authorizing the use of lead shot ammu-
nition by hunters, which resulted in secondary poisoning of en-
dangered eagles. 198
Strahan is particularly significant because it signals that the judi-
ciary may enforce responsibilities on non-federal governmental
units which are not subject to the Section 7 conservation duty to
ensure that they do not authorize activities that lead to takes. This
is consistent with Sweet Home, which endorsed the view that harm
may be indirect as long as it occurs through a "foreseeable chain
of causation." 199 Nonetheless, the recent Supreme Court decision
of Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett raises the possi-
bility that Congressional imposition of such requirements on state
government is unconstitutional. 200
In 1998, the U.S. District Court in Massachusetts, deciding
United States v. Town of Plymouth,201 extended the indirect liability
of Strahan to a municipality whose inaction likely caused the tak-
ing of threatened piping plovers.202 The Plymouth town beach
hosted breeding piping plovers that nested and fed in the same
area used by off-road vehicles (ORVs). The court found that the
ORVs disturbed these essential behavior characteristics. 2 3 But, in
addition to the liability of the ORV operators, the court also found
the town liable for causing the harm to occur. Though town em-
197. 882 F.2d at 1301.
198. Id. (citing Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1089, 1092-93
(E.D. Cal. 1985)).
199. BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 21, at 221. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 697-698 (1995). Finding a "foreseeable chain
of causation" connecting land uses with harm to listed species, however, may create greater
challenges. We discuss this issue at greater length in note 213, infra.
200. 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001) (invalidating the application of the Americans with Disabilities
Act against an entity of a state).
201. 6 F. Supp.2d 81 (D. Mass. 1998).
202. The court issued a preliminary injunction after it found that the FWS showed a like-
lihood of prevailing on its claim that current town management of its beach had and would
continue to harm piping plovers. Id. at 91.
203. Id. At least one dead bird was found in an ORV tire track.
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ployees had authority to close the beach to ORVs, town officials
prevented the employees from taking that protective action.204
An important factor that led the Town of Plymouth court to im-
pose indirect liability for inaction was the long history of FWS
warnings about takes caused by permissive beach management
allowing ORVs.205 For five years, the FWS attempted to work with
the town on a management plan, and even came to an agreement
which the town failed to implement. The town's failure to carry
out its obligations under the agreement, specifying what steps
were necessary to avoid indirect take liability, created a situation
where a court could identify with precision what actions the town
failed to take.
Still, the Town of Plymouth decision significantly extended indi-
rect liability to a situation where the governmental unit did not is-
sue any license or permit specifically allowing the action (ORV
use) causing the take to occur. Instead, the town failed to meet an
affirmative duty to exercise its authority to prevent activities that
proximately cause takes.206
Another recent application of indirect municipal take liability
involves two species of endangered turtles and one species of
threatened turtle that use the beaches of Volusia County, Florida,
seasonally for nesting. The county, in recognition of its govern-
mental liability, secured an incidental take permit for allowing
private vehicles to drive on its beaches at night. However, the
permit did not cover takings caused by stationary artificial
lights.207 The recent phase of the litigation addressed the county's
liability for its artificial lighting ordinance. Artificial lighting can
disorient turtle hatchlings who must migrate at night across the
beach from their birth nest to the sea via reflection from the surf.
While the U.S. District Court found that artificial lighting on pri-
vate property is responsible for the taking of sea turtles,208 it none-
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Petersen, supra note 183, at 434. In this respect, Town of Plymouth builds on dic-
tum in Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), affd in part sub nom. Sierra
Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991), which suggested that Forest Service failure to
control the encroachment of trees contributed (along with affirmative actions, such as cle-
arcutting) to the take of the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker. For another view on
this issue of indirect takes, see BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 21, at 222-223.
207. Loggerhead Turtle v. Council of Volusia County, 148 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 1488 (1999), remanded to 92 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (M.D. Fla. 2000).
208. Loggerhead Turtle v. Council of Volusia County 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1304-5.
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theless found the county not indirectly liable for those violations
of the Act.2°9 The court accepted the county's argument that while
it does regulate artificial lighting (to protect the turtles), it does
not allow beach lighting that harms turtles and should not be held
liable simply because its ordinance is ineffective in preventing all
takes. The court rejected the contention of the plaintiffs that the
county "is responsible for the ESA-violative conduct of its resi-
dents under an 'implied permission' theory."210
In holding that the county was not liable for the acts of its citi-
zens, the Volusia County court limited the Strahan principle to
situations where a regulatory scheme authorizes, entitles, or le-
gitimates an activity that results in a take. In contrast to the Mas-
sachusetts fish licensing program, the Volusia County court found
that the Volusia ordinance sought to restrict artificial beachfront
lighting but did not succeed entirely. The Volusia County decision
is puzzling in this respect and does not identify why the county
ordinance fails to eliminate takes from artificial lighting. The
court seems to rule out the possibilities that the ordinance itself is
defective or that the county's enforcement scheme is lax.21' What
explanation remains for the lighting takes? Perhaps there is some
inherent limitation in county authority to make rules and enforce
them that allows residents to use lights that take turtles. The court
may have believed that it is unfair to punish a county for doing
the best it can to reduce harmful artificial lights. But, in Strahan,
Massachusetts did establish limitations in its fishing licenses to
reduce conflicts with whales; it simply did not limit the fishing ac-
tivities effectively enough. From this perspective, the two cases
are difficult to reconcile.
Nonetheless, the results in the cases support some general dis-
tinctions. First, where a jurisdiction, such as Plymouth, owns and
operates a property, such as the beach, courts are likely to impose
greater affirmative duties for protecting listed species under Sec-
tion 9 than for a jurisdiction exercising police powers over private
property. State or municipal ownership of property is likely the
only situation where a court would find that complete failure to
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1307.
211.Even if the county did fail to enforce its rules, courts are unlikely to intervene in such
an essential police function, absent some pattern of bias. See, e.g. Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985).
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regulate rises to the level of a Section 9 violation.212
Second, and more relevant to the urban land use context where
most jurisdictions do engage in some regulation, permitting is dif-
ferent from standard setting. A standard setting ordinance, such
as the one enacted by Volusia County, sets out general require-
ments to protect species but does not translate the requirements to
the site-specific circumstances in which they apply. Courts will
likely not find Section 9 liability for standard setting ordinances
that generally succeed in protecting listed species, are enforced in
good faith, but that fail to prevent takes in some circumstances.213
By contrast, in permitting, an agency typically authorizes a par-
ticular person to engage in a specific activity. In this situation,
such as in Strahan, the application of standards to a particular set
of facts through a permit gives rise to a relatively greater respon-
sibility for takes that result from the activities authorized under
the permit. This might create a perverse incentive for state and lo-
cal governments to avoid even attempting to regulate activities
that result in takes. However, in many jurisdictions, especially cit-
ies, some form of land use control, which regulates activities caus-
ing habitat destruction,21 4 is already in place. In urban areas,
where land use regulation tends to be the most stringent and
permits for construction and modification of improvements are
common, the governmental action will be closer to the affirmative
authorizations in Strahan.215 In part for this reason, urban areas
will have strong incentives to cooperative with the Services in de-
veloping comprehensive 4(d) rules, especially where direct habitat
modification from activities governed by land use controls is the
primary hurdle to recovery.216
212 J.B. Ruhl, State and Local Government Vicarious Liability Under the ESA, 16 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 70, 73 (2001).
213. For instance, if Plymouth had enacted a beach closure rule but a few scofflaws failed
to abide by the restriction on use, the court would likely not have held the town liable. I
thank Prof. Holly Doremus for sharing this prediction with me.
214. Sprawling land development is a major contributor to the loss of biological diver-
sity. Brian Czech et al., Economic Associations Among Causes of Species Endangerment in the
United States, 50 BIOSCIENCE 593 (2000) (cited in Kostyack, supra note 137, at 10,715).
215. For instance, Petersen, supra note 169, at 430, uses the example of the City of Seattle
issuing "a developer a permit to raze an old warehouse downtown and build a new con-
dominium complex." If the resulting runoff harms the threatened Puget Sound chinook
salmon, then the city will likely be liable under Section 9. We discuss Seattle's response to
this prospect in great detail infra at V(B)(2).
216. This may have been a factor influencing the recent decision by the Pima County,
Arizona, Administrator to withhold land use permits until the applicants show that the
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As we discuss in greater detail infra at VI(B)(5), an important
factor weakening the incentive that state and local governments
have to seek Section 4(d) rule protection from take liability is the
attenuated proximate causation of harm to listed species from
land use. In Strahan, Plymouth, and Volusia, the harm to the listed
species could be observed directly. Whales could be seen entan-
gled in nets, plovers could be found crushed in tire tracks, and
turtles could be observed disoriented by artificial lights. In con-
trast, it might be very difficult to observe or identify individual
gnatcatchers hurt by lost nesting habitat or individual salmon
loses due to reduction in suitable streambeds for hatching. Indi-
rect governmental liability for authorizing private takes is only as
strong as the causation of the harm from the private activity. The
Services can strengthen the connection, however, by using a 4(d)
rule to clarify the types and extent of activities that will likely
harm a particular species in a particular area.217
Also, as Professor Ruhl points out, there are some serious prob-
lems with the theory of indirect governmental liability that may
doom this emerging line of cases. In addition to raising Tenth
Amendment concerns about forcing states to adopt protective
measures, Professor Ruhl argues that the structure of the ESA it-
self and the unfairness of vicarious liability make Strahan an un-
tenable precedent.218 Moreover, Ruhl observes that ESA indirect
liability departs from pollution control law federalism: state or lo-
cal governments may issue land use or regulatory permits without
assuming responsibility under federal law for any contamination
that results from the authorized activity.219 Without question, the
indirect liability case law has yet to come into logical focus. How-
ever, it nonetheless contributes to the incentives motivating state
and local governments to work with the Services to protect listed
species. And, the successful operation of ESA Section 4(d) does
not require an expansive theory of indirect governmental liability,
though it may help.
FWS has approved their plans to protect the listed pygmy owl. Blake Morlock, Building
Halted on Owl Habitat, TUCSON CITIZEN, Jan. 13, 2001, at 1A. The county action affected four
planned subdivisions, three churches, two office complexes, several businesses, a fire sta-
tion, and the expansion of a park. Id.
217. See discussion infra at VI(A)(6).
218. Ruhl, supra note 212, at 76. Ruhl has no quarrel with Town of Plymouth because of
the proprietary basis of the governmental liability. Id. at 73.
219. Id. at 74.
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Section 4(d) is poised to usher in the next era in the develop-
ment of the ESA program. It presents an opportunity to marry
federal recovery goals with state programs regulating activities
that harm species threatened with extinction. The 4(d) rule au-
thority has been used for some time, especially by the NMFS.
However, its application to date has been narrow. The next sec-
tion of this article describes two important current experiments
with Section 4(d), which will reveal some lessons for tapping the
full potential of the program.
V. EMERGING APPROACHES UNDER ESA SECrION 4(d)
In Section III of this article, we described the different treatment
that ESA Section 9 accords threatened, as compared with endan-
gered, species. Species listed as endangered are protected by a se-
ries of prohibitions specified in the Act itself. In contrast, the Ser-
vices may, by regulation, establish the prohibitions that pertain to
species listed as threatened. 2 ° A 4(d) rule is one that tailors a par-
ticular set of prohibitions to suit the threats to a particular spe-
cies.221 This part of the article reviews the experience with the 4(d)
rule to date. Part A describes the legislative history, mechanics,
and judicial interpretation of ESA Section 4(d). Part B focuses on
two innovative and comprehensive 4(d) rules that point in a new
direction for recovery through comprehensive cooperative feder-
alism.
To date, most 4(d) rules tailored to particular species, as op-
posed to those that merely extend the general terms of the Section
9 endangered species take prohibitions, have focused on animal
management measures, such as trapping wolves or excluding sea
turtles from seafood harvesting. While these rules are important,
they do not address the most important cause of listing, habitat
degradation. There are a few important experiments with 4(d)
rules, however, that begin to address the greatest challenge to re-
covery, maintaining and restoring the ecosystems on which spe-
cies depend. Because land use control is primarily a state func-
tion, these 4(d) rules require cooperation between the Services and
the states. The two subsections of Part B describe innovative 4(d)
rules that offer important lessons for using this section of the ESA
220. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1)(G), (2)(E) (1994).
221.16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1994).
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as a vehicle for more comprehensive conservation planning.
A. Introduction to Section 4(d) Rules
The single most important standard for the promulgation of the
4(d) rule is that it "provide for the conservation" of the threatened
species.= In contrast to the jeopardy or the HCP standard, then,
the 4(d) rule cannot merely mitigate threats to survival. A 4(d)
rule must contribute to the recovery of the species.223 The affirma-
tive federal duty to promote conservation also supports this inter-
pretation of the recovery standard for 4(d) rules.224
When Congress enacted the ESA in 1973, its discussion of how
the statute would work centered principally around two issues:
the creation of the threatened category of species not yet at the
brink of extinction, and the role of states in conservation.225 The
4(d) rule can revitalize these two original concerns of the ESA by
linking them through cooperative federalism. In providing au-
thority for the Services to intervene to protect species before they
reach endangered status, Congress sought to avoid "a long, costly,
and frequently unsuccessful process," and increase the likelihood
of recovery.226
The legislative history of the ESA does not include much analy-
sis of Section 4(d). Congress intended to provide the Services with
"discretionary authority... to regulate the import, taking, and in-
terstate transportation" 227 of threatened species to minimize the
222- Id.
223. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (defining conservation to mean the use of all methods and
procedures which are necessary to bring any listed species to the point at which the meas-
ures of the ESA are no longer necessary). The strongest judicial endorsement of this princi-
ple is Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608, 612-618 (8th Cir. 1985) (reading the definition of
conservation, Section 4(d), and the conservation duty of Section 7(a)(1) as mutually rein-
forcing). See also Holly Doremus, Restoring Endangered Species: The Importance of Being Wild,
23 HARv. ENVTL L. REV. 1, 27 (1999) (reading the Act to require 4(d) rules to "provide
enough protection to ensure progress toward removal from the protected list").
224. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167, 170 (D.D.C. 1977) (find-
ing that the Service "must do far more than merely avoid the elimination of protected spe-
cies. It must bring these species back from the brink so that they may be removed from the
protected class .... The Service cannot limit its focus to what it considers the most impor-
tant management tool available to it").
225. Holly Doremus, Delisting Endangered Species: An Aspirational Goal, Not a Realistic Ex-
pectation, 30 Envtl. L Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst) 10,434,10,441 (2000).
226. Id., quoting, Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1972: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on the Env't of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong. 68 (1972) (statement of Nathaniel P.
Reed, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Fish, Wildlife, and Parks).
227. Endaigered Species: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation
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use of the most stringent taking prohibitions in every case.228 In
those areas where species were merely "threatened," this type of
discretion would allow the Secretary to reduce economic hard-
ships by promulgating less stringent taking prohibitions. Both the
testimony of Nathaniel P. Reed, Assistant Secretary of the Interior
for Fish, Wildlife and Parks, and the committee report for the
House bill indicate that the Services can tailor a set of prohibitions
that address the particular circumstances faced by a threatened
species.229 Professor Doremus accurately summarized the overall
sentiment of both the Administration and Congress in 1973 that
Section 4(d) should promote flexible rules to meet the needs of
species recovery while "minimizing impacts on economic activ-
ity."230 Though these statements indicate that Congress intended
Section 4(d) to loosen the Section 9 prohibitions for threatened
species when appropriate, nothing in the history suggests that
anyone envisioned that this section could spur a comprehensive
species management program. There is also no direct evidence in
the legislative history to indicate that Congress anticipated coop-
erative federalism to be a method of implementing a 4(d) rule.
Though the statutory intent of the ESA clearly envisioned more
state participation in conservation efforts than has occurred to
date,231 Congress hoped that the Section 6 cooperative programs
with states232 would play that role, not Section 4(d).
Although there is little litigation of 4(d) rules, the recovery
mandate has influenced judicial review of 4(d) rules in two ways.
First, the strong conservation language supports the Services
when 4(d) rules are challenged as being too restrictive and con-
and the Enp't of the House Comm. On Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong. 204 (1973) (tes-
timony of Nathaniel P. Reed, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Fish, Wildlife and
Parks).
228. 119 Cong. Rec. 25,669 (statement of floor sponsor Sen. Tunney).
229. See Endangered Species Hearing (testimony of Nathaniel P. Reed), supra note 226 (not-
ing that "[t]he type and degree of control exercised over this class [threatened] of animal
would depend on the circumstances of each species"); H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 12 (1973)
("Once an animal is on the threatened list, the Secretary has an almost infinite number of
options available to him with regard to the permitted activities for those species.").
230. Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science
Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 1029, at 1115-16 (1997) (citing H.R. REP. No. 93-
412, at 12 (1973) and 119 CONG. REC. 25, 669 (1973) (statement of the floor sponsor Sen.
Tunney)).
231. See Doremus, supra note 225, at 10,441 (describing the hearings leading up to the
passage of the ESA in which Interior Department officials stressed the importance of au-
thorizing states to control the implementation of conservation programs).
232. 16 U.S.C. § 1535, supra notes 173-182 and accompanying text.
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taining prohibitions unnecessary for conservation. Courts have
responded with great deference to Service expertise on what is
necessary for recovery and Service presumptions that measures
designed to abate the decline in populations of threatened species
will contribute to recovery.2 33
Second, the conservation criterion may weaken deference when
4(d) rules are challenged as too permissive. In overturning the
FWS 4(d) rule to allow public sport trapping of eastern timber
wolves, the Eighth Circuit stressed that the Service's discretion "is
limited by the requirement that the regulations" provide for con-
servation.234 The court used this limitation to endorse the long-
standing interpretation of the ESA that "before the taking of a
threatened animal can occur, a determination must be made that
population pressures within the animal's ecosystem cannot oth-
erwise be relieved."23m The connection between Section 4(d) and
the statutory conservation definition was especially important in
the wolf case. That is because the ESA, after listing a number of
conservation methods, including census, habitat maintenance and
law enforcement, explicitly conditions regulated taking on "the
extraordinary case where population pressures within a given
ecosystem cannot be otherwise relieved." 236
Section 4(d) contains a perplexing exception to the applicability
of 4(d) rules in any state that has entered into a cooperative
agreement with the Service. In that instance, Section 4(d) applies
only to the extent that it has also been adopted by the state.23 7 In
construing this provision, courts have required that state coopera-
tive agreements, to be valid, must contain protections at least as
stringent as federal prohibitions.238 In Swan View Coalition v.
233. See BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 21, at 226-227 (discussing Cayman Turtle Farm v.
Andrus, 478 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1979), affd without opinion, (D.C. Cir. Dec. 12, 1980) and
Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Verity, 853 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1988) respectively). See generally
Keith Saxe, Regulated Taking of Threatened Species Under the Endangered Species Act, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 399 (1988) (discussing judicial review of 4(d) rules for wolves and grizzly
bears).
234. Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608,612-613 (8th Cir. 1985).
235. Id. at 613 (citing 577 F. Supp. 783, 787 (D. Minn. 1984)). The district court applied
this principle in earlier litigation to uphold a wolf trapping program in the "extraordinary"
situation where population pressures within the ecosystem needed to be relieved by regu-
lar taking of excess wolves. Fund for Animals v. Andrus, 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2189,
2199 (D. Minn. 1978).
236. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1994).
237. Id. § 1533(d).
238. Id. § 1535(0. Swan View Coalition v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923 (D. Mont. 1992). See
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Turner, the court rejected a claim that Montana law, which does
not include harm in its definition of take, controlled prohibitions
on taking threatened grizzly bears because the state had a coop-
erative agreement with the Service. In holding that the federal
4(d) prohibition, including harm, applied in Montana, the court
relied in part on the interpretive principle that the Congress gave
"overwhelming priority" to the preservation of listed species.239
Also, the ESA provision dealing with conflicts between federal
and state laws in Section 6 (on cooperation with states) is explicit
about preempting state regulations weaker than the federal regu-
lation.240 The lesson here is that the Services can rely on 4(d) rules
to develop conservation strategies without having to worry about
the terms in cooperative agreements creating loopholes through
weaker state standards. As in the pollution control area, states
may enforce more stringent standards but weaker state rules will
not supplant the federal floor of protection.
Most of the controversial applications of Section 4(d) involve
two situations.241 First, some 4(d) rules grant permission for par-
ticular kinds of takes (such as capturing for scientific purposes or
incidental harms from specified activities) without a Section 10
permit.242 Second, some 4(d) rules are used to tailor more lenient
take rules than would otherwise apply for a group individuals of
a listed species released in an area as an "experimental popula-
tion."243 This article recommends that the 4(d) rule be used in a
different way, to encourage states to incorporate threatened spe-
cies habitat recovery in land use regulation.
also United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. Cal. 1992). BEAN
& ROWLAND, supra note 21, at 270 also endorse this interpretation.
239. Swan View, 824 F. Supp. at 938.
240. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(f) (1994).
241. As of November 17, 2001, the Services had issued 4(d) rules for 63 species, many of
them dealing with commerce in animals not native to the United States. U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, Listed Species with 4(d) Rules, at
http://ecos.fws.gov/webpage/webpage-specrule.html (last visited Nov. 17,2001).
242. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.440), 17.44(k), 17.46(a) (allowing take of the Foskett speckled
dace, the Niangua darter, and a cave-dwelling isopod, respectively, for scientific purposes);
50 C.F.R. §§ 17.40(i), 17.42(b), 17.42(0, 17.440) (allowing incidental catch or take of the Lou-
isiana black bear, a variety of threatened sea turtles, the southern populations of the bog
turtle, and the Warner sucker, respectively, under certain specified conditions); 50 C.F.R. §
17.40(b) (allowing removal of nuisance grizzly bears).
243. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j) (1994). Professor Doremus skillfully surveys the key issues, espe-
cially the permission of direct takes, in the use of the 4(d) rule for experimental popula-
tions. Doremus, supra note 223, at 27-30.
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B. Two Models for Comprehensive Section 4(d) Rules
The Services have twice used the ESA Section 4(d) to incorpo-
rate state and local conservation initiatives into limitations on
prohibitions: in 1993 for the coastal California gnatcatcher, and in
2000 for several runs of West Coast salmon.244 In these cases, state
initiatives to address habitat loss influenced the Services to list the
species as threatened (rather than endangered) and prepare a 4(d)
rule. This part examines two situations where these 4(d) rules ap-
ply to urban areas experiencing development pressure. Land use
decisions in coastal southern California and in the Puget Sound
will decide the fate of the coastal California gnatcatcher and the
Puget Sound chinook salmon respectively. Both areas are in-
volved in comprehensive planning under the auspices of local
land use authorities, state programs, and a federal 4(d) rule.
However, while the 2000 salmon 4(d) rule employs recovery as a
standard for approving comprehensive habitat protection plans,
the 1993 gnatcatcher 4(d) rule runs afoul of the ESA in mandating
only jeopardy avoidance in local plans that receive limitations
from the general take prohibition.
1. The Coastal California Gnatcatcher: Natural Community
Conservation Planning
The coastal California gnatcatcher is a small, long-tailed subspe-
cies of bird in the thrush family. It dwells in southern coastal Cali-
fornia and northwestern Baja California, Mexico. 245 The non-
migratory bird occurs "almost exclusively" in the coastal sage
scrub plant community that is composed of short deciduous and
succulent plants.246 With the widespread fragmentation and de-
struction of this habitat due to urban development, the gnat-
244. Special Rule Concerning Take of the Threatened Coastal California Gnatcatcher, 58
Fed. Reg. 65,088 (Dec. 10, 1993); Final Rule Governing Take of 14 Threatened Salmon and
Steelhead Evolutionary Significant Units (ESUs), 65 Fed. Reg. 42,422 (ul 10, 2000). The
NMFS may soon promulgate a third 4(d) rule employing cooperative federalism. Proposed
Rule Governing Take of Four Threatened Evolutionarily Significant Units (ESUs) of West
Coast Salmonids, 66 Fed. Reg. 43,150 (Aug. 17, 2001). The proposed rule for this group of
California salmonids is identical in all relevant respects to the 2000 West Coast salmon rule
explored in the case study below.
245. Endangered & Threatened Wildlife and Plants, Determination of Threatened Status
for the Coastal California Gnatcatcher, 58 Fed. Reg. 16,742 (Mar. 30,1993).
246. Id.
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catcher populations have declined to 1000 to 1500 pairs.247 Most of
the remaining habitat and birds occur on private lands in Orange,
Riverside, and (predominately) San Diego County.248
Subsection (a) reviews the FWS listing and 4(d) rule for the
gnatcatcher. Subsection (b) examines the California program that
provides the framework for regional planning to balance conser-
vation with development. Finally, Subsection (c) describes the
application of the California program and the 4(d) rule to the
coastal sage scrub ecosystem subregion in San Diego County.
a. The Gnatcatcher 4(d) Rule
In March, 1993, the FWS listed the coastal California gnatcatcher
as threatened and proposed a 4(d) rule249 to authorize certain land
use activities under the state Natural Community Conservation
Planning (NCCP) program.250 This state program, discussed in
greater detail below, encourages private land owners to collabo-
rate with public entities to develop land use plans that protect
wildlife while allowing compatible growth.25' The FWS found
that the Coastal Sage Scrub NCCP effort reduced the risks of ex-
tinction for gnatcatcher. 252 As a result, the Service listed the bird as
247. Id. at 16,743.
248. Id.
249. Determination of Threatened Status for the Coastal California Gnatcatcher, 58 Fed.
Reg. 16,742 (Mar. 30, 1993). In 1994, a district court found the listing to be flawed because
some of the underlying biological data supporting the listing decision were not available to
the public. The court at first vacated the listing (May 2, 1994) but then reinstated the listing
(June 16, 1994) pending a determination by the FWS whether the listing should be revised
or revoked, after the public had a chance to review the data. Endangered Species Comm. of
the Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of Southern Cal. v. Babbitt, 852 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1994). The order
can be found at Id. at 38. For a discussion of this litigation and other issues surrounding
disclosure of biological data, see Robert L. Fischman & Vicky J. Meretsky, Endangered Spe-
cies Information: Access and Control, 41 WASHBuRN L.J. 90 (2001). On March 27, 1995, the
Service determined that the listing and 4(d) rule should stand as they were promulgated in
1993. Notice of Determination to Retain the Threatened Status for the Coastal CaL Gnat-
catcher under the ESA, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,693 (Mar. 27,1995). Subsequent litigation concerned
designation of critical habitat. See NRDC v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 113 F.3d
1121 (9th Cir. 1997) (remanding Service decision not to designate critical habitat); 64 Fed.
Reg. 5963,5967 (Feb. 8,1999) (designating critical habitat).
250. 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. 765 (West), (codified at CAL. FISH AND GAME CODE §2800-2840
(West 1999)).
251. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §2805 (West 1999).
252. Determination of Threatened Status for the Coastal California Gnatcatcher, 58 Fed.
Reg. at 16746,16753-55. Without mandatory habitat protection under state law, the volun-
tary NCCP proved to be insufficient to forestall listing entirely. Jon Wener, Natural Com-
munities Conservation Planning: An Ecosystem Approach to Protecting Endangered Species, 47
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threatened rather than endangered.2 -3 Establishing a precedent
that the NMFS would follow for the West Coast salmon listings,
the FWS sought to encourage further integration of habitat protec-
tion in comprehensive land use plans by proposing a 4(d) rule that
would shield from Section 9 liability local governments and de-
velopers who abide by approved agreements.
On December 10, 1993, the FWS published its final 4(d) rule for
the coastal California gnatcatcher.25 4 The rule extends to the gnat-
catcher all of the statutory prohibitions of Section 9 applicable to
endangered animals. However, land-use activities covered by a
valid NCCP plan2mS approved by the FWS are not prohibited by
the special rule.256 This approach of applying the general prohibi-
tions on take, unless activities fall within a particular program re-
ceiving the Service's imprimatur, establishes the cooperative fed-
eralism framework for gnatcatcher recovery.
The rule also requires the Service to monitor implementation of
the NCCP program guidelines, discussed in Subsection (b) below,
that govern the development of local ("subregional") plans, and to
review their progress every six months. If the program guidelines
are not making adequate progress toward NCCP objectives, then
the Service will seek modifications. If the modifications do not oc-
cur, then the FWS may revoke its approval of the program. A
revocation would cause the Section 9 prohibitions to apply to all
activities formerly shielded by the program. The Service must
publish findings for revocation and provide a public comment pe-
riod before taking action.257 Modifications and revocations may
STAN. L. REV. 319,341-43 (1995).
253. 58 Fed. Reg. at 16,755. The proposed gnatcatcher listing in 1991 would have desig-
nated the subspecies endangered. Proposed Rule to List the Coastal California Gnatcatcher
as Endangered, 56 Fed. Reg. 47,053 (1991).
254. Special Rule Concerning Take of the Threatened Coastal California Gnatcatcher, 58
Fed. Reg. 65,088 (Dec. 10, 1993) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
255. Although the term "NCCP plan" is redundant, it is the common usage to refer to a
plan developed under the Natural Community Conservation Planning Act of 1991 (CAL
FISH AND GAME CODE §§ 2800-2840). In this context, the NCCP plan refers to the subre-
gional plans developed in accordance with the coastal sage scrub regional conservation and
planning guidelines, discussed in Subpart (b) below.
256. 50 C.F.R. § 17.41(b)(2). While landowners who do not participate in an NCCP plan
may still apply for an incidental take permit directly from the federal government, the Ser-
vice indicated in its final 4(d) rule that, in considering a permit application, it intends to
apply the very same conservation guidelines adopted by the state under the NCCP pro-
gram. Special Rule Concerning Take of the Threatened Coastal California Gnatcatcher, 58
Fed. Reg. at 65,091. See also Welner, supra note 252, at 345.
257. 50 C.F.R § 17.41(b)(4); Special Rule Concerning Take of the Threatened Coastal Cali-
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apply regionwide to the entire coastal sage scrub area, or only to
particular subregions not meeting the NCCP objectives. 258 This
oversight is consistent with cooperative federalism and adaptive
management.
However, the gnatcatcher 4(d) rule fails to meet the ESA re-
quirement that it "provide for the conservation" of threatened
species.259 The FWS will approve an NCCP plan meeting the
regulatory criteria for an incidental take permit.260 Many of the
incidental take permit criteria, such as requiring that the take be
incidental to an otherwise lawful activity, that the plan minimize
and mitigate impacts, and that the plan contain assurances of im-
plementation, are perfectly appropriate for approving plans that
limit Section 9 liability under a 4(d) rule. But, the incidental take
permit regulatory criteria do not require conservation or recovery
of the species. Instead, the plan must "not appreciably reduce the
likelihood of survival and recovery of the gnatcatcher in the wild.
This criterion is equivalent to the regulatory definition of 'jeop-
ardy' .... ,"261 As we discussed in Section III, this "no jeopardy"
standard does not require the contribution toward recovery that
the conservation standard of Section 4(d) does. The gnatcatcher
rule adopts this weaker incidental take model of excusing or ex-
empting takes rather than the conservation model that would
limit the application of the take prohibition to plans that promote
recovery.
Why did the FWS promulgate a gnatcatcher 4(d) rule that falls
short of the ESA mandate for recovery? There are two factors that
likely explain why the rule does not measure up to the statutory
standard. First, the 1993 rule was one of the very first demonstra-
tions of Secretary Babbitt's initiative to show that the Act pro-
vided sufficient flexibility to accommodate development. Like the
overly liberal terms of the early Babbitt-era incidental take per-
mits, the gnatcatcher 4(d) rule reflected the Service's strong desire
to save the Act from the paring knives of Congress.
fornia Gnatcatcher, 58 Fed. Reg. at 65094.
258. 50 C.F.R. § 17.41(b)(4); 58 Fed. Reg. at 65,094.
259. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1994).
260. 50 C.F.R. § 17.41(b)(2)(ii); Special Rule Concerning Take of the Threatened Coastal
California Gnatcatcher, 58 Fed. Reg. at 65,088. Those criteria are found at 50 C.F.R. §
17.32(b)(2).
261. Special Rule Concerning Take of the Threatened Coastal California Gnatcatcher, 58
Fed. Reg. at 65,089.
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Second, years of focus on the reactive ESA Section 7 jeopardy
standard blinded the Service to the greater obligations to recov-
ery. The California NCCP seemed to promise so much in terms of
comprehensive habitat planning that the Service was eager to en-
dorse it in order to promote other broad area-wide conservation
efforts. The recovery criterion hovered beyond the Service's radar
screen for encouraging innovation. In some respects, the Service
confused the gnatcatcher 4(d) rule's NCCP with an incidental take
permit's HCP, where it applies the "no jeopardy" criterion.262
The FWS does not independently review a NCCP plan for its
contribution to conservation. Therefore, the gnatcatcher 4(d) rule
promotes recovery only to the extent that the California NCCP
program itself requires recovery.263 Although recovery is consis-
tent with the goals of the NCCP Act, California law does not ex-
plicitly establish recovery as a criterion for an NCCP plan, as the
ESA does for a 4(d) rule. The next subsections describe the state
NCCP program and the way in which San Diego has used it to in-
corporate gnatcatcher habitat protection in land use control.
b. The California Natural Community Conservation
Planning Program
The California NCCP program, like many state conservation
programs, originated as an effort to forestall the need for listing
under the ESA.264 Following a set of petitions in 1991 to list the
gnatcatcher under the ESA, Governor Pete Wilson announced the
NCCP program to promote voluntary, collaborative conserva-
tion.263 Though the program would cover all of California's eco-
262. See, e.g., George Frampton, Ecosystem Management in the Clinton Administration, 7
DUKE ENvTL. L. & PoL'Y F. 39, 42 (1996) ("[T]hese NCCP plans are a special version of a
device called Habitat Conservation Plans."). Frampton was a high-ranking Clinton Ad-
ministration official involved in these programs.
263. The NCCP Act requires the "perpetuation of natural wildlife diversity." CAL. FISH
AND GAME CODE § 2805(a) (West 1999).
264. Welner, supra note 252, at 339. Though the NCCP program failed to prevent the list-
ing of the gnatcatcher, it did contribute to the designation of the species as threatened, with
a 4(d) rule, rather than as endangered, as originally proposed. See Proposed Rule to List
the Coastal California Gnatcatcher, 56 Fed. Reg. 47,053 (1991). The current state NCCP
guidelines for the coastal sage scrub community express the goal of forestalling the listing
of other sage scrub species through comprehensive ecosystem planning. California Dept.
of Fish and Game and Cal Resources Agency, Southern Cal. Coastal Sage Scrub NCCP Process
Guidelines, Summary (Nov. 1993), at http://ceres.ca.gov/CRA/NCCP/pgindex.htm [here-
inafter Southern California CSS NCCP Process Guidelines].
265. Welner, supra note 252, at 338.
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logical regions, the pilot application addressed the conflict be-
tween development and habitat protection in the coastal sage
scrub ecosystem. A few months later, the state legislature enacted
the Natural Community Conservation Planning Act,266 which
provides a simple statutory framework for the program.
The NCCP Act encourages interagency cooperation and agree-
ments among local, state, and federal agencies, along with private
parties.267 These groups work together to develop natural com-
munity conservation plans, which provide for "the regional or
areawide protection and perpetuation of natural wildlife diver-
sity, while allowing compatible and appropriate development and
growth."268 The NCCP program seeks broader biological diversity
protection than simply recovery of listed species. 269 However, be-
cause the listing of the gnatcatcher presents such a great challenge
for a densely populated region of California to accommodate
growth and biological conservation, the coastal sage scrub (CSS)
regional NCCP process is the most important application of the
California law. Of course, the CSS NCCP process is also impor-
tant from the standpoint of being an early attempt to introduce the
cooperative federalism model to the ESA.
The CSS NCCP is comprehensive in scope. The CSS region en-
compasses the range of the vegetation on which the gnatcatcher
depends. It includes parts of five counties in a six thousand
square mile area and about a dozen subregional planning areas
developing their own agreements with landowners and local ju-
risdictions.270 The counties in the CSS region have some of the
highest land values in the United States, as well as one of the fast-
est rates of population growth.271 The regional plan aims to pro-
tect not just federally listed animals but a broad range of species
266. 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. 765 (West), codified at CAL FISH AND GAME CODE §2800-2840
(West 1999).
267. CAL. FISH AND GAME CODE §§ 2810, 2820 (West 1999).
268. Id. at § 2805(a).
269. The administrators of NCCP program tie together the long- and short-term goals of
the program by seeking to "anticipate and prevent the controversies and gridlock caused
by species' listings by focusing on the long-term stability of wildlife and plant communities
and including key interests in the process." An Introduction to NCCP, at
http://ceres.ca.gov/CRA/NCCP/intro.htm (last modified Aug 12, 1997).
270. Southern Coastal Sage Scrub NCCP Region at
http://ceres.ca.gove/CRA/NCCP/cssreg.htm (last modified Sept. 26, 1997); Southern Cali-
fornia CSS NCCP Process Guidelines, supra note 264, at Summary.
271. Craig Manson, Natural Communities Conservation Planning: California's New Ecosystem
Approach to Biodiversity, 24 ENVTL. L. 603, 611-12 (1994); see also Sheldon, supra note 131.
100 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 27:45
native to the area.272
The NCCP program itself does not authorize land acquisition 273
or compel local participation. Instead, the program provides a
framework for collaborative planning. The statute authorizes the
California Department of Fish and Game to develop regional
guidelines for the development and implementation of NCCP
plans.274 The department, along with the California Resources
Agency, issued the first set of guidelines in the NCCP program in
1993. These are the Conservation and the Process Guidelines for
the CSS region.275 In 1998, the department issued more general
Process Guidelines for all the other NCCP regions patterned after
the Southern California CSS NCCP Process Guidelines. 276 In the
CSS region, the Conservation and Process Guidelines operate in
tandem to enable local communities to develop subregional
NCCP plans.277
Though it did not specifically approve the CSS Guidelines, the
FWS did cooperate in their preparation under a 1991 Memoran-
dum of Understanding.278 The Service also endorsed the month-
old Guidelines in its final 4(d) rule, which states that a plan must
272. For instance, the San Diego Multiple Species Conservation Program covers 85 spe-
cies and 23 vegetation types. See http://www.dfg.ca.gov/nccp/updates.htm.
273. Other state and federal programs, however, provide funding for acquisition of habi-
tat identified in plans as high priorities for reserves. See, e.g., Wildlife Conservation Board
Approves Grants for Natural Community Conservation Plan Efforts in Southern California (Sept
25, 2000) (describing six grants for the purchase of 1741.9 acres of habitat in San Diego and
San Bernardino County and noting that California received $ 5.6 million in land acquisition
funding under ESA § 6), at http://ceres.ca.gov/CRAN/NCCP/NCCP-release.htmL The
California Wildlife Conservation Board, operating under Cal. Fish and Game Code § 1320-
1324, has approved funding for 25 land acquisitions in the "NCCP planning areas of South-
ern California" totaling more than 11,700 acres. California Department of Fish and Game,
NCCP Update, at http://www.dfg.ca.gov/nccp/updates.htm (last modified Nov. 7, 2000).
Local governments also fund habitat acquisition. See, e.g., U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
California Department of Fish and Game, and County of San Diego, Implementing Agree-
ment 33-34 (Mar. 17, 1998), at http://www.co.san-
diego.ca.us/cnty/cntydepts/landuse/planning/mscp/index.h tml.
274. CAL. FISH AND GAME CODE § 2825(a) (West 1999).
275. California Department of Fish and Game, and California Resources Agency, South-
ern California Coastal Sage Scrub NCCP Conservation Guidelines (November 1993) at
http://ceres.ca.gov/CRA/NCCP/cgindex.htm [hereinafter Conservation Guidelines]; South-
ern California CSS NCCP Process Guidelines, supra note 264.
276. California Department of Fish and Game and California Resources Agency, NCCP
General Process Guidelines, Section V (January 1998) at
http://ceres.ca.gov/CRA/NCCP/genprocl/htm [hereinafter General Process Guidelines].
277. Conservation Guidelines, supra note 275, at Introduction; Welner supra note 252, at 344.
278. Southern California CSS NCCP General Process Guidelines, supra note 264, at Section 1.1
(citing the December 1991 MOU).
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conform to the NCCP. The NCCP, in turn, authorizes the Califor-
nia Department of Game and Fish to prepare "nonregulatory
guidelines for the development and implementation of natural
community conservation plans."279
The CSS Conservation Guidelines envision a patchwork of
subregional NCCPs that will form "a system of interconnected re-
serves designed to: 1) promote biological diversity, 2) provide for
high likelihoods for persistence of target species [including the
gnatcatcher] . . ., and 3) provide for no net loss of habitat value...
taking into account management and enhancement."280 The CSS
Conservation Guidelines build on the work of the NCCP Scientific
Review Panel (SRP), composed of prominent conservation biolo-
gists, which the California Department of Fish and Game and the
FWS commissioned to review available scientific information.281
The objective of the Conservation Guidelines is to facilitate the
production of "viable, long-term conservation plans and reserve
designs."282 The Conservation Guidelines describe what type of
biological information each plan must contain so that it can be
evaluated, approved, and implemented. 283
Not surprisingly for a set of guidelines based on the recommen-
dations of conservation biologists, the CSS Conservation Guide-
lines promote (ecosystem-wide) adaptive management in subre-
gional plans. The Guidelines envision that management of
reserves and restoration of habitat will play an important role in
NCCP plans. The Conservation Guidelines employ the reserve
design principles of conservation biology.284 These principles rec-
ommend that plans conserve target species throughout the subre-
gion, establish larger rather than smaller reserves, designate re-
279. CAL. FISH AND GAME CODE §2825(a) (West 1999); see supra note 274 and accompany-
ing text
280. Conservation Guidelines, supra note 275, at Section 3(d).
281. How the NCCP Pilot Program Began, available at
http://ceres.ca.gov/CRA/NCCP/nccp-pilotLprogram.html (last visited October 2000);
Welner, supra note 252, at 344; Conservation Guidelines, supra note 29, at Introduction.
Though the SRP completed its task in 1993, the California Department of Fish and Game
continued to consult with members of the panel How the NCCP Pilot Program Began, supra
note 281.
282. How the NCCP Pilot Program Began, supra note 281.
283. Id.
284. See GARY K. MEFFE & C. RONALD CARROLL, PRINCIPLES OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
(2d ed. 1997) (especially chs. 1 and 10). The NCCP General Process Guidelines make ex-
plicit the link between conservation biology principles and NCCP plans. General Process
Guidelines, supra note 263, at Section 111(B)(2)(d).
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serve areas close together, keep habitat contiguous, link reserves
with corridors, make reserves diverse, and protect reserves from
encroachment.285
The Conservation Guidelines, however, provide no precise
benchmarks for measuring the adequacy of plans. Instead, adap-
tive management will monitor and adjust exotic species control,
recreational use, fire, restoration unit size, vegetative responses to
soil conditions, and other key factors.8 While this flexibility to
respond to the discovered effects of development and conserva-
tion activity promotes continuous improvement, it leaves subre-
gions with few clear criteria for determining whether the initial
level of conservation in plans is adequate.287 Other than general
prescriptions for reserve design,2 8 the Guidelines will permit
plans to make their own trade-offs.
The CSS Process Guidelines shape the land use planning of the
ten to fifteen subregions in the CSS region, and serve as models
for other NCCP regions in the state.289 The important steps in the
subregional planning process are enrollment, establishment of a
planning agreement, collaborative development of a detailed final
subregional plan, and approval of an implementing agreement.290
The NCCP process begins when a local jurisdiction, such as a
city or county, enters into an enrollment agreement with the Cali-
fornia Department of Fish and Game.291 The enrollment agree-
ment commits the lead local agencies to follow the state Guide-
lines. By 1995, 40 major landowners and 30 local governments
had agreed to participate in the NCCP program, including
"[v]irtually all of the eligible habitat in both Orange and San
Diego Counties...."292 After enrollment, the local jurisdictions,
landowners, the Department of Fish and Game, and the FWS enter
285. Conservation Guidelines, supra note 275, at Section 3(d) (Conservation Planning Guid-
ance: Application to subregional planning).
286. Id. at Section 3(c) (Management and Restoration).
287. The only precise standards for habitat loss apply to interim planning, discussed infra
notes 299-310, and accompanying text.
288. Conservation Guidelines, supra note 275, at Section 3(c) (Management and Restoration)
and Section 5(c) (Evaluation Methods).
289. Southern California CSS NCCP Process Guidelines, supra note 264, at 1.1. The 1998
NCCP General Process Guidelines, which apply to all but the CSS region, are based on the
1993 CSS Process Guidelines.
290. Southern California CSS NCCP Process Guidelines, supra note 264, at Summary.
291. Id. at Section 3.3 (Program Enrollment).
292. Welner, supra note 252, at 345.
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into a planning agreement. The planning agreement sets forth the
basic parameters for applying the Guidelines to the subregion.
The agreement includes basic information such as the planning
boundary and the species, jurisdictions, permits, landowners, and
local planning and public participation requirements in the subre-
gion.293 The planning agreement must also include a timetable.294
The Process Guidelines encourage local governments to adapt the
NCCP process to their exiting procedures "relating to plan prepa-
ration, public participation, public hearing, and environmental re-
view."295 The Guidelines, however, encourage subregions to set
out enhanced, collaborative public participation processes in the
planning agreement. 296 This collaboration occurs under the aus-
pices of the lead local jurisdiction or agency. Recent amendments
to the NCCP Act also require the planning agreement to establish
a process for independent scientific input and analysis in plan de-
velopment.297
Development in a subregion engaged in the NCCP process need
not halt. The 4(d) rule allows a subregion actively engaged in the
NCCP process to avoid Section 9 liability for incidental takes so
long as the taking activity abides by the Guidelines. 298 The Con-
servation Guidelines require that not more than five percent of
primarily low quality coastal sage scrub habitat be lost during in-
terim planning.299 The Guidelines also require that short-term
losses of habitat be minimized and long-term conservation plan-
ning options not be foreclosed by interim takes.3°° Once a subre-
gion reaches the five percent limit on the loss of habitat, no 4(d)
shield to Section 9 liability is available until the state and FWS ap-
prove a final NCCP plan.3°1 This quantitative limit on habitat loss
293. Southern California CSS NCCP Process Guidelines, supra note 264, at Section 5.1 (Plan-
ning Agreement).
294. Id.
295. Id. at Section 5 (Subregional Planning).
296. Id.
297. S.B. 1679 § 2,1999-2000 Session (Cal.) (codified at CAL. FISH AND GAME CODE § 2811
(West 2000)).
298. 50 C.F.R. § 17.41 (b) (3).
299. Conservation Guidelines, supra note 275, at Section 3(a) (The Interim Strategy). This
interim planning limit is commonly known as the "5% limit" See also Welner, supra note
252, at 344.
300. Conservation Guidelines, supra note 275, at Section 3(a) (The Interim Strategy), and
Section 5(a) (Ranking Land for Interim Protection); Special Rule Concerning take of the
Threatened Coastal California Gnatcatcher, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,088, 65,090 (Dec. 10,1993).
301. Special Rule Concerning Take of Threatened Coastal California Gnatcatcher, 58 Fed.
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and the mandate to minimize are the strongest criteria in the Con-
servation Guidelines. The actual, final subregional plans may de-
viate from these interim limits.
Once a subregion has developed a draft plan, it submits the plan
along with the necessary NEPA and California state environ-
mental impact review documents to the Department of Fish and
Game and the FWS. The public has the opportunity to comment
on the draft.302 The state and federal agencies then review the
draft plan by applying the Conservation Guidelines, as well as
applicable statutory criteria. 303 The Process Guidelines specify
that the FWS will apply the criteria for issuance of an ESA inci-
dental take permit in evaluating the draft plan.304 As we have
noted earlier, the FWS has interpreted these criteria to require no
jeopardy, not necessarily recovery.305 Along with the absence of
strong substantive recovery criteria and the lack of firm time lines
for conservation benchmarks in the CSS Conservation Guidelines,
this makes federal review of the subregional plans weak. Indeed,
the Process Guidelines anticipate that ongoing involvement of the
FWS in the planning process will lead to acceptance of the draft
that results. 30 6 The lack of specific substantive criteria, addressing
the biological needs of the gnatcatcher, for FWS approval of local
plans enjoying the Section 4(d) shield from the otherwise applica-
ble take prohibitions is the single greatest problem with the gnat-
catcher experiment.
Based on the public and agency response to the draft plan, the
subregional lead agency prepares a final NCCP plan. The De-
partment of Fish and Game and the FWS officially approve the
plan through an implementing agreement with the local lead
Reg. at 65,090.
302. CAL. FISH AND GAME CODE § 2815 (West 1999).
303. Southern California CSS NCCP Process Guidelines, supra note 264, at Section 5.3 (Public
and Agency Review).
304. Id.
305. See supra notes 124-131, and accompanying text. This interpretation creates a gap
between what the criteria require (no jeopardy) and what the Act requires of the 4(d) rule
(recovery).
306. Southern California CSS NCCP Process Guidelines, supra note 264, at Summary (Subre-
gional Planning Process) and Section 5.3 (Public and Agency Review). In the unlikely
event that the Department of Fish and Game and the FWS cannot accept the draft NCCP,
the agencies have 60 days to provide a report containing the reasons for rejecting the plan
and suggested modifications that would result in its acceptance. Southern California CSS
NCCP Process Guidelines, supra note 264, at Section 5.3 (Public and Agency Review).
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agency.3 7 The implementing agreement replaces the interim, five
percent standard with the terms of the final NCCP plan. The FWS
approval also triggers coverage of the NCCP plan by the 4(d) rule
exception to the take prohibition for the gnatcatcher in the area.
The implementing agreement, which binds the parties with en-
forceable assurances of implementation and funding commit-
ments, should contain all the terms and conditions on activities
authorized under the NCCP subregional plan.308 These include
periodic reporting to demonstrate compliance and to facilitate
monitoring of the Guidelines by the agencies and adaptive man-
agement by the subregions.3 9 The implementing agreement must
provide procedures for amending or suspending the plan.310
c. The San Diego Multiple Species Conservation Program
One of the earliest and largest subregional applications of the
CSS regional guidelines is the San Diego Multiple Species Conser-
vation Program (MSCP). Approved in December 1996 by the Cali-
fornia Department of Fish and Game and the FWS, the subre-
gional plan encompasses 582,000 acres in southwestern San Diego
County.311 The Secretary of the Interior lauded the local govern-
ments in the subregion for developing the complex MSCP under
conditions of tremendous development pressure. 312 The MSCP
subdivides the large subregion into eleven planning subareas to
implement the broad subregional program.313 Although we are
primarily concerned with the relationship between the local plans
and conservation of gnatcatcher habitat, the MSCP subarea plans
307. Southern California CSS NCCP Process Guidelines, supra note 264, at Section 5.4 (Im-
plementing Agreement and Formal NCCP Approval).
308. Id.; Special Rule Concerning Take of the Threatened Coastal California Gnatcatcher,
58 Fed. Reg. 65,088, 65,092 (Dec. 10, 1993).
309. Southern California CSS NCCP Process Guidelines, supra note 264, at Summary (Subre-
gional Planning Process).
310. Special Rule Concerning Take of the Threatened Coastal California Gnatcatcher, 58
Fed. Reg. at 65,094.
311. California Department of Fish & Game, NCCP Update, at
http://www.dfg.ca.gov/nccp/updates.htm (last modified Oct. 5, 2001). The MSCP estab-
lishes a 172,000 acre preserve in this subregion. Id.
312. Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service Press Release, Interior Secretary
Praises 'Monumental Conservation Achievement' in San Diego County (Oct. 23, 1997), at
http://www.fws.gov/%7Er9extaff/pr/sdmscpco.html (asserting that the MSCP is a blue-
print for the future that "balances the conservation of ecologically-sensitive areas with the
need to accommodate long-term economic development") (last visited Nov. 28,2001).
313. California Department of Fish and Game, NCCP Update, at
http://www.dfg.ca.gov/nccp/updates.htm (last modified Oct. 5,2001).
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seek to conserve all of the species and ecosystems in the area. So,
gnatcatcher recovery, though a spur to NCCP plan development,
is but one component of a broader system of reserves and modifi-
cations to development.314
This subsection focuses on the County of San Diego MSCP Su-
barea Plan, which implements the MSCP within the unincorpo-
rated areas under the jurisdiction of San Diego County.31 5 The
County Subarea Plan, approved by the state and federal agencies
in March 1998,316 is significant because it is the largest subarea
plan currently in force and it contains a significant amount of
coastal sage scrub habitat.317 Moreover, because the undeveloped
areas in the MSCP subregion are disproportionately under the
planning jurisdiction of the County of San Diego, most of the habi-
tat targeted for reserves occurs in the unincorporated areas of the
county.318 In the Russian-doll world of NCCP planning, this su-
barea plan is itself divided into three geographic segments.31 9 For
the purposes of this article, however, we will consider generally
how the County Subarea Plan protects gnatcatcher habitat from
adverse impacts of development.
After surveying the 73% of the County Subarea that provides
habitat for native species,320 the county established numerical
goals for conservation. For instance, the plan sets the gnatcatcher
314. The MSCP and the San Diego County Subarea Plan cover 85 species of concern
California Department of Fish & Game, NCCP Update, at
http://www.dfg.ca.gov/nccp/updates.htm (last modified Oct. 5, 2001); County of San
Diego, Multiple Species Conservation Program Subarea Plan, (Oct. 22, 1997), at
http://www.co.san-diego.caus/cnty/cntydepts/landuse/planning/mscp/index.html
[hereinafter MSCP Subarea Plan]. Julia Levin notes that many large-scale habitat conserva-
tion plans in California are being used as "de facto land use plans, either wholly supplant-
ing comprehensive land use planning updates or superseding many of the decisions that
should be made during those updates." JuLiA A. LEVIN, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS
(HCPS) AND LAND USE PLANNING IN CALIFORNIA 4 & 23 (June 2000) (unpublished report for
Union of Concerned Scientists, on file with Columbia Journal of Environmental Law).
315. MSCP Subarea Plan, supra note 314, at 1-1.
316. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, California Department of Fish and Game, & County
of San Diego, supra note 273.
317. California Department of Fish & Game, supra note 313. Coastal sage scrub habitat
composes 28 percent of the land in the County Subarea. MSCP Subarea Plan, supra note
314, at 1-10.
318. MSCP Subarea Plan, supra note 314, at 1-17.
319. Id. at 1-1. To review the terminology, the NCCP divisions are, from larger areas to
smaller: region (CSS), subregion (MSCP), subarea (County of San Diego), and segment (ar-
ea within the jurisdiction of the county, such as Lake Hodges).
320. Id. at 1-10. The remaining 27% of the Subarea is "disturbed, developed, or agricul-
tural land" having little habitat value. Id.
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goal of protecting 95% of the existing 937 occurrences of the
bird.321 This constitutes about half of the gnatcatchers in the
whole MSCP subregion. 322 Reflecting the NCCP Conservation
Guidelines, the subarea plan concentrates on protecting habitat
reserves and linkages between the reserves as the principal means
of achieving its goals. Much of the planning effort, therefore, is
designation of which areas will be dedicated for preservation and
which for development.323 The county maintains records that
show the location, habitat types, and acres of habitat of the areas
earmarked for preservation.324 The plan thus provides landowners
with certainty in what activities can be conducted without ESA li-
ability and which areas are amenable for further development.
The plan limits permissible uses within preserves to ensure the
viability of habitat. Generally prohibited in land designated as
preserve is: grading, excavation, filling, clearing, construction of
buildings or structures, driving, dumping, and planting.325 In
some cases, a public entity will purchase land in the preserve
zone, but in other situations the public will acquire an open space
or conservation easement or covenant.326
The County Subarea Plan also establishes guidelines for uses in
areas adjacent to preserves. These buffer zones should be com-
patible with the preserve and include restrictions on landscaping,
structures, lighting, and fencing.327 The plan identifies a number
of open space uses that are compatible with adjacent preserves.328
For development that adversely impacts sensitive habitats, the
plan requires mitigation. The County established extensive miti-
gation procedures and offsite mitigation banking through an or-
321. Id. at 1-16.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 1-18.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 1-20.
326. MSCP Subarea Plan, supra note 314, at 1-29. Though the county "has failed to set
aside the $3 million per year that it committed to in the MSCP," Levin, supra note 314, at 29,
it has been paying comparable sums for preserve acquisition through its general fund. E-
mail from Dan Silver, Coordinator, Endangered Habitats League (Feb. 25, 2002) (on file
with author). Levin also reports that transportation decisions made subsequent to the plan
"seriously undermine the conservation measures and protected areas contained in those
plans." Levin, supra note 314 at 29. If the county has failed to abide by the terms of the
plan, the Service may need to revoke the plan's authorization. We explore this issue infra
note 482 and accompanying text.
327. MSCP Subarea Plan, supra note 314, at 1-26-1-27.
328. Id.
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dinance and Board of Supervisors' policy.329 The 1997 mitigation
ordinance, like the County Subarea Plan itself, reflects the NCCP
Conservation Guidance perspective of conservation biology. The
ordinance sets out design criteria for preserves, linkages, and cor-
ridors.33° It provides standards for avoiding impacts to preserves,
and mitigation requirements that the county will impose for all
projects requiring a discretionary permit.331 Some of the ordi-
nance's requirements are numerically specific, such as the limita-
tion on encroachment on sensitive species, which "shall not ex-
ceed 20% of the population on site."332 Projects must be designed
to avoid and minimize disturbance to habitat before employing
specific mitigation measures.333 The ordinance also establishes
specific mitigation ratios where impacted land is offset on a miti-
gation site.334 The mitigation ordinance is a good example of a lo-
cal government providing substantive habitat protection because
of the cooperative federalism established in a 4(d) rule.
Also reflecting the NCCP Guidelines, the implementing agree-
ment for the Subarea Plan provides for adaptive preserve man-
agement through monitoring, reporting, and adjusting criteria.
The monitoring and reporting provisions of the agreement are ex-
tensive and include: continual habitat acreage accounting, an an-
nual report and public workshop on habitat status, an annual im-
plementation meeting (which may require "altering management
activities or redirecting mitigation"), reports, hearings, and au-
dits.3 In addition to specifying the acreage of preserve land the
county is to establish, the implementation agreement also binds
the county to prepare management plans and area-specific man-
agement directives to ensure preservation.3 6
Because the FWS applies the ESA Section 10 incidental take
329. San Diego County, Cal., Ordinance 8845 (Oct. 22, 1997) (included in the MSCP Su-
barea Plan) available at http://www.co.san-
diego.ca.us/cnty/cntydepts/landuse/planning/mscp/index.htnl; San Diego County, Cal.
Board of Supervisors Policy No. 1-117 (Mitigation Banking Policy) (attachment L of Biologi-
cal Mitigation Ordinance); MSCP Subarea Plan, supra note 314, at 1-30.
330. San Diego County, Cal., Ordinance 8845 (Oct. 22,1997), at Attachments G, H.
331. Id. at Art. I.
332. Id. at Art. VII(A)(1)(b). Another specific criterion applies to habitat of the gnat-
catcher, which may not be graded between March 1 and August 15. Id. at VII(A)(4)(ii).
333. Id. at Art. V(A).
334. Id. at Attachment M.
335. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, California Department of Fish and Game, & County
of San Diego, supra note 273, at 37-39.
336. Id. at 26-32.
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permit criteria in approving plans that will be exempted from the
take requirements pursuant to the 4(d) rule, it regards the imple-
mentation agreement as the basis for issuance of an incidental take
permit. In addition to applying the lower, "no jeopardy" standard
to the county's program rather than the conservation standard of
Section 4(d), the FWS also incorporates other attributes of the ESA
Section 10 permit process. For instance, the implementing agree-
ment establishes a standard of "extraordinary (or, unforeseen) cir-
cumstances" that the Service must demonstrate by clear and con-
vincing data before it may require additional conservation
measures. 337 This high burden of reopening the agreement con-
trasts with the federal government's usual retained authority to
require additional environmental controls when circumstances
indicate that permits or programs are failing to meet established
goals.3m
2. The Puget Sound Salmon Listings
The NCCP program is an intermediate step on the road to more
comprehensive species protection under Section 4(d). Though an
innovation in employing cooperative federalism, the HCP orienta-
tion of the gnatcatcher 4(d) rule limits its ability to promote recov-
ery. The most important proving ground for the potential of 4(d)
rules will be in the Pacific Northwest, where the NMFS has listed
as threatened several runs of anadromous fish. It is here that local
plans addressing habitat must contribute to recovery in order to
qualify under a 4(d) rule as a limitation on the take prohibition.
This section examines the efforts in Washington State to retain lo-
cal control over land use in areas where development affects
salmon habitat.
The NMFS uses the term "evolutionarily significant units"
("ESUs") to define the distinct population segments of anadro-
mous fish species it protects under the ESA. These separate ESUs
are reproductively isolated because they "run," or breed, at differ-
ent times of the year and in different watersheds. 339 In recent
337. Id. at 13-14. See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text for a description of the
no surprises" policy for Section 10(a) permits.
338. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 122.44 (1999) (NPDES permits); 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(5) (2001) (SIP
revisions).
339. See generally Phillip S. Levin & Michael H. Schiewe, Preserving Salmon Biodiversity, 89
AM. SCIENTIsT 220 (2001) (providing a description of the genetic diversity of salmon and its
relation to the reproductive isolation of salmon runs).
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years, the NMFS has promulgated a number of threatened ESU
listings for anadromous fish.340 However, the most important list-
ing for using cooperative federalism through a 4(d) rule occurred
in March, 1999, when the NMFS designated as threatened several
ESUs341 that occur in the Puget Sound and near other urban cen-
ters.342 This part focuses on the Puget Sound chinook salmon ESU,
included in the March 1999 listing, which affects millions of peo-
ple in the Seattle, Bellevue, and Takoma area.343 If incorporating
habitat conservation into existing local land use controls will work
anywhere, it should work in this urban region, where regulation
of development is relatively familiar.
Subsection (a) of this part describes the 4(d) rule that NMFS
340. See Listing of Several Evolutionary Significant Units (ESUs) of West Coast Steelhead,
62 Fed. Reg. 43,937 (Aug. 18, 1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R pts. 222 and 227) (listing the
Snake River Basin, Central California Coast, and South/Central California Coast steelhead
as threatened); Threatened Status for Two ESUs of Steelhead in Washington, Oregon, and
California, 63 Fed. Reg. 13,347 (Mar. 19,1998) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227) (listing the
Lower Columbia River and Central Valley, California steelhead); Threatened Status for the
Oregon Coast Evolutionary Significant Unit of Coho Salmon, 63 Fed. Reg. 42,587 (Aug. 10,
1998) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227). A recent, startling decision of a federal district
court overturned the August 1998 listing of the coho salmon. Alsea Valley Alliance v. Ev-
ans, 161 F. Supp.2d 1154 (D. Or. 2001). The court found the Service's policy to exclude
hatchery fish from the populations of the ESUs invalid under the ESA listing provision that
prohibits distinctions below the level of distinct population segments. Id. at 1162 If this
holding stands on appeal, it will call into question many more NMFS listing decisions.
Unless the NMFS can show that hatchery-bred fish are a separate, distinct population seg-
ment, and therefore substantially reproductively isolated from natural runs under its regu-
latory standard, then it may not exclude the hatchery fish from the populations considered
for listing. Id.
341. Threatened Status for Two ESUs of Steelhead in Washington and Oregon, 64 Fed.
Reg. 14,517 (Mar. 25,1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R pt. 223) (listing the Middle Columbia
River (MRCI) and Upper Willamette River (UWR) steelhead); Threatened Status for Three
Chinook Salmon Evolutionary Significant Units (ESUs) in Washington and Oregon, and
Endangered Status for One Chinook Salmon ESU in Washington, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,308 (Mar.
24,1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.Rt pts. 223 and 224) (listing the Puget Sound, Lower Co-
lumbia River and Upper Willamette River ESUs of West Coast chinook salmon in Washing-
ton and Oregon); Threatened Status for Ozette Lake Sockeye Salmon in Washington, 64
Fed. Reg. 14,528 (Mar. 25, 1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. p t 223); Threatened Status for
Two ESUs of Chum Salmon in Washington and Oregon, 64 Fed. Reg 14,508 (Mar. 25,1999)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt 223) (listing the Hood Canal Summer-run and Columbia
River chum salmon in Washington and Oregon).
342. These centers include the Seattle-Takoma-Bremerton metropolitan area containing
3.5 million people and the Portland-Vancouver metropolitan area containing over 1.8 mil-
lion people. U.S. Census Bureau, Metropolitan Area Population Estimates for July 1,1999
at www.census.gov/population/esimates/metro-city/ma99-02.txt (last visited Feb. 22,
2001).
343. Lynda V. Mapes & Ross Anderson, Nine Runs of Salmon Hit Endangered List Today,
SEATLE TIMES, Mar. 16,1999, at Al.
20021 Cooperative Federalism and the Endangered Species Act 111
promulgated in 2000 for 14 listed ESUs. The 4(d) rule establishes
the framework for federal approval of state programs that will
avoid Section 9 liability and conserve habitat. Then, Subsection
(b) describes the patchwork of programs that Washington has cre-
ated to respond to the decline in anadromous fish populations.
Subsection (c) focuses on the plan by jurisdictions in the Puget
Sound region to qualify under the 4(d) rule in order to avoid li-
ability and recover the Puget Sound chinook salmon.
a. The West Coast Salmon 4(d) Rule
The rule listing the Puget Sound chinook salmon ESU as threat-
ened described a wide range of factors that contribute to the de-
cline in the fish population. The species suffers habitat degrada-
tion from dams, forest practices, and agricultural activities in a
manner similar to other listed salmon.344 However, it is particu-
larly affected by urban development in the region. The final rule
states that "[i]ncreasing percentages of land in the Puget Sound
area are composed of impermeable surfaces, and the reductions in
habitat quality due to point- and non-point source pollutants have
been widespread.... [R]ecent research has shown that juvenile
chinook salmon from a contaminated estuary in Puget Sound are
more susceptible to disease pathogens than are juvenile chinook
salmon from a non-urban estuary." 345 The urban setting may cre-
ate special challenges for recovering Puget Sound chinook, but it
also provides a basis for successful application of a comprehen-
sive conservation plan under ESA Section 4(d).
The NMFS promulgated the final 4(d) Rule for fourteen listed
ESUs of salmon and steelhead in the Federal Register on July 10,
2000.346 In its March, 1999, listing of threatened salmon ESUs, the
NMFS had promised that it would issue a 4(d) rule.347 At least
one regional association of local governments eagerly proceeded
with a conservation plan (the Puget Sound Tri-County Initiative)
and was ready to submit it for approval on June 21, 2000, the day
after the NMFS announced its final rule but more than two weeks
before promulgation in the Federal Register.348 This readiness to
344. Threatened Status for Three Chinook Salmon ESUs, 64 Fed. Reg. at 14,318-19.
345. Id. at 14,319.
346. Final Rule Governing Take of 14 Threatened Salmon and Steelhead Evolutionary
Significant Units (ESUs), 65 Fed. Reg. 42,422 (July 10, 2000).
347. Threatened Status for Three Chinook Salmon ESUs, 64 Fed. Reg. at 14,325.
348. Susan Gordon, Saving Salmon Called Job for All: Federal Protection Plan Due, but Offi-
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engage in a cooperative relationship with the NMFS stems from
the region's interest in sustaining development through expand-
ing and improving existing land use controls and incentives.
The final 4(d) rule generally extends to the threatened salmon
ESUs the same prohibitions on take that apply to endangered
animals. However, for those activities that the NMFS certifies as
contributing to recovery under a number of categorical limitations
of the general rule, there will be no Section 9 liability. The NMFS
calls these categorical exceptions "limits on the take prohibitions"
to distinguish them from binding, proscriptive regulations.349 The
rule emphasizes that an activity which fails to fall within a limit
does not necessarily violate the ESA. Instead, it means that the ac-
tivity is subject to the general prohibition on take and may give
rise to direct or indirect liability.350 The federal rule does not
compel any jurisdiction to seek approval of a plan or program un-
der the 4(d) rule. Still, the incentive to gain NMFS approval under
the 4(d) rule is great because it protects from liability both the
governmental unit and the private entities proceeding in compli-
ance with the local program. Private developers, for instance,
need not negotiate incidental take permits for habitat disturbing
activities affecting listed salmon if the development is covered by
a local program approved under the 4(d) rule.
The 4(d) rule creates thirteen categories of limitations to the take
prohibitions.351 Some of the limitations are very narrowly drawn
to cover activities complying with particular programs the NMFS
has already approved or has nearly approved. These programs
cials Say State, Local - and Public - Help Needed, THE NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), June 21,
2000, at A2.
349. Final Rule Governing Take of 14 Threatened Salmon and Steelhead ESUs, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 42,423-24.
350. Id. at 42,423.
351. 50 C.F.R. § 223.203 (2001). The 13 categories of limits to the take prohibition are: (1)
ESA permits already granted under Section 7 or Section 10, (2) ongoing scientific research
by state fishery agencies, (3) rescue and salvage actions, (4) fishery management, (5) artifi-
cial propagation, (6) Joint Tribal/State Plans Developed under the United States v. Washing-
ton or United States v. Oregon Settlement Processes, (7) scientific research, particularly by
state fishery management agencies, (8) certain habitat restoration activities, (9) water diver-
sion screening operated according to the Rule, (10) routine road maintenance conforming
to ODOT's approved plan or others approved by NMFS, (11) Portland Park's Integrated
Pest Management, (12) forest management in Washington that conforms to certain guide-
lines that must be adopted by Washington's Forest Practices Board, and (13) Municipal,
Residential, Commercial, and Industrial (MRCI) development and redevelopment that
must be developed according to guidelines in the Rule.
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include the Oregon Department of Transportation's road mainte-
nance plan,352 the City of Portland Parks and Recreation Depart-
ment's pest management program,353 and the Washington forest
practices control program.354 Other limitations apply to fairly nar-
row categories of activities that are carefully monitored, such as
scientific research, fisheries management and habitat restora-
tion.355
The most important category for a limitation on take is munici-
pal, residential, commercial and industrial (MRCI) development
activities. Most urban development control programs, such as the
Tri-County Initiative,356 will fall under this limitation. However,
plans are not restricted to receiving limits under only one cate-
gory. For instance, comprehensive land use plans will likely in-
clude habitat restoration and may seek partial approval under that
category. 357
The NMFS intends the MRCI category to protect the threatened
salmon ESUs, such as the Puget Sound chinook, that reside in ur-
ban areas while avoiding delays, multiple permits, and frag-
mented conservation efforts that can occur under the general Sec-
tion 9 take prohibitions. In order for MRCI development activities
to avoid the general take prohibition, they must occur pursuant to
an ordinance or governmental plan that the NMFS determines
adequately conserves the ESU.358 The NMFS will make this de-
termination by evaluating twelve considerations that judge the ex-
tent to which a proposed ordinance, plan, or program:
1. ensures that development will avoid inappropriate areas
such as unstable slopes, wetlands, areas of high habitat
value, and similarly constrained sites;
2. prevents stormwater discharge impacts on water quality
and quantity and stream flow patterns in the watershed-
including peak and base flows in perennial streams;
352. Id. § 223.203(b)(10) (the Transportation Maintenance Management System Water
Quality and Habitat Guide).
353. Id. § 223.203(b)(11).
354. Id. § 223.203 (b)(13) (the Forest and Fish Report).
355. Id. §§ 223.203(b)(2), (4), (5), (6), (7).
356. See infra notes 431-446 and accompanying text.
357. The Tri-County Plan is a good example-it contains sections on road maintenance
and other land use activities that are likely to fall under the auspices of development, and
also contains a section on habitat planning.
358. Final Rule Governing Take of 14 Threatened Salmon and Steelhead ESUs, 65 Fed.
Reg. At 42,480 (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 223.203(b)(12)(i) (2001)).
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3. protects riparian areas well enough to attain or maintain
properly functioning conditions (PFC) around all rivers, es-
tuaries, streams, lakes, deepwater habitats, and intermittent
streams, and offers compensatory mitigation, where neces-
sary, to offset unavoidable damage to PFC in riparian man-
agement areas;
4. avoids stream crossings (whether by roads, utilities, or
other linear development) wherever possible and, where
crossings must be provided, minimizes impacts;
5. protects historic stream meander patterns and channel mi-
gration zones and avoids hardening stream banks and
shorelines;
6. protects wetlands and wetland function, including isolated
wetlands;
7. preserves the hydrologic capacity of waters to pass peak
flows;
8. includes adequate provisions for landscaping with native
vegetation to reduce the need for watering and application
of herbicides, pesticides, and fertilizer;
9. includes provisions to prevent erosion and sediment run-off
during construction;
10. ensures that water supply demands can be met without im-
pacting flows needed by the ESUs and that any new water
diversions are positioned and screened in a way that pre-
vents injury or death of salmonids;
11. provides mechanisms for monitoring, enforcement, fund-
ing, reporting, and implementation, and periodic (at inter-
vals not to exceed five years) evaluation; and
12. complies with all other state and Federal environmental and
natural resource laws and permits.359
In addition to the twelve substantive considerations, the 4(d)
rule also specifies special procedures for approval and mainte-
nance of an MRCI development program. The NMFS must pub-
lish notice in the Federal Register of consideration of an MRCI de-
velopment program for approval for a limit on take prohibitions
and allow at least thirty days for public comment.360 Local gov-
ernments operating approved MRCI development programs must
359. Id. § 223.203(b)(12)(i).
360. Id. § 223.203(b)(12)(iv).
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submit annual reports to the NMFS. 361 The reports must describe
implementation and effectiveness of the programs.362 This ongo-
ing evaluation will enable the NMFS periodically to review the
program to ensure it is providing for conservation of the ESUs.363
The NMFS may identify changes needed to support conservation
goals. Local governments then have up to one year to make the
changes before the NMFS promulgates an announcement of its in-
tention to withdraw approval from the program.364
This monitoring and oversight of the MRCI development pro-
grams approved for a limit on the take prohibition echoes a
broader theme of the 4(d) rule to track both implementation of the
programs approved and the terms of the 4(d) rule itself in order to
adapt to new information and changed circumstances.365 The sci-
entific standard of attaining the "properly functioning conditions"
(PFC) is the basis in the MRCI development limit on take, and in
the other parts of the 4(d) rule, for measuring progress toward
ESU recovery. The "NMFS defines PFC as the sustained presence
of [a watershed's] natural habitat-forming processes that are nec-
essary for the long-term survival of salmonids through the full
range of environmental variation."366 The biological processes of
361. Id. § 223.203(b)(12)(ii).
36Z Id.
363. Id. § 223.203(b)(12)(iii). Though the first sentence of 50 C.F.R1 § 223.203(b)(12)(iii)
could be read to focus on the activities approved under a program rather than the program
itself, the overall concern of this part of the 4(d) rule is programmatic. Furthermore, the
commentary in the final Federal Register promulgation stresses the importance of monitor-
ing and reviewing programs. See, e.g., Final Rule Governing Take of 14 Threatened Salmon
and Steelhead ESUs, 65 Fed. Reg. at 42,426 (comment and response 9); Id. at 42,459-60
(comment and response 245). Still, the NMFS states that it does plan to review each MRCI
project's monitoring plan, though it adds the seemingly contradictory caveat that it will not
have a role in individual project reviews. Id. at 42,457-58 (comment and response 231).
Given the Service's limited resources, it is likely that the individual project plan review,
even of monitoring alone, will not receive much attention. See Id. at 42,459 (comment and
response 242). This is appropriate given the cooperative federalism framework that should
focus NMFS oversight on the local jurisdictions' implementation and monitoring rather
than individual projects. As in the pollution control setting, it will be the exception rather
than the rule for the federal agency to intervene in a particular state/local permit proceed-
ing.
364. 50 C.F.R. § 223.203(b)(12)(ii) (2001).
365. See, e.g., Final Rule Governing Take of 14 Threatened Salmon and Steelbead ESUs,
65 Fed. Reg. at 42,424 ("This final rule may be amended to add new limits on the take pro-
hibitions, or to amend or delete limits as circumstances warrant."); Id. at 42,426 (comment
and response 9); Id. at 42,459-60 (comment and response 245).
366. 50 C.F.R. §§ 223.203(b)(11)(vii), (b)(12)(iii) (2001). See Final Rule Governing Take of
14 Threatened Salmon and Steelhead ESUs, 65 Fed. Reg. at 42,431-32 (discussing the PFC as
a basis for evaluating habitat).
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spawning, breeding, rearing, feeding, migrating, and sheltering
are among the essential functions habitat supports.367 The proc-
esses monitored to evaluate risks to PFC include vegetation
growth, sediment load transport, and rainfall runoff patterns.368
For the purposes of this article, the details of how the NMFS can
actually measure the PFC criteria 369 is less important than the exis-
tence of a habitat-based recovery standard to ensure continued
progress toward conservation under the 4(d) rule. This is an ex-
ample of the NMFS applying the principle of adaptive manage-
ment to comprehensive conservation.
However, more important (and more open to question) is
whether NMFS will use the PFC framework to identify risks and
insist on risk reductions. Though it is difficult to predict how ag-
gressively the Service will use its discretion, the 4(d) rule does
provide enough supplemental material to permit citizen groups to
threaten enforcement of the PFC limitation if the NMFS is not
vigilant. We address the problem of lax agency exercise of discre-
tion at V(B)(5).
Still, critics have challenged the validity of the 4(d) rule on the
basis that it lacks clear and enforceable standards. Specifically, the
Washington Environmental Council and a coalition of other envi-
ronmental organizations charge that the twelve MRCI develop-
ment considerations are vague and cannot ensure that only plans
contributing to recovery receive NMFS approval.370 The environ-
mental groups are correct to press for more specific, measurable
criteria for approval of limitations on take. It would provide
greater certainty to local jurisdictions as well as to environmental-
ists attempting to predict how NMFS will exercise its discretion.
The problem, however, is that more specific, measurable criteria
may not be possible given both our ignorance of the precise condi-
tions for salmon recovery and the site-specific nature of the harm
367. Final Rule Governing Take of 14 Threatened Salmon and Steelhead ESUs, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 42,431.
368. Id.
369. For these details, see Final Rule Governing Take of 14 Threatened Salmon and
Steelhead ESUs, 65 Fed. Reg. at 42,431; National Marine Fisheries Service, A Citizen's Guide
to the 4(d) Rule for Threatened Salmon and Steelhead on the West Coast 25-26 (June 20, 2000), at
http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/lsalmon/salmesa/4ddocs/citguide.htm. In summary, NMFS
employs an "analytic methodology" matrix to determine the risks to PFC from an activity.
370. Washington EnvtL. Council v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. COO-1547R (W.D.
Wash. Sept. 12, 2000). In addition to the MRCI limitation, the lawsuit also challenges the
4(d) limit on take for the Washington forest practices control program.
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done through environmental degradation. Moreover, the third
consideration, employing the properly functioning conditions
standard, may offer an objective, scientific basis for evaluating the
effects of MRCI development programs and requiring mitigation.
The plaintiffs argue that the NMFS should, in the 4(d) rule, estab-
lish minimum sizes of riparian buffers and identify unstable
slopes to avoid.371 But, these are the kind of the site-specific appli-
cations best left to local jurisdictions to propose and support based
on the broader standards in the 4(d) rule. As long as the local ju-
risdiction has the burden of showing how its development limits
meet the twelve considerations, it should have the flexibility to set
its own numerical limitations.
Despite the likelihood that the 4(d) rule's MRCI development
limit will not run afoul of the Administrative Procedure Act's ar-
bitrary and capricious standard of review in the pending litiga-
tion,372 the rule could be improved. The most important im-
provement would be to transform the twelve considerations that
the Service, under the existing 4(d) rule, must merely consider in
approving plans into binding criteria. The current rule appears to
allow the NMFS to approve plans that fail to meet one or more of
the considerations as long as the agency takes into account the
situation in preparing its administrative record.373 A better rule
would limit the NMFS' discretion to approve only programs that
fulfill twelve listed conditions.
In addition to the requirements of the 4(d) rule, the NMFS also
expressed a number of preferences. For instance, the 4(d) rule
seeks to encourage area-wide comprehensive planning. Thus, the
NMFS stated in its commentary to the final 4(d) rule that it will
give greater priority to comprehensive plans rather than individ-
ual ordinances in order to promote greater efficiency and to pro-
tect the full suite of essential ecological functions.374
Also, the NMFS expects local governments that submit plans,
programs, or ordinances for limits on the take prohibition under
the 4(d) rule to develop some basic information to help the Service
and citizens evaluate the application. The Citizen's Guide that the
371. Id. at III(C)(1).
372. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2001) (defining the scope of judicial review of challenged agency
action); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
373. 50 C.F.R. § 223.203(b)(12)(i) (2001).
374. Final Rule Governing Take of 14 Threatened Salmon and Steelhead ESUs, 65 Fed.
Reg. 42,422,42,459 (comment and response 242).
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NMFS published as a companion to the 4(d) rule suggests that an
application for a limit on take contain the following features:
1. Descriptions of the activity or program being proposed, the
geographic area within which the proposed ac-
tion/ program will apply or be carried out, and the jurisdic-
tion or entity responsible for overseeing the ac-
tion/program.
2. A description of the listed species and habitat that will be
affected by the action. This information should include fish
distribution and abundance in the affected area and a de-
scription of the type, quantity, and quality of habitat in the
affected area.
3. A description of the environmental baseline. This informa-
tion should describe existing habitat conditions in terms of
water quality, access, riparian areas, stream channels, flow,
and watershed health indicators such as total impervious
area and any existing high quality habitat areas.
4. A description of the anticipated short-term and long-term
impacts the action is expected to have on the species (in-
cluding all life-cycle stages) and its habitat. This description
should include both positive and negative impacts and de-
scribe how any adverse impacts will be avoided, mitigated,
or minimized.
5. A discussion of the likelihood that the program or action
will be implemented as described. Some questions that
would need to be answered are: What commitment has
been made to carry out the action or program? Are the legal
authorities needed to carry out the program in place? Is im-
plementation funding available and adequate? Is staffing
available and adequate? What is the schedule for imple-
mentation? If the program is currently being implemented,
what is its record of implementation and effectiveness to
date?
6. A program for monitoring both the action's implementation
and effectiveness. It should include a schedule for conduct-
ing monitoring and submitting reports.
7. A method for using monitoring information to change ac-
tions when needed - adaptive management.375
Finally, the Citizen's Guide also offers examples of the kinds of
375. National Marine Fisheries Service, supra note 369, at 21.
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activities that would likely injure threatened salmonids.376 The
guidance is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of those actions
that will definitely cause take, and the determination of take is
necessarily a site-specific analysis.377 However, it does offer regu-
lated entities and private parties, as well as governmental jurisdic-
tions, some help in determining which of their activities may give
rise to liability in the absence of a take limitation under the 4(d)
rule. Such activities include:
1. constructing or maintaining structures like culverts, berms,
or dams that eliminate or impede a listed species' ability to
migrate or gain access to habitat;
2. discharging pollutants into a listed species' habitat; remov-
ing, poisoning, or contaminating plants, fish, wildlife, or
other biota that the listed species requires for feeding, shel-
tering, or other essential behavioral patterns;
3. removing or altering rocks, soil, gravel, vegetation or other
physical structures that are essential to the integrity and
function of a listed species' habitat;
4. constructing, maintaining, or using inadequate bridges,
roads, or trails on stream banks or unstable hill slopes adja-
cent to or above a listed species' habitat; and
5. conducting timber harvest, grazing, mining, earth-moving,
or other operations that substantially increase the amount
of sediment going into streams.378
b. The Washington Program for Salmon Conservation
Like other states affected by the recent salmon listings, Wash-
ington hoped to avoid listing by initiating its own conservation ef-
forts.379 However, compared to Oregon, which had a draft state-
wide salmon conservation plan by 1996, Washington was slow to
respond to the growing concern over declining fish runs.38' And,
376. Id.
377. See Final Rule Governing Take of 14 Threatened Salmon and Steelhead ESUs, 65
Fed. Reg. at 42,436 (comment and response 77).
378. National Marine Fisheries Service, supra note 369, at 5-6.
379. See Lydia V. Mapes, Chinook 'Endangered'? If So, It's Going to Cost Us, SEATrLE TIMES,
February 22, 1998, at Al; Kery Murakami, Endangered Species Act Hits Home-Again,
SEATrLE TIMES, Jan. 8,1999, at B1.
380. See The Oregon Plan, Oregon Coastal Salmon Restoration Initiative, Original Draft Plan
(August 19, 1996), at http://www.oregon-plan.org/archives. The final plan, The Oregon
Plan: Restoring an Oregon Legacy through Cooperative Efforts, can be found at
http://www.oregon-plan.org/archives.
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even Oregon was unable to demonstrate that it had sufficiently
removed the risks to salmon in order to preempt listing.381
However, the NMFS indicated that Washington's preemptive
conservation efforts played some role in the decision to list the
West Coast salmonids as threatened rather than endangered. 382
The final listing for the Puget Sound chinook stated that "[e]ven
though existing conservation efforts and plans are not sufficient to
preclude the need for listings at this time, they are nevertheless
valuable for improving watershed health and restoring salmon
populations."38 3 With this, the NMFS signaled its intent to pre-
pare a 4(d) Rule that would likely include "well-developed and
reliable [state] conservation plans" in the 4(d) limits on take. 4
Though the states would have preferred to avoid the listing de-
cisions, they continued to pursue conservation programs to retain
some control in the salmon management process. This subsection
describes the patchwork of authorities that Washington has em-
ployed to begin to address salmonid conservation. The state-wide
efforts support regional strategies, such as the Tri-County Initia-
tive (discussed in the following subsection), primarily through
guidance, technical support, and funding. The regional strategies,
in turn, provide a framework for local governmental revisions of
land use plans and ordinances.
The first significant state response to the NMFS consideration of
381. See Blumm & Corbin, supra note 17, at 545-548.
382. See Proposed Endangered Status for Two Chinook Salmon ESUs and Proposed
Threatened Status for Five Chinook Salmon ESUs; Proposed Redefinition, Threatened
Status, and Revision of Critical Habitat for One Chinook Salmon ESU; Proposed Designa-
tion of Chinook Salmon Critical Habitat in California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, 63 Fed.
Reg. 11,482, 11,507 (1998) (finding that the Washington state conservation plan, discussed
below, "may ameliorate risks facing many salmonid species in this region").
383. Threatened Status for Three Chinook Salmon Evolutionary Significant Units (ESUs)
in Washington and Oregon and Endangered Status for One Chinook Salmon ESU in Wash-
ington, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,308,14,325 (Mar. 24,1999).
384. Id. at 14,326 stating
NMFS is encouraged by these significant efforts [referring to various conservation ini-
tiatives, including state efforts], which could provide all stakeholders with an ap-
proach to achieving the purposes of the ESA-protecting and restoring native fish
populations and the ecosystems upon which they depend-that is less regulatory.
NMFS will continue to encourage and support these initiatives as important compo-
nents of recovery planning for chinook salmon and other salmonids.
The Secretary of Commerce specifically cited the contribution local recovery efforts in
Washington could make to reducing risks to salmon. Press Release, Statement by Commerce
Secretary William M. Daley on Pacific Northwest Salmon (March 16, 1999), at
http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/lpress/031699_2.htm-
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listing Washington salmonids under the ESA occurred in 1997,
when Governor Gary Locke and several state agency heads estab-
lished the Joint Natural Resources Cabinet.385 The Cabinet, con-
sisting of state agency leaders, a tribal representative, and other
key decision-makers, provides an institutional framework to pro-
mote interagency communication.3 6 Though the Cabinet has
broad jurisdiction over environmental issues, salmon conservation
has been a primary concern.387
By January 1998, the Cabinet had prepared a working-draft re-
covery strategy. Later in 1998, the Washington legislature enacted
the Salmon Recovery Planning Act to help direct salmon conser-
vation and recovery efforts.38 8 This legislation created a frame-
work for salmon recovery that emphasizes habitat restoration.
The Act also created the Governor's Salmon Recovery Office to
work on the state recovery strategy.
In response to the final salmon listings in 1999, the legislature
created the Salmon Recovery Funding Board to coordinate state
funding for habitat projects.3 9 This statute endorsed the frame-
work of "integrating local and regional recovery activities into a
state-wide plan that can make the most effective use of provisions
of federal laws allowing for a state lead in salmon recovery." 390
Thus, state money is available as an additional incentive for local
governments to participate in cooperative federal efforts under a
4(d) rule. The 1999 legislation also stressed monitoring and adap-
tive management.391 Though by this time the Joint Natural Re-
sources Cabinet and the Governor's Salmon Recovery Office were
in the process of finalizing the statewide recovery strategy, the
1999 Act contained guidelines for developing the statewide strat-
egy. The amendments also required that, beginning in September
2000, the statewide recovery strategy be revised through a public
385. Governor's Salmon Recovery Office, About Us, at
http://www.govemor.wa.gov/esa/aboutus.htm (last modified Aug. 22.2001).
386. Id.
387. Development of the state salmon recovery effort required a larger and more broadly
based group, the Government Council on Natural Resources. The Council includes repre-
sentatives from the Cabinet, the legislature, tribes, cities, counties, and the federal govern-
ment. Id.
388. Engrossed Substitute H.B. 24%, 55th Leg. (Wash. 1998) (amended by Second En-
grossed Second Substitute S.B. 5595,56th Leg. (Wash. 1999)).
389. Second Engrossed Second Substitute S.B. 5595,56th Leg. (Wash. 1999).
390. WAsH. REV. CODE § 77.85.005 (2001).
391. Id. § 77.85.
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involvement process.392
The Salmon Recovery Funding Board makes grants and loans
for salmon habitat projects and other recovery activities from the
amounts appropriated by the state legislature and Congress.393 It
coordinates all the funds, be they state or federal monies funneled
through the state, that are set aside for salmon habitat protection
and restoration. It also develops procedures and criteria for the
allocation of funds. Counties, cities, tribes, and other entities can
join together to identify habitat restoration projects in their area
that need funding and submit requests to the Board. The jurisdic-
tional and other stakeholder entities designate a "lead entity" to
coordinate the list of projects developed for that area.394 The lead
entity establishes a committee consisting of various representa-
tives from interested groups in the area that provides citizen input
on the proposed salmon habitat projects.395 The committee com-
piles and sets priorities for habitat projects which it then submits
to a state "technical review team."396 The technical review team
assists the Salmon Recovery Funding Board in allocating money
by ensuring that scientific principles are integrated into the
Board's funding criteria and reviewing habitat projects to recom-
mend for funding.397 The team also works in conjunction with an
"independent science panel" composed of experts in salmon biol-
ogy and management.398 The panel reviews the salmon recovery
plans, but does not make policy decisions or habitat funding rec-
ommendations.399 With the technical review team, the panel also
recommends: 1) standardized monitoring indicators and data
quality guidelines for use by entities involved in habitat projects;
and, 2) criteria for the systematic and periodic evaluation of moni-
392. Id. § 77.85.150. The statute does not specify how frequently revisions should occur.
393. Id. § 77.85.120. Funds appropriated for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 total almost $120
million $83 million from Congress and $37 million from the Washington legislature. Sec-
ond Engrossed Second Substitute S.B. 5595, 56th Leg. Section 22 (Wash. 1999); Senate Passes
Appropriations Bill at http://www.senate.gov/-gorton/int6.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2000).
As of March, 2000, the Funding Board had approved over $13 million in salmon recovery
grants. Press Release: Salmon Recovery Funding Board Grants $13.34 million for Salmon Recov-
ery Projects (Mar. 20, 2001), at http://www.governor.wa.gov/esa/funding.htm (last visited
Aug. 22,2001).
394. WASH. REV. CODE § 77.85.050.1(a).
395. Id. § 77.85.050.1(b).
396. Id. § 77.85.050.3.
397. Id § 77.85.130.5
398. Id. § 77.85.040
399. Id. § 77.85.040.4.
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toring to help enable the state to answer questions about the effec-
tiveness of salmon recovery efforts.4 "°
Some cooperative entities that might work on recovery projects
already exist. To help the state achieve its watershed protection
and development goals, including the development of a compre-
hensive state water program, Washington enacted the Watershed
Resources Act of 1971.4° The Act enabled the Washington De-
partment of Ecology to create Watershed Resource Inventory Ar-
eas ("WRIAs").4°2 Local governments and other stakeholders
within the boundaries of the WRIA collaborate on watershed is-
sues. These local entities are already accustomed to coordinating
watershed planning activities. It is likely they will now also work
together in coordinating salmon habitat projects. However, other
multi-entity units (such as the Tri-County Partnership) may also
be formed to develop habitat projects under the Salmon Recovery
Funding Act.
In September 1999, meeting a deadline established in the 1999
amendments to the Salmon Recovery Funding Act, and after a
draft, comment, and revision period, the Joint Natural Resources
Cabinet and the Governor unveiled the final statewide recovery
plan.40 3 The plan, entitled "Extinction is Not an Option," seeks to
provide all the various stakeholders, public and private, with a
framework and information necessary to make sound decisions
about how they can contribute to salmon restoration.404 One of
the plan's goals is to aid regional efforts to gain NMFS approval of
programs under a 4(d) rule.405
The "Extinction is Not an Option" plan establishes a menu for
conservation options consisting of four core elements, termed the
400. Id. § 77.85.040.5, .6.
401. Id. § 90.54.
402- Id. § 90.54; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-500 (1983).
403. Washington Joint Natural Resources Cabinet, Extinction is Not an Option, Statewide
Strategy to Recover Salmon (Sept. 21, 1999), at
http://www.governor.wa.gov/esa/strategy/strategy.hn.
404. Washington Joint Natural Resources Cabinet, Message from the Joint Natural Resources
Cabinet and Governor's Salmon Recovery Office, at
http://www.governor.wa.gov/esa/strategy/strategy.htm.
405. Washington Joint Natural Resources Cabinet, supra note 403 at 46 (establishing a
goal to "identify actions, options or programmatic approaches that could lead to conserva-
tion of salmon and protection of state, local, and/or private actions from legal exposure
under the ESA"), at http://www.govemor.wa.gov/esa/strategy/strategy/roadmap.pdf.
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"four H's" -habitat, harvest, hatcheries, and hydropower. 406 It
provides guidance in land use law and policy, stormwater man-
agement, clean water, fish passage devices, and hatchery man-
agement.40 7 The plan also reviews tools, such as public education
and permit streamlining, that state and local planners can use to
help implement recovery.408
The "Extinction is Not an Option" planners worked with state
and federal officials to identify seven salmon recovery regions in
the state.4°9 Although circumstances vary from region to region,
each is required to recover salmon within its boundaries and to
make decisions about what needs to be done in the area.410 To
achieve recovery objectives, regional salmon recovery plans will
build upon existing watershed plans and data, such as those gen-
erated by the WRIAs.411 Regional salmon recovery plans will ad-
dress the specific factors under the "four H's" contributing to the
decline of the salmon within the recovery region. An example of a
regional recovery entity currently developing a recovery strategy
is the Tri-County Partnership, consisting of representatives from
the three most populous counties in Washington: King, Snoho-
mish, and Pierce.
Local municipal habitat protection and restoration projects may
proceed concurrently with regional watershed assessments and
plans.412 Local initiatives, such as municipal subdivision ordi-
nance reforms, occur within regional efforts, such as watershed
conservation plans. For example, Seattle, though located within
the Tri-Counties and an important player in the regional planning
for recovery, has developed its own local strategy for recovery.
This strategy largely implements part of the overall regional Tri-
County Initiative.
It should be clear by now that Washington's response to the
salmon listings is not limited to a single statute or program. It
proceeds on many fronts. Besides the initiatives already dis-
cussed, there are other important programs. For instance, recent
406. Washington Joint Natural Resources Cabinet, supra note 403.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 39.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 50.
412. Id.
[Vol. 27:45
2002] Cooperative Federalism and the Endangered Species Act 125
legislation addresses minimum stream flows,413 and dairy farm
regulation to control run-off.414
In addition to the new initiatives, Washington has begun to ret-
rofit its existing environmental and land use laws to accommodate
salmonid conservation concerns. The Shoreline Management Act
(SMA)415 was Washington's first comprehensive land planning
statute.416 It requires every local government in a coastal location
to adopt a protective shoreline master program approved by the
Department of Ecology (DOE).417 The DOE is currently revising
the SMA regulations and, despite a setback in a recent administra-
tive challenge, is attempting to integrate salmon protection under
the ESA and SMA.418
The State Environmental Policy Act ("SEPA"), 419 much like
NEPA, requires a state agency or local government to prepare an
environmental impact statement before making a decision that
will have "a probable significant, adverse environmental im-
pact."420 The SEPA's primary function is to inform decision-
makers about the consequences of their actions, and to assess and
mitigate the environmental impacts of state and local legislation
and specific development proposals.421 The statewide recovery
plan considers the SEPA a critical tool to enhance salmon habi-
tat.
42 2
The most important law with respect to local land use planning
is the Growth Management Act ("GMA).423 The GMA seeks to
manage urban growth to protect environmental and aesthetic val-
ues.424 The GMA applies to eighteen counties that are required to
413. H.B. 2514,55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1998).
414. S.B. 6161, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1998).
415. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58 (1971).
416. Washington Joint Natural Resources Cabinet, supra note 403, at 86.
417. WASH. REv. CODE § 90.58 (1971).
418. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, Amendments to Washington Administrative Code § 173-26
(May 24, 2000), at
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/sea/sma/guidelines/ProposedShorelineRule.pdf.
The Shorelines Hearings Board remanded these regulations in Ass'n of Wash. Bus. v. State
of Washington Dep't of Ecology, Order Granting and Denying Appeal (SHB 00-037 Aug.
28, 2001), available at
http://www.eho.wa.gov/searchdocuments/2001%20archive/shb%2000-037%20final.htm.
419. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C (1971).
420. Id. § 43.21C.031 (1).
421. Id. § 43.21C.
422. Washington State Joint Natural Resources Cabinet, supra note 403, at 86.
423. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A (1991).
424. More specifically, the planning goals aim to: (1) encourage development in urban
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plan because of their high population or rate of growth. In addi-
tion, eleven counties have voluntarily chosen to plan under the
Act. Together, these twenty-nine counties contain more than 80%
of the state's population.425 The GMA requires local governments
to create comprehensive plans to channel growth and ensure that
it meets state-imposed development regulations.426 The plans ad-
dress the key determinates of where and how growth occurs: land
use, housing, capital facilities, utilities, and transportation.427
A 1997 amendment to the GMA requires all GMA cities and
counties to review and revise, if needed, their comprehensive
plans and development regulations not later than September 1,
2002, and every five years thereafter.428 Additionally, two provi-
sions of the Growth Management Act apply to all counties and cit-
ies in the state, whether or not they are planning under GMA: 1)
the requirement to designate natural resource lands (agriculture,
forest, and mineral lands); and, 2) the requirement to designate
and protect critical areas.429 This second requirement is especially
important to salmon recovery because the critical areas include
both wetlands, and fish and wildlife habitat conservation areas.
When designating and protecting critical areas, the GMA requires
jurisdictions to use "best available science" and give "special con-
sideration to conservation or protection measures necessary to
preserve or enhance anadromous fisheries."430
areas where adequate public facilities and services exist or can be provided efficiently; (2)
reduce low-density development (sprawl) in the state; (3) encourage efficient and well-
coordinated multimodal regional transportation systems; (4) encourage the availability of
affordable housing to all economic segments of Washington society; (5) encourage eco-
nomic development consistent with GMA and promote economic opportunity for all citi-
zens; (6) encourage growth consistent with natural resources; (7) preserve property rights
from arbitrary and discriminatory actions; (8) process permits in a timely and fair manner
to ensure predictability; (9) maintain and enhance natural resource industries; (10) preserve
open space and recreation, and access thereto; (11) protect the aquatic environment, air and
water quality; (12) encourage citizen involvement and coordination. Coordinate between
and among communities and jurisdictions to reconcile conflicts; (13) ensure the availability
of public facilities and services; and, (14) encourage active historic preservation. Id. §
36.70A.020.
425. Washington Joint Natural Resources Cabinet, Extinction is Not an Option, supra note
403, at 87.
426. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A (1991).
427. Id. § 36.70A.070.
428. Id. § 36.70A.130(1).
429. Id. § 36.70A.170.
430. Id. § 36.70A.172(1).
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c. The Tri-County Partnership
The Tri-County Partnership is the most important response to
the 4(d) rule and will likely be a model for incorporating species
recovery in an area-wide system of land use controls. It will also
test the framework established in the 4(d) rule for approving and
monitoring MRCI development plans.
In anticipation of the Puget Sound chinook listing, the most
populous counties in the region, King, Snohomish, and Pierce,
formed the Tri-County Partnership. In addition to county gov-
ernments, the partnership includes representatives of federal,
state, tribal and local governments; representatives of businesses
and environmental groups; and ordinary citizens.431 The Tri-
County Partnership developed and continues to revise an area-
wide recovery plan (known originally as the "Tri-County Initia-
tive to Recover the Puget Sound Chinook" and now being revised
as the "Tri-County Model 4(d) Rule Response Proposal") 432 that
attempts to balance recovery goals with maintenance of the re-
gion's economic vitality.
As we have already noted, the Tri-County Partnership is an ex-
ample of a regional entity developing a regional plan to help im-
plement the statewide recovery strategy. The Tri-County Model is
designed to guide the conservation plans and regulatory revisions
of each local county and city within the area. However, some
small cities that are not experiencing the great development pres-
sures of Seattle, Takoma or Bellevue may focus only on habitat
management. Other small cities are experiencing rapid growth
and development, but have not yet tackled local implementation
of the Tri-County Model because their planning staffs are under-
funded and inexperienced. So, there remains great variation
within the Tri-County region, which may limit the ultimate effec-
tiveness of the partnership.433
431. The Tri-County Partnership formed in February 1998, around the same time as the
proposed Puget Sound chinook listing. King County's Response Report, Return of the
Kings: Strategies for the Long-Term Conservation and Recovery of Chinook Salmon (March 1999),
at http://www.metrokc.gov/exec/news/1999/O31699rok.htm; Proposed Listing Rule, 63
Fed. Reg. 11,482 (Mar. 9,1998).
432. Tri-County Partnership, Tri-County Model 4(d) Rule Response Proposal: A Salmon Con-
servation Plan (May 18, 2001), at http://www.salmoninfo.org/tricounty/tcplan.htm.
433. Also, though the entire Tri-County area is in the Puget Sound recovery region, de-
lineated in the state recovery strategy to include all or part of 12 counties, it encompasses
21 WRIAs. Governor's Salmon Recovery Office, Salmon Recuvery Regions (Sept. 22,2000), at
http://www.govemor.wa.gov/esa/regions.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2001); Governor's
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The Tri-County Partnership presented its draft initiative to the
NMFS on June 21, 2000, immediately following the June 20 an-
nouncement of the final 4(d) rule. The partnership had been work-
ing closely with NMFS throughout the development of the final
rule and initially hoped to secure a specific limitation for its re-
gional plan, much like the Oregon Department of Transportation
secured a specific limitation for its maintenance plan in the final
4(d) rule.434 Instead, however, the NMFS created the general
MRCI development limitation under which the Tri-County juris-
dictions' programs will have to qualify. On May 18, 2001, the Tri-
County Partnership published a revised draft response to the 4(d)
rule, which the participating jurisdictions will use to steer local
implementation.435 Though the Tri-County Model will not actu-
ally authorize any particular city or county land use program as
an MRCI development limitation, the jurisdictions hope that
NMFS' endorsement of the model will ease the process of ap-
proval of conforming local ordinances and programs.
The Tri-County Model includes the regional implementation of
the state land use laws, such as the GMA, described above, in Sub-
section (b), as applied to the Puget Sound region. This makes it a
showcase regional program as envisioned by the state strategy. 436
The Tri-County Model contains six programs: road maintenance
best management practices, stormwater controls, land manage-
ment, habitat funding, watershed planning, and adaptive
management. While seeking to provide some constraints to qual-
ify under the 4(d) rule's MRCI considerations and the PFC stan-
dards, the programs allow local jurisdictions to make choices
about what approaches are most effective in their locality.437 The
programs contain schedules for phasing in restrictions and resto-
ration efforts, but do not specifically detail how local ordinances
may be amended. This may be particularly troublesome for the
land management program.
The land management program consists of four parts: county-
Salmon Recovery Office, Watershed Recovery Inventory Project, at
http://www.wa.gov/wdfw/hab/wrip/wriaisthtm Oast visited Nov. 29, 2001). The in-
congruence of the tri-counties, the recovery region, and the WRIA is bound to create con-
flicts.
434. 50 C.F.R. § 223.203(b)(10) (2000).
435. Tri-County Partnership, supra note 432.
436. Washington Joint Natural Resources Cabinet, supra note 403, at 9.
437. Tri-County Partnership, supra note 432.
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wide planning policies, regulation of development, urban area
controls, and agricultural practices. The countywide planning
policies are designed to mesh the requirements of the GMA with
the conservation demands of the 4(d) rule.438 Most of these advi-
sory policies are broad statements promoting ecosystem manage-
ment, monitoring, restoration of habitat, coordination of conserva-
tion efforts, control of runoff, and use of best available science. 439
The regulatory component, implemented through existing local
tools (such as critical areas ordinances, or forest practices permits),
requires avoidance and minimization of development impacts and
preservation of essential biological functions for salmon. The
model establishes three alternative regulatory programs:
1. a prescriptive set of standard regulations that can be ap-
plied across an entire jurisdiction,
2. a site-specific habitat evaluation governed by a standard set
of scientific goals and objectives, and
3. a programmatic approach that allows a jurisdiction to per-
form a habitat evaluation for a specific geographic area or
upon a specific set of activities, resulting in a suite of regu-
lations tailored to those specific areas or activities.440
The Tri-County Initiative and Model reflect a great deal of con-
scientious work on assessment techniques, governmental control
options, and commitments to monitoring and adaptive manage-
ment. In addition, an outside environmental consultant is con-
ducting a biological review of the revised model for the Partner-
ship.441 However, it remains to be seen whether the municipalities
will implement such key parts of the model as urban area controls
and regulation of development in such a way as to contribute to
recovery of the Puget Sound chinook salmon.
Seattle, a key municipality in the regional Tri-County Partner-
ship, illustrates the way in which local land use controls can be
adapted to conserve salmon. The city regulates a wide range of
activities, including use of property; location siting, sizing and
construction of new structures; alterations of existing structures;
demolition; vegetation removal; grading, drainage, excavation
and placement of fill; road, parking lot and driveway construc-
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Tri-County Partnership, supra note 432, at Ch. 1 (Land Management Model Planning
Policies).
441. Id.
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
tion; and utility installation.442 This pervasive regulation makes
the city a key agent for effectuating MRCI development goals and
other considerations.
The city implements the regulation by issuing permits that in-
corporate "site-specific development controls" which will vary
depending on a number of factors, including the size of the pro-
ject, whether it is in or over water, the amount of grading pro-
posed, and whether the location is in a riparian corridor or within
200 feet of a shoreline.443 In addition to these substantive con-
cerns, the Seattle approach also discusses administrative imple-
mentation. This dimension is almost entirely missing from the
NCCP plans and the 4(d) rules. Seattle describes inspection and
enforcement of permit conditions as part of its permit review
process.444 The city's report to the NMFS discusses staffing in-
creases for the development of new code provisions to better con-
serve salmon; staffing increases for permit review, inspection and
enforcement; and staff training on fisheries issues.445 Also impor-
tant for a city where 65 percent of the surface is impervious, Seat-
tle has focused attention on adapting its stormwater management
program to protect salmon.
With the improvements promoted in the Tri-County Model, the
Seattle program will probably score high on all of the MRCI de-
velopment considerations contained in the 4(d) rule. The Tri-
County Model, if endorsed by NMFS, would provide a frame-
work to speed local plan preparation and NMFS review without
specifying exactly how the local jurisdictions will implement the
ambitious goals. The NMFS cannot grant 4(d) limitations to non-
bonding, framework plans. Indeed, one lesson from the litigation
overturning Service decisions not to list species based on unen-
forceable conservation plans is that the ESA requires more than
promises of future action to meet statutory criteria.446 To avoid
making a similar mistake in the 4(d) program, the Service should
authorize only programs that bind the jurisdiction with enforce-
442. City of Seattle, Land Use Regulatory and Stormwater Programs: An Endangered Species
Context (July 21,1999) at http://www.ci.seattle.wa.us/seattle/salmon/citydocuments.htm.
443. Tri-County Partnership, supra note 435, at Ch. 2, Pt I (Background).
444. Id.
445. Tri-County Partnership, supra note 432, at CL. 2, Pt IV (Adaptive Management for
Regulatory Programs) and Ch. 4, Pt. I (Response to Endangered Species Act). The revised
Tri-County model now contains implementation guidelines as well. Tri-County Partner-
ship, supra note 432, at Ch. 8 (Implementation of the Model 4(d) Rule Response Proposal).
446. See infra note 461 and accompanying text.
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able ordinances and regulations. This is the only way to ensure
that 4(d) rules actually promote recovery, as required by ESA.
But, the NMFS can answer advisory submissions with non-
bonding endorsements to provide local jurisdictions with better
guidance for developing MRCI limitation proposals. The major
jurisdictions, such as King County and Seattle, will likely apply
for MRCI development limitation authorization irrespective of the
NMFS' decision on the Tri-County submission.
3. Conclusion
In many respects, the gnatcatcher presents a simpler recovery
problem than the salmon. The gnatcatcher is non-migratory, lives
exclusively in one plant community, and suffers from essentially a
single threat, the reduction of coastal sage scrub habitat.447 If
southern coastal California is able to preserve and restore the
coastal sage scrub plant communities, the gnatcatcher will likely
recover. The implementing land use plans under the gnatcatcher
4(d) rule, therefore, focus principally on establishing habitat re-
serves and buffer areas.
In contrast, the salmon migrate from the open ocean, through
estuaries, up major rivers, and ultimately back to the tributaries
where they were hatched. Threats to the salmon exist in all of
these areas. The Puget Sound region needs to maintain aquatic
habitat in riparian areas, but also must control the myriad factors
that cause sediment, contaminants, and storm flows to enter wa-
ters of the area. This presents a much more difficult regulatory
challenge. The implementing land use plans under the salmon
4(d) rule must focus on regulating ongoing activities throughout
the region's watersheds, not simply on designating reserves. It is
always harder to change existing practices than to protect unde-
veloped areas.
Nonetheless, both 4(d) rules suffer from insufficient federal
standards to measure progress toward recovery. The gnatcatcher
rule relies primarily on state guidelines oriented toward reserve
design and management, and toward loose public participation
requirements without formal rights of appeal or intervention. The
only independent federal criterion for program approval is a find-
ing of "no jeopardy." As with its early HCP approvals, the Chin-
447. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 58 Fed. Reg. 16,742, 16,742 (Mar.
20,1993).
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ton/Babbitt Administration was eager to demonstrate that it
could administer the Act flexibly and consistently with the inter-
ests of the state when it promulgated the gnatcatcher 4(d) rule
adopting the NCCP. In doing so, it neglected to incorporate suffi-
cient programmatic safeguards or spurs to ensure recovery.
The salmon rule does a better job at providing substantive guid-
ance for local land use control. Its requirement that local plans
demonstrate progress toward recovery through PFC establishes a
good foundation for conservation through adaptive management.
There is an inherent tension between crafting a generally applica-
ble 4(d) rule and establishing specific, binding standards. It re-
mains to be seen whether the PFC can be monitored and sustained
in highly modified urban settings. Still, more detailed substantive
criteria for development plans and administrative requirements
for local jurisdictions to demonstrate their capacity for effective
and fair enforcement would improve the rule.
VI. RECOVERY THROUGH COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM: TAPPING THE
POTENTIAL OF § 4(d)
Section IV of this article described Section 4(d) as an ideal vehi-
cle for making a transition in the ESA program toward more com-
prehensive conservation through cooperative federalism. But, the
strengths of the 4(d) rule extend beyond just its recovery require-
ment and its ability to enlist the mechanisms of state land use
regulation in conserving listed species. This section reviews these
two principal strengths and describes other benefits offered
through the use of a comprehensive 4(d) rule. This discussion
stresses the comparative advantages of employing 4(d) rules in-
stead of Section 10(a) permits as the primary instrument for pro-
moting comprehensive conservation on non-federal lands. This
section also answers some likely objections to the widespread use
of 4(d) rules.
In describing the potential strengths of a 4(d) program, we push
past the limitations of the gnatcatcher and salmon examples de-
scribed in the previous section. While these moderate applica-
tions of Section 4(d) do represent progress in the ESA program,
we are interested in exploring the full, untapped potential of 4(d)
rules to be developed in the future.
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A. Strengths of Expanded Use of the 4(d) Rule
1. The 4(d) Rule Harnesses Cooperative Federalism
As the gnatcatcher and salmon examples illustrate, Section 4(d)
can harness the power of cooperative federalism to establish
working partnerships between the Services and state/local gov-
ernments.448 For decades, the federal government has established
cooperative agreements with states to manage public lands jointly
and contribute federal monies to state wildlife programs. How-
ever, cooperative agreements to allow states to issue permits and
regulate under federal oversight, which are ubiquitous in pollu-
tion control law, have been absent from resource management law
in general and the ESA in particular.
The ESA Section 6 cooperative agreements can and should be
used in conjunction with 4(d) rules to fund state programs to im-
plement specific comprehensive recovery plans for listed spe-
cies.449 A 4(d) rule should establish criteria for local jurisdictions
and state agencies to apply in designing land use controls, and
best management practices for agriculture and forestry. In ex-
change, the planning jurisdiction can control the details of imple-
mentation, become eligible for cooperative agreement funding,
448. The terms "cooperative federalism" and "cooperative agreement" traditionally refer
to a relationship between the federal government and a state government. In this article,
we mean to broaden the meaning of the terms to include also the relationship between the
federal government and local jurisdictions such as cities, counties, and watershed authori-
ties. These local jurisdictions are all created by states and operate under state enabling leg-
islation. Local governmental entities are creatures of state law just as the NMFS and FWS
are creatures of federal law. Therefore, a federal approval of a county land use control
program under a 4(d) rule involves the state legal regime, which determines what counties
may do and how they may do it. One might consider the broader meaning of "cooperative
federalism" to be a form of the "democratic experimentalism" advocated by Charles Sabel,
Archon Fung, and Bradley Karkkainen. See Charles Sabel et. al., Beyond Backyard Environ-
mentalism: How Communities Are Quietly Refashioning Environmental Regulation, BOSTON
REV., Oct-Nov. 1999, reprinted in BEYOND BACKYARD ENVIRONMENTALSM 3, 30-36 (Joshua
Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 2000).
449. The political dynamics of Congress are likely to make more money available under
cooperative federalism schemes than under a purely federal permit program, such as ESA
Section 10(a). So, cooperative 4(d) rules do not simply shift permitting costs from the fed-
eral government to states. They can be expected to increase federal spending on species
conservation. State congressional delegations will support federal grants to states that en-
ter into cooperative agreements. It is always more politically popular to appropriate
money to support state and local governments than it is to fund a federal regulatory re-
gime. See notes 178-179 supra and accompanying text for a description of the funding lev-
els for states under the ESA.
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and enjoy protection from Section 9 indirect governmental liabil-
ity. Greater use of cooperative agreements with states can
instill a sense of ownership in the ESA program, and can help to in-
sure that the states are better educated as to the flexibility built into
the Act. As state agencies become better educated, affected parties
will find a larger pool of experts who can assist them in designing
their actions to avoid conflicts with listed species.45 0
Urban areas, such as the Puget Sound and San Diego regions,
are good starting points for applying the principles of cooperative
federalism to comprehensive recovery planning for two reasons.
First, they tend to have existing land use controls, so a 4(d) rule
protecting habitat would not need to start from scratch to develop
a system of controls. Professor Tarlock has cataloged many of the
common local powers (and their limitations) that can be used to
protect biological diversity.451 A 4(d) rule can require the plan-
ning jurisdiction to modify existing land use controls to conform
with a recovery program. It can rely on the administrative infra-
structure that already exists to inspect, permit, and evaluate land
use. A comprehensive 4(d) rule in an urban area can build on ex-
isting traditions rather than attempt to change local attitudes to-
wards land use control. Seattle, for instance, which has an exten-
sive land use control regime, is doing this under the framework of
the Tri-County Initiative and Model. 45 2 Existing land use controls
also create a history of administration that the Services can use to
evaluate whether the local jurisdiction has the capacity and politi-
cal will to implement protections.45 3
Second, habitat destruction in urban areas often results from
numerous small land-disturbing activities, rather than a few large
operations. Widely dispersed harm is very difficult for the Ser-
vices to control. Local jurisdictions, in contrast, are already on the
scene. The local jurisdictions use police, inspectors, and neighbors
to monitor land use for human health, safety and welfare. In his
450. Mark Squillace, Applying the Park City Principles to the Endangered Species Act, 31
LAND & WATER L. REv. 385,397 (19%).
451. Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodiversity, supra note 2, at 574-584. Our pro-
posal to employ cooperative federalism in 4(d) rules fulfills many of the suggestions Pro-
fessor Tarlock makes to use "partnership federalism" to address biodiversity conservation.
Tarlock, Biodiversity Federalism, supra note 2, at 1350-53.
452. See supra notes 442-446 and accompanying text.
453. See John Pendergrass, What Whitman May See in N.J. Program, ENVrL. F., Mar./Apr.
2001, at 10 (describing how federal approval of state pollution control programs generally
occurs only after the programs have been fully operating at the state level).
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study of HCPs, Timothy Beatley concludes that preventive land
use planning and growth management in areas such as Kern
County, California, can effectively serve as the basis for compre-
hensive conservation. 45 4
Harnessing this state land use control power would also relieve
the Services from the burden of processing hundreds of permits. 455
Because the 4(d) rule could define the universe of prohibited ac-
tivities, it could find that any land disturbing activity that con-
forms with a federally approved state conservation program
meeting the recovery criteria does not constitute a take of the
threatened species. Since the activity is not a take in the first
place, it need not receive a federal incidental take permit to shield
the responsible parties from Section 9 liability. The state conser-
vation plan may require permits for certain activities; but, there
are other state land use control options, such as zoning overlays
and notification requirements, that are less burdensome for pri-
vate landowners. Even where local permits may be required,
property owners often find it more convenient and user-friendly
to apply and negotiate with a local agency than with the federal
government. The federal Services, then, would be left with the
task of evaluating the aggregate progress that the state program
makes toward specific recovery goals.45 6
Delegating implementation of a land use/habitat recovery plan
over a large area responds to criticisms that, in negotiating HCPs,
the Services insert their interests into local land use decisions with
little input from the elected officials of the community.4 7 A 4(d)
rule can allow local land use plans to incorporate and customize
biodiversity conservation tools. 458 A 1998 University of Michigan
study found that states often face the same "obstacles to partici-
pating effectively" in HCP negotiations as private stakeholders.459
454. TIMOTHY BEATLEY, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING: ENDANGERED SPECIES AND
URBAN GROwTH 204-06 (1994).
455. It would, of course, also relieve landowners from applying for the 10(a) permits.
Landowners following local rules or getting local permits would not need to make parallel
applications to a Service. We discuss this advantage as a counterbalance to the loss of some
future certainty in VI(A)(4), infra notes 566-567 and accompanying text.
456. See, e.g., supra notes 366-368 and accompanying text (describing the salmon 4(d)
rule's use of PFC as a measure of progress in local jurisdictions).
457. Michael O'Connell, Improving Habitat Conservation Planning Through a Regional Eco-
system-Based Approach, 14 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE No. 7-8, at 18 (1997).
458. See, e.g., BEATLEY, supra note 454, at 160-172, 204-206.
459. JEREMY ANDERSON & STEVEN YAFFEE, BALANCING PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE
INTEREST: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING 20 (1998).
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Cooperative plans under a 4(d) rule restore state and local gov-
ernment to a key role in developing conservation plans. States
have attempted to respond to the burdens of the Section 9 prohibi-
tions by adopting conservation plans to avoid species listings.46 °
Though these tactics tend to falter in the courts because they often
rely on unenforceable promises, 461 they do illustrate the untapped
interest of states to play a role in species conservation and to ease
the sting of the untailored take prohibition.
In developing the cooperative 4(d) rule, the Services may bor-
row from pollution control law. Consider the analogy between
the challenges of improving air quality and the challenges of re-
covering species. Some air pollution originates directly from
point source emissions. These sources are regulated by requiring
permits for emissions under the Clean Air Act. In degraded areas,
permits require offsets for new sources of pollution through the
abatement of pollution from existing sources.462 Similarly, direct
habitat destruction, such as the logging or clearing of forests, can
be regulated through permits. Also, the habitat loss should be off-
set by habitat restoration or preservation in another location. In
the habitat conservation context, these offsets are often called
mitigation.463 The San Diego County MSCP Subarea Plan applies
this principle to habitat protection.464
But air pollution also originates from the diffuse mobile and
"area" sources, which often are the result of land use patterns,
such as the arrangement of residences to work places. The Clean
Air Act addresses this cause of air pollution by requiring such
460. The NCCP pilot project in California and the salmon strategy in Washington both
originated as attempts to avoid listings. See supra notes 264, 379 and accompanying text.
See also Blumm & Corbin, supra note 17; Golightly, supra note 182 (describing the Oregon
state strategy for salmon conservation).
461. See, e.g., Or. Nat. Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Or. 1998) (remanding
NMFS decision not to list salmon); Save Our Springs v. Babbitt, 27 F. Supp. 2d 739 (W.D.
Tex. 1997) (remanding FWS decision not to list the Barton Springs salamander). See also
Francesca Ortiz, Candidate Conservation Agreements as a Devolutionary Response to Extinction,
33 GA. L. REV. 413 (1999).
462. See 42 U.S.C. § 7503(c) (1994). Often offsets require abating a greater quantity of
pollution than a new source will generate Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 7511a (1994).
463. See BEATLEY, supra note 454, at 170-171, 198-199 (describing mitigation ratios that
require restoration of a greater area than is destroyed by development). In the coastal sage
scrub NCCP region, the San Diego Biological Mitigation Ordinance, discussed supra notes
329-335 and accompanying text, applies a kind of offset to the problem of habitat conserva-
tion.
464. See supra notes 329-334 and accompanying text.
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things as transportation planning,465 technical assistance,466 and
public education.467 Similarly, area-wide land use patterns deter-
mine where species can continue to be viable, where potential
habitat for preservation is located, and what corridors are needed
for migrations. To address these concerns, the ESA must address
land use patterns, offer technical assistance in how to accomplish
commercial activities (such as construction) with a minimum of
habitat degradation, and educate the public in the threats from
everyday activities to species. The Tri-County region is attempt-
ing this in protecting stream corridors, and the CSS region in de-
veloping networks of reserves.
Though the federal Clean Air Act requires that these steps be
taken to improve air quality, it relies on states to develop the per-
mits, plans, technical assistance, public education, and other nec-
essary tools through the state implementation plan ("SIP").46s The
role of the EPA is to establish, through notice and comment rule-
making, the basic criteria that SIPs must meet.469 The Clean Air
Act allows and encourages each state (and frequently each air re-
gion within each state) to tailor to local circumstances a different
blend of controls to achieve the federal air quality criteria. Under
a SIP, a state has some flexibility to allocate the burden of control-
ling air pollution among the range of sources.
465. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Transportation-Related Pollution and the Clean Air Act's Con-
fonnity Requirements, 13 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 406 (1998).
466. For instance, the Puget Sound Air Pollution Control Agency in Washington has
worked with small businesses, building owners, and property managers to reduce emis-
sions of perchloroethylene and asbestos. Suellen Terrill Keiner, State and Local Innovations
in Air Quality Control, 13 NAT. REs. & ENV'T 413, 413-414 (1998). The NMFS offered work-
shops on the 4(d) process in the Puget Sound to help landowners and local governments
understand their roles and responsibilities. See Salmon Information Center at
http://www.salmoninfo.org/news/4dworkshops.htm. The NMFS also published a guide
for citizens and one for local governments to provide additional technical assistance, avail-
able at http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/lsalmon/sahnesa/4ddocs/citguide.htm; and
http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/lsalmon/salmesa/4dguid2-htm.
467. See Suellen Terrill Keiner, State and Local Innovations in Air Quality Control, 13 NAT.
REsouRcEs & ENV'T 413, 415 (1998) for examples of public education and media alerts that
encourage people to take personal steps to reduce air pollution. The Puget Sound salmon
conservation effort includes numerous public education initiatives on television, web sites,
and billboards. See, e.g., Salmon Information Center at http:/www.salmoninfo.org;
http://www.salmoninfo.org/sitvmain.htm. In addition the public can call, toll free, 1-877-
SALMON9 for answers to questions and suggestions for ways to help.
468. See John P. Dwyer, The Practice ofFederalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L REv.
1183, 1193-1216 (1995) (describing the role of the SIP in creating the federal-state partner-
ship to achieve the goals of the Clean Air Act).
469. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (2001).
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If a state does not comply with the federal guidelines, or does
not enforce its plan, then the EPA may penalize the state in a
number of ways, including withholding federal funds for high-
ways and imposing federal restrictions and permit requirements
directly on the states.470 Periodically, in response to new informa-
tion, changed circumstances, or requirements for incremental en-
vironmental improvements, the EPA will announce a "SIP call" to
demand that states revise SIPs. 471 But, the EPA itself will not step
in to revise a SIP unless a state fails to comply. Also, though the
state agencies have routine enforcement and implementation re-
sponsibilities, the EPA has residual authority to oversee these ef-
forts. The 4(d) rule, by setting the basic criteria for recovery and
allowing a region to adopt its own mix of controls, can employ all
of these characteristics of cooperative federalism. The gnatcatcher
and salmon 4(d) rules both employ most of these components of
cooperative federalism. Though the ESA lacks important financial
sticks, such as loss of highway funds, indirect governmental liabil-
ity raises the specter of judicial interference with state or local
land use control. Congress will need to increase substantially the
financial carrots available to states operating programs qualifying
under a 4(d) rule by making more cooperative funding available.
The Clean Air Act requires SIPs for degraded airsheds to dem-
onstrate incremental progress over the years toward achieving air
quality standards.472 Similarly, 4(d) rules should set incremental
goals for habitat recovery that state plans would meet over the
course of several years. The Clean Air Act requires that the more
severely degraded an area's air, the more stringent the SIP re-
quirements.473 The SIP development process, requiring an inven-
tory of problems, 474 modeling of effects, 475 the development of en-
470. Id. §§ 7410(c)(1), 7410(m), 7509. See, e.g., David Firestone, Collapse ofAtlanta Talks
Keeps Road Builders Idle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2001, at A18 (describing how first the EPA and
then environmental groups used these penalty provisions to halt new road construction in
Atlanta).
471. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(5) (1994).
472. Id. §§ 7501(1), 7502(c) (mandating reasonable further progress in reducing degrada-
tion).
473. See, e.g., id. § 7511a (providing more stringent requirements, such as higher offsets
for new sources, and for areas with greater ozone pollution problems).
474. Id. § 7502(c)(3).
475. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(K). The regulations set forth detailed guidelines on air quality mod-
els that states may use to demonstrate that a control strategy will be adequate. 40 C.F.R Pt.
51, Appendix W (2000).
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forceable control measures to address the problems, 476 monitoring
of results,477 and continual revision to adapt to results, 478 is strik-
ingly similar to the adaptive management process advocated by
most scientists for conserving species. 479 Just as SIPs guide re-
gions into compliance with ambient air quality standards, state
plans under 4(d) rules should map out a path to meet the ESA's
goal: recovery.
For instance, if stormwater discharges from new construction
impede salmon reproduction in the Puget Sound basin, the 4(d)
rule might phase in progressively more stringent sedimentation
controls. Plans may have to provide for "offsets" of recovery
habitat to mitigate damage done by permitted development.480
Rather than comprehensively managing all pollution, a SIP con-
centrates on remedying the most severe air pollution problems in
a region.48' A 4(d) rule should similarly focus on the imperiled
species of an area rather than attempting to manage all habitat
concerns. Nonetheless, even single-species conservation objec-
tives will often demand controls on a wide range of activities,
such as land use development, application of chemicals, traffic
management, and exotic plant control.
Like species recovery, air quality improvement requires land
use planning and control, basically a state and local function. The
Clean Air Act recognizes that, without state and local partners, the
federal government is unequipped to respond to place-based en-
vironmental problems that arise from the peculiar circumstances
of a region's geography and economy. However, like the Clean
Air Act SIP requirement, the 4(d) rule should condition approval
of a state conservation plan on a demonstration that the state has.
the administrative capacity to enforce and implement its commit-
ments in the plan.482 The gnatcatcher and salmon rules are particu-
476. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(A),7502(c)(6) (1994). Control measures include economic in-
centives such as fees and marketable permits.
477. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(B).
478. Id. §§ 7410(a)(2)(H), 7502(d).
479. Adaptive management is discussed infra notes 541-549 and accompanying text
480. See Michael Bean & Lynn E. Dwyer, Mitigation Banking as an Endangered Species Con-
servation Tool, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (EnvtL L Inst.) 10,537 (2000), for a discussion of the issues
involved in applying mitigation and offsets to listed species habitat.
481. 1 WILuAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.9(A) (1986).
482. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A), (C), (E) (requiring enforceable control measures, an en-
forcement program, and necessary assurances that the state has adequate personnel, fund-
ing, and authority to carry out the SIP). See Markell, supra note 166, at 38-39,44-51 (describ-
ing weaknesses common in state administrative capacities to enforce environmental
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larly weak in establishing a standard to ensure effective admini-
stration of substantive requirements.483 An exception to the gen-
eral neglect of local administrative capacity is, as a consideration
for NMFS approval of MRCI development programs, the provi-
sion of "mechanisms for monitoring, enforcement, funding, re-
porting, and implementation, and periodic. . . evaluation."484
As with the prior comparison of permit programs under the
ESA and Clean Water Act, it is important to resist idealizing the
pollution control model.485 In practice, the SIP scheme does not
live up to its potential or achieve all of its statutory goals. Air
quality has improved under the SIP regime, but many SIPs suffer
from a lack of clear, enforceable standards, incomplete control
programs, and delays in design, adoption, and implementation.486
States and local jurisdictions continue to complain that they do
not have enough autonomy under cooperative federalism. The SIP
program specifically, and cooperative federalism generally, cer-
tainly has its share of critics.487 But, importing some of the basic
tools from cooperative federalism to the relatively shorthanded
Services will result in greater progress toward leveraging local
land use controls to protect habitat.
Although SIPs necessarily deal with land use control, the issue
is not as central as it is in habitat management. And, land use con-
trol has been one of the weaker segments of the SIP program.488
Moreover, air pollution is not exactly analogous to biological en-
dangerment. Perhaps the most crucial difference is that the at-
mosphere naturally cleanses many air pollutants over time so that
controls fairly and effectively).
483. Professor Markell has discussed some of the EPA's shortcomings in assuring that
states receiving federal authorization under pollution control laws have adequate enforce-
ment programs. Markell, supra note 166, at 35-39.
484. 50 C.F.R. § 223.203(b)(12)(i) (2000).
485. See supra notes 160-165 and accompanying text.
486. See Richard E. Ayres, The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments: Performance and Prospects,
13 NAT. RES. & ENv'T 379,380 (1998); RODGERS, supra note 481, § 3.10; William F. Pedersen,
Jr., Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. PENN. L. REV. 1059 (1981).
487. See, e.g., Pedersen, supra note 486; Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution and the Public Health,
24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 351 (2000); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation
Through the Government Performance and Results Act: Are the States Ready for the Devolution?,
29 EnvtL L Rep. (Envtl L Inst.) 10074 (1999).
488. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Transportation-Related Pollution and the Clean Air Act's Con-
formity Requirements, 13 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 406 (1998) (describing some of the transporta-
tion planning requirements); Dwyer, supra note 468, at 1199-1208 (describing the successive
failures of the EPA to force states to address land use controls in SIPs).
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current pollution may not significantly impair the quality of air in
the future. In comparison, habitat loss leading to population de-
cline in a species generally is less reversible. Once an imperiled
species population reaches a certain low level, it may never re-
cover.489 Many habitat-destroying activities, such as paving, de-
grade the environment in a way that will not abate in the foresee-
able future.
For instance, suppose the Service revokes authorization to a lo-
cal jurisdiction for an exception to the take prohibition because the
funding mechanism for purchase of mitigation reserves failed to
support the level of habitat protection required for recovery. This
plausible scenario has been described as likely by a court for a
proposed HCP490 and by a commentator for the San Diego NCCP
plan.491 Though revocation may restrict future development from
thwarting recovery of the species, existing development author-
ized by the now-revoked plan with the flawed funding mecha-
nism will already have done its irreversible damage. Suitable
mitigation sites may no longer be available by the time the local
plan can be revised.
Nonetheless, the basic principle of a state shaping its authorities
to conform to national environmental goals is sound for both pol-
lution control and resource protection. The SIP model certainly
could be improved in its details as it is adapted to serve Section
4(d). Also, cooperative federalism success depends on adequate
funding and enforcement capabilities of state and local agencies.
But, particularly in the ESA program, where the potential for co-
operative conservation has not been tapped often, inviting states
to adapt existing land use control authorities will achieve signifi-
cant early gains. In the longer term, a habitat conservation part-
nership between the Services and the states may spur the states to
develop better growth planning in order to enjoy the benefits of a
cooperative 4(d) agreement.
489. See, e.g., Leah R. Gerber, et aL, Measuring Success in Conservation, 88 AM. ScIENTIST
316, 323 (2000) (describing the "extinction vortex" that pulls species inexorably towards
extinction once population levels fall below a certain level). The geologic record indicates
that global species diversity required one to eight million years to rebound after previous
periods of mass extinction.
490. National Wildlife Federation v. Babbitt, supra note 136.
491. Levin, supra note 314.
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
2. The 4(d) Rule Promotes Recovery
Unlike the statutory criteria for finding no jeopardy in consulta-
tion or issuing an incidental take permit (and, notwithstanding the
gnatcatcher rule), Section 4(d) explicitly requires that rules pro-
vide for species "conservation."492 Recall that "conservation" is a
term of art, defined by the ESA to mean the "use of all methods
and procedures which are necessary" to recover listed species so
that they no longer need the protection of the Act.493 Conservation
is also a duty that the Services share with other federal agencies.
The conservation mandate of Section 7 requires that agencies
"utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes" of the
Act.494 And, the statutory purpose of the Act is to "provide a
means whereby the ecosystems upon which [listed] ... species
depend may be conserved. 495 The Services' statutory authorities
under the ESA and other legislation such as the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act 496 and Marine Mammal Protection Act,497 contain far
more useful tools for conserving species than the authorizing leg-
islation for most other agencies. The Services, therefore, have a
greater burden under the Section 7 conservation mandate than
those other agencies whose authorities do not provide such direct
and effective tools for conservation. In addition, Section 4(c) of
the Act places a special conservation mandate on the Services to
implement recovery plans for listed species.498 A 4(d) rule pro-
moting conservation can be an important part of any recovery
plan for a threatened species dependent on privately owned habi-
tat. Even if the Services have not yet prepared a Section 4(f) re-
covery plan, the Section 7 affirmative conservation duty does re-
quire the Services to have some "specific and particular" plan or
program to recover the species.499 A 4(d) rule can be an important
part of such a plan or program.
492. 16 U.S.C. § 1633(d) (1994); Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608, 612-613 (8th Cir. 1985).
See supra notes 222-226 and accompanying text
493. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1994).
494. Id. § 1536(a)(1).
495. Id. § 1531(b).
496. Id. §§ 703-712
497. Id. §§ 1361-1421(h).
498. Id. § 1533(f).
499. Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606, 615 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that the U.S.
Dept. of Agriculture violated the Section 7 conservation duty by failing to develop an or-
ganized program for utilizing its authorities for the conservation of listed species depend-
ent on the Edwards Aquifer in Texas).
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Not only does the recovery criterion for the 4(d) rule fulfill the
statutory mandates of the Act, it is also good policy. Recovery
usually requires planning over a network of habitat reserves, with
corridors connecting small fragments.500 Because the 4(d) rule can
cover a significant portion of the range of a listed species, it can
spread the burden of habitat protection over a larger area-%' and
reconnect fragmented ecosystems.5 0 2 Project-by-project piecemeal
approaches to reducing injury to species seldom add up to recov-
ery and often result in disparate burdens on landowners.
Even the strict prohibitions of Section 9 applicable to endan-
gered species frequently are insufficient to assure species recov-
ery. In addition to requiring no Section 7(a)(1)-like affirmative
conservation steps, the prohibitions do not protect currently unoc-
cupied habitat that may be required for a species to recover.503 A
Section 4(d) rule that sets out criteria for a conservation plan in-
troduces the affirmative recovery mandates from Sections 4 and
7(a)(1) into promulgated guidelines for state and local planners to
adopt to avoid liability for Section 9 takes. In this paradoxical
sense, tailored prohibitions under Section 4(d) for threatened spe-
cies may be more protective than the general Section 9 prohibi-
tions applicable to endangered species.
Also, although the second sentence of ESA Section 4(d) allows
the Services to use any of the prohibitions under Section 9 appli-
cable to endangered species, it does not, on its face, limit the Ser-
vices to these prohibitions.5 04 The Section 4(d) power to regulate
private activity, therefore, under a purely textual analysis, can be
interpreted more broadly than Section 9. While this interpretation
is bolstered by Section 4(d)'s first sentence which mandates that
the Services issue regulations deemed "necessary and advisable"
to provide for recovery,5 05 it is not consistent with the legislative
history of the Act. Recall that the discussion surrounding the
500. NOSS ET AL., supra note 15, at 4; David S. Wilcove et al., Rebuilding the Ark. Toward a
More Effective Endangered Species Act for Private Land (Dec. 5, 1996), at
http://www.edf.org/pubs/Reports/help-esa/index.html (last visited June 16, 2000). See
supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
501. Marc J. Ebbin, The Ecosystem Approach: New Departures for Land and Water: Southern
California Habitat Conservation: Is the Southern California Approach to Conservation Succeeding?,
24 EcoLoGY L.Q. 695,698 (1997).
502. Sheldon, supra note 131, at 334-335 (1998).
503. Wilcove et aL, supra note 500.
504. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1994).
505. Id.
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adoption of Section 4(d) in 1973 centered on providing a safety
valve to reduce the hardships of applying the stringent take pro-
hibitions across the board even to species designated as less im-
periled than the high priority endangered category.-06 That legis-
lative history militates against interpreting Section 4(d) to allow
the Services to impose greater restrictions for threatened species
than Section 9 does for endangered species. Still, the cooperative
federalism 4(d) rule guidelines to qualify a jurisdiction for exemp-
tion from the Section 9 prohibitions may contain proscriptions not
covered by Section 9. Those guidelines are not imposed but rather
accepted by the jurisdiction in exchange for the relief from the Sec-
tion 9 statutory prohibitions.
As long as the Services continue to interpret the term "jeop-
ardy,"0 7 and implement the Section 10(a) "survival and recovery"
criterion,-0 as requiring no more than the avoidance of extinction,
then the 4(d) rule will be a better tool for comprehensive conserva-
tion planning. In 1986, the Services added the word "both" to the
term "survival and recovery," which defines the circumstances
under which appreciable reduction in the species viability would
constitute jeopardy.s°9 Since then, the Services interpretation has
been that "except in exceptional circumstances, injury to recovery
alone would not warrant the issuance of a jeopardy opinion."510
The Services, therefore, normally require injury to survival to trig-
ger a "no jeopardy" finding. The Services interpret "survival" to
mean the "retention of a sufficient number of individuals and/or
populations with necessary habitat to insure that the species will
keep its integrity in the face of genetic recombination and known
environmental fluctuations."51' Hence, the consultation, "no jeop-
ardy" standard, which each incidental take permit must meet,
falls short of requiring some affirmative contribution toward re-
covery.
Although the statutory criteria in Section 10(a) for issuing a
506. See supra notes 227-232 and accompanying text (describing the legislative history of
Section 4(d)).
507. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
508. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv).
509. Interagency Cooperation-Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended, 51 Fed.
Reg. 19,926 (1986) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402). See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying
text.
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permit do not contain the word "both" modifying the "survival
and recovery" term, the Services appear to be applying the stan-
dard in same way as they apply the "no jeopardy" criterion.5 12
Indeed, the HCP handbook makes the incorrect assertion that the
10(a) criterion requiring the take not appreciably reduce the likeli-
hood of survival and recovery of the specieS 13 "is identical" to the
Services' jeopardy definition, which includes the word "both."14
In its conference report on the 1982 amendments creating the inci-
dental take permit program, the House committee stated that the
Services should determine whether to grant a permit "in part, by
using the same standard as found in Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA, as
defined by the [Services'] regulations."515 At that time, in 1982, the
applicable regulations did not modify "survival and recovery"
with the term "both."516 Therefore, Congress may have intended
the 10(a) criterion to be more stringent, perhaps assuring no ap-
preciable reduction in the recovery as well as in the survival of the
species.
Nonetheless, a change in the Services' interpretation of this
standard for issuing an incidental take permit to give greater em-
phasis to recovery is unlikely considering the recent investment
the Services have made in their "no contribution to recovery nec-
essary" interpretation. 17 This will result in more plans like the
Balcones Canyonlands Conservation Plan in Texas, which sought
to preserve the minimum habitat to prevent extinction.518 Melinda
Taylor notes that "[tihe ultimate result of preserving minimum
habitat to stave off extinction will not be the long term preserva-
512. Parenteau, supra note 131, at 293-294; Sheldon, supra note 131, at 311-313; Melinda E.
Taylor, Promoting Recovery or Hedging a Bet Against Extinction: Austin, Texas's Risky Approach
to Endangered Species' Survival in the Texas Hill Country, 24 ENVTL. L 581, 592 (1994).
513. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv) (1994).
514. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES HABITAT CONSERVATION
PLANNING HANDBOOK 7-4 (1996) [hereinafter HANDBOOK] See also id. at 3-20.
515. H.R CONF. REP. NO. 97-835 (1982), quoted in HANDBOOK, supra note 514, at 7-4.
516. The regulations in force in 1982 had been promulgated in 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 870
Gan. 4,1978). Nonetheless, when the Services promulgated the 1986 rule adding the word
"both," it stated that the change did not represent a change in policy "because the Service
has internally interpreted the "jeopardy" standard as requiring detrimental impacts to the
continued existence of a species under a joint survival and recovery concept" 51 Fed. Reg.
19,926 and 19,933-34 (1986).
517. Parenteau, supra note 131, at 293-294; Sheldon, supra note 131, at 313. The FWS re-
cently reaffirmed its position in revisions to the HCP Handbook, Notice of Availability of a
Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and Incedental Take
Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242, 35,243 (une 1, 2000).
518. Taylor, supra note 51Z at 595-602.
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tion of protected species, but rather a prescription for ultimate
failure." 19 Moreover, the piecemeal nature of permit-by-permit
decision-making makes incorporating habitat recovery very diffi-
cult. Habitat recovery typically requires looking at the entire
range of a listed species and making judgments about trade-offs
and corridors.5 20
3. The 4(d) Rule Promotes Comprehensive Conservation
Nobody disputes Congress' logic in declaring that meeting the
goal of species recovery requires conserving the ecosystems upon
which the species depend.5 21 The National Research Council ex-
pressed the corollary that "habitat protection is a prerequisite for
conservation of biological diversity and protection of endangered
and threatened species."522 Ecosystem conservation, of course, re-
quires that habitat be managed over a large enough area to pro-
vide sufficient range for species recovery. Commentators advo-
cate ecosystem, or large-scale area-wide, planning for conserving
biological diversity.523 At least one court has seen the light and
suggested that compliance with the ESA and other statutes re-
quires "planning on an ecosystem basis."524
Though the Services encourage large-scale, area-wide HCPs,
they remain mired in the reactive mode of responding to what-
ever permit applications landowners make. In 1997, Michael
CYConnell reported that about 85 percent of HCPs were for "sin-
gle landowners, single species, and relatively small areas."5 25 A
519. Id. at 601, quoted in Sheldon, supra note 131, at 313.
520. See supra notes 18-20 and 500-502-
521. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
522. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 12, at 7
523. See, e.g., Reed F. Noss, Some Principles of Conservation Biology, As They Apply to Envi-
ronmental Law, 69 CIM.-KENT L. REV. 893, 904-07 (1994) (describing the multiple scales con-
servation strategies must consider); O'Connell, supra note 457, at 19 (arguing for ecosystem
based planning for species conservation); William H. Rodgers, Jr., Adaptation of Environ-
mental Law to the Ecologists' Discovery of Disequilibria, 69 CIm.-KENT L. REv. 887, 890-91 (1994)
(discussing the inadequacy of parcel-by-parcel conservation).
524. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291,1311 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (uphold-
ing the interagency, ecosystem management plan for the federally owned forests within the
geographic range of the threatened northern spotted owl).
525. O'Connell, supra note 457, at 18. See also PETER KAREIVA et al., USING SCIENCE IN
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS 4-16 (1999), at http://www.nceas.ucsb.edu/projects/hcp.
Excellent summaries and analyses of the report include Frances James, Lessons Learned from
a Study of Habitat Conservation Planning, 49 BIOSCIENCE 871 (1999); Laura Watchman, Mar-
tha Groom, and John D. Perrine, Science and Uncertainty in Habitat Conservation Planning, 89
AMERICAN SCIENTIST 351 (2001). See also NOSS ET AL., supra note 15, at 35,49; DEFENDERS OF
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single landowner, of course, faces a much higher transaction cost
to organize an area-wide plan into which her activity will fit than
she does to apply for a permit for just her activity alone. So, the
landowner has little incentive to respond to the Services' prefer-
ence that she collaborate with other landowners and citizens for
comprehensive planning. The 4(d) rule promotes comprehensive
conservation planning because it allows the Services rather than
permit applicants to define the boundaries of the plan area and to
set the priorities for which areas deserve attention first.
Comprehensive planning is preferable to piecemeal project
permitting not just from an ecological perspective. It also more
effectively meets the Services' goal of "minimizing social and
economic impacts." 26 Comprehensive planning is cheaper and
more flexible. It is cheaper because it spans a wider area to find
the best conservation opportunities for the least cost.5 27 It is more
flexible because it disperses the burden of preservation or restric-
tion of development over a broad area to allow for more trade-
offs.528 This, of course, is precisely the strategy of the area-wide
4(d) rules for the California gnatcatcher and the Puget Sound
salmon. It is also a strategy embraced in such pollution control
law programs as offsets and other forms of emission trading un-
der the Clean Air Act.
The earlier conservation efforts are directed towards species re-
covery, the greater the chance they will be successful at a lower
price. Just as flexibility to trade off between habitat conservation
and degradation shrinks with the geographic size of the plan, it
also diminishes over time as a species becomes more imperiled.
The Services have endorsed this view in a policy that states: "initi-
ating or expanding conservation efforts before a species and its
habitat are critically imperiled increases the likelihood that sim-
pler, more cost-effective conservation options will still be available
WILDLIFE, FRAYED SAFETY NET: CONSERVATION PLANNING UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
Acr 44 (1998). As of Dec. 31,1999, approximately 63% of HCPs covered 100 acres or less,
and 78% of HCPs covered 500 acres or less. Only 2% of HCPs covered 500,000 acres or
more. Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conserva-
tion Planning & Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg 35,242, 35,248 (June 1,
2000).
526. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, PROTECTING AMERICA'S LIVING HERITAGE: A FAIR,
COOPERATIVE AND SCIENTIFICALLY SOUND APPROACH TO IMPROVING THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT 5 (1995) (issued jointly with NMFS).
527. See BEATLEY, supra note 454, at 204.
528. See O'Connell, supra note 457, at 19-21.
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and that conservation will ultimately be successful." 29 Any com-
prehensive conservation plan should promote early action. To
some extent, the 4(d) rule has this incentive built in. Local juris-
dictions will prefer to get plans approved under 4(d) before a spe-
cies declines to the point at which desperate habitat needs im-
pinge on the trade-offs that smooth the way for a politically
acceptable plan. 30
An additional incentive is also provided by the Act. Section 4 of
the ESA requires a Service to take into account conservation ef-
forts of a state or local jurisdiction before determining whether to
list a species.531 These pre-listing conservation efforts are gener-
ally called candidate conservation agreements.5 32 Many candidate
conservation agreements, such as the one between NMFS and the
state of Oregon to prevent the listing of Oregon coho salmon, are
too little and too late to succeed.5 33 However, if agreements go
beyond speculation on future regulation and voluntary actions534
to outline binding promises to relieve the need for listing, then
candidate conservation agreements extended over large areas
could become the ultimate in collaborative comprehensive plans.
Unfortunately, the Services are currently pushing the candidate
conservation agreement tool to the very limits of its legality. A
new policy has created candidate conservation agreements with
529. Announcement of Final Policy for Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assur-
ances, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,726,32,726 (June 17,1999).
530. See supra notes 431-446; 264-279 and accompanying text for descriptions of how
California and Washington sought early approval from the Services of their conservation
efforts.
531. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (1994).
532. Strictly speaking, a candidate species is one for which the FWS has sufficient infor-
mation to justify proposing it for listing, but for which development of a proposed rule-
making is preempted by higher priority listing activities. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(iii)
(1994); U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Candidate Species and Candidate Conservation Agree-
ments With Assurances for Private Property Owners (June 16, 2000), at
http://endangered.fws.gov/listing/cca.pdf. Candidate conservation agreements, how-
ever, are applicable to both candidate and proposed species. Announcement of Final Pol-
icy for Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,726, 32,726
(June 17, 1999). As of November 18, 2001, the FWS had 255 candidate species and 39 pro-
posed species. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Candidate Species, at
http://ecos.fws.gov/webpage/webpage-nonlisted.html U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
Proposed Species, at http://ecos.fws.gov/webpage/webpage-nonlisted.html (last visited
Nov. 18, 2001).
533. See Blumm & Corbin, supra note 17, at 544-548; Oregon Natural Res. Council v.
Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Or. 1998).
534. Blumm & Corbin, supra note 17, at 544-548; Or. Natural Res. Council, 6 F. Supp. 2d
1139. See also Save Our Springs v. Babbitt, 27 F. Supp. 2d 739 (W.D. Tex. 1997).
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assurances. Parties to these agreements receive "assurances from
the Services that additional conservation measures will not be re-
quired and additional ... resource use restrictions will not be im-
posed should the species become listed in the future."535 Cer-
tainly, landowners need incentives to conserve species on the
verge of listing.536 However, the assurances in the new policy are
too enduring and allow future promises to counterbalance current
threats.
For candidate conservation agreements to work, the Service
must facilitate them long before listing is warranted.537 That way,
management plans can obviate rather than respond to a need to
list a species. If the plan fails to keep a species from slipping to
the listing threshold, then at least it may sustain a large enough
population to avoid a listing as endangered. Upon a threatened
listing, then, the agreement may serve as a basis for a more flexi-
ble 4(d) rule than would otherwise be promulgated. This should
be inducement enough for landowners and local governments to
collaborate on conservation with the Services: the up side of suc-
ceeding is great, the avoidance of listing; and, the down side of
failing is not so bad, a threatened listing with a foundation for the
development of a state-implemented plan through a 4(d) rule.
This consolation prize sustained comprehensive planning efforts
in Washington and Southern California despite those states' fail-
ure to prevent listing. Even Oregon, after failing to prevent
salmon listings with its statewide initiative, subsequently re-
adopted the initiative as a blueprint for conserving threatened
habitat. 38
Just as a pre-listing conservation agreement that does not suc-
535. Announcement of Final Policy for Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assur-
ances, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,726, 32,727 (June 17, 1999). The Services had been agreeing to defer
listing in exchange for conservation agreements even before the 1995 initiatives to intro-
duce greater flexibility in the ESA programs. See Robert L Fischman, Endangered Species
Conservation: What Should We Expect of Federal Agencies?, 13 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1, 17-18
(1992); Ortiz, supra note 461, at 466-67 (1999); U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, supra note
526.
536. See, Ortiz, supra note 461, at 463-64 (1999) (describing how landowners began clear-
ing their properties of golden-cheeked warbler habitat to avoid the possible land use re-
strictions when the Service considered listing the bird).
537. See id. at 478-487 (describing cases rejecting the Services' decisions to abandon an
initiated listing because of a candidate conservation agreement).
538. Or. Exec. Order No. E099-01 (1999), reprinted in Or. Admin. Bull., Jan. 8, 1999 (im-
plementing the Oregon Coastal Salmon Restoration Initiative). Golightly, supra note 182, at
444-45.
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ceed in staving off listing can serve as a basis for a 4(d) rule, a 4(d)
rule conservation plan may serve as a basis for a delisting agree-
ment. Delisting occurs when a Service, through notice and com-
ment rulemaking, removes a species from the threatened or en-
dangered list. A delisting decision is based on the same criteria as
a listing decision: a review of the factors affecting the continued
existence of a species.5 39 In her recent analysis of delisting under
the ESA, Professor Doremus recommends that strong state laws
and conservation agreements specifying enforceable means of en-
suring species protection be the basis for delisting decisions.40
The future possibility of delisting in response to a Section 4(d)
comprehensive plan that succeeds (and then basing the delisting
agreement on the existing 4(d) plan) should provide a further in-
centive for states and landowners to participate.5 41
4. The 4(d) Rule Responds Adaptively to Uncertainty
The assurances offered by the new candidate conservation
agreements are typical of the the Clinton Administration's efforts
to enlist private landowners to help preserve and restore habitat.
Recall the most important component of the Administration's ini-
tiative, the "no surprises" policy, which provides an incidental
take permit holder a guarantee that no new obligations will arise
from new information or unforeseen circumstances.5 42 This will
place an enormous strain on future administrations struggling to
promote recovery with HCPs and candidate conservation agree-
ments based on outdated assumptions. About the only thing cer-
tain with respect to conservation biology is that circumstances will
change and new information will disturb existing understand-
539. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1), (c)(2) (1994).
540. Holly Doremus, Delisting Endangered Species: An Aspirational Goal, Not a Realistic Ex-
pectation, 30 EnvtL L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,434, 10,453 (2000) (these laws and agreements
would ensure that, once population levels rebound to the point of delisting the risks that
created the need for listing in the first place would be controlled).
541. The Services, however, have not published de-listing criteria with the 4(d) rules.
See, e.g. Final Rule Governing Take of 14 Threatened Salmon and Steelhead Evolutionary
Significant Units (ESUs), 65 Fed. Reg. 42,422, 42,439 (July 10, 2000) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R pt. 323). Those criteria must await recovery plans.
542. "Unforeseen circumstances" are "changes in circumstances affecting a species or
geographic area covered by a conservation plan that could not reasonably have been an-
ticipated by plan developers and the Service at the time of the conservation plan's negotia-
tion and development, and that result in a substantial and adverse change in the status of
the covered species." Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances ["No Surprises"] Rule, 63 Fed.
Reg. 8859, 8870-71 (Feb. 23, 1998). See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 27:45
2002] Cooperative Federalism and the Endangered Species Act 151
ings.%43 The very essence of what we currently know about nature
is that it is a "relentlessly dynamic," stochastic system.- 4 This
conception is incompatible with the old view of plans as "visions
of an ideal future that, once achieved, would avoid the need for
additional change."5 45 Plans, whether they are HCPs, candidate
conservation agreements, or 4(d) rules, must be "processes for
adapting to change." 46
Adaptive management is a term that seeks to capture the reali-
ties of modem, disequilibrium, probabilistic conservation biology.
It responds to ecological characteristics by "[r]ecognizing that
every land management practice is an experiment with an uncer-
tain outcome."5 47 In adaptive management, authorized activities
are coordinated and monitored to determine their effects on bio-
logical integrity.5 48 The information gained then feeds back into
the plan "to adjust management in a desirable direction." 49
The "no surprises" HCP is a poor vehicle for this iterative plan-
ning. The most comprehensive study of HCPs to date, conducted
by the American Institute of Biological Sciences and the National
Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis, found insufficient
543. NOSS ET AL., supra note 15, at 63.
544. Jonathan Baert Wiener, Law and the New Ecology: Evolution, Categories, and Conse-
quences, 22 ECOLoGY L.Q. 325, 326 (1995); see also Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The
Influence of Ecological Science on American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 848
(1994) (describing the modem understanding of "the environment as in a process of con-
stant change rather than in search of a stable end-state") and NOSs, O'CONNELL & MURPHY,
supra note 10, at 77 ("[olne of the striking revelations of modem ecology is that ecological
systems are characterized by nonlinear, nonequilibrium, and often chaotic dynamics").
545. Bosselman & Tarlock, supra note 544, at 860.
546. Id.
547. Noss, supra note 523, at 907. See also infa notes 556-557, describing adaptive man-
agement as based on feedback from continual management experimentation.
548. See generally ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S. Holl-
ing ed., 1978); KAI N. LEE, COMPASS & GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLITICS FOR
THE ENVIRONMENT (1993); C.J. WALTERS, ADAPIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE
RESOURCES (1986). The FWS provides a helpful bibliography of relevant adaptive man-
agement literature in its recent notice revising the HCP Handbook. Notice of Availability
of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental
Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242,35,256-57 (Tune 1, 2000).
549. Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conserva-
tion Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35256-57. Although
the term "adaptive management" seldom appears in pollution control law, it is the basic
model for such key programs as the state implementation plan in the Clean Air Act, dis-
cussed supra notes 468-481 and accompanying text. One of the benefits of employing co-
operative federalism to recover species is that the ESA can borrow the best of the adaptive
management model used in the Clean Air Act.
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data to support the commitments in many plans.550 The report
also found monitoring to be lacking or inadequate in many
HCPs.55' The lack of important biological information needed to
develop measures for species recovery led the report to conclude
that the Services should adopt more flexible, adaptive manage-
ment.552
Other commentators, as well, view the no surprises policy as an
impediment to needed adaptive management.55 3 Noss, O'Connell
& Murphy, suggest that the real issue is the availability of federal
funding to engage in the monitoring and adjustments (e.g., pur-
chase of habitat in a different area or to provide a new corridor)
that new information and circumstances demand.55 4 Because
funds for federal agency conservation projects are always paltry,
even in the recent era of budget surpluses, it would be wiser for
the Services to assume that the federal government will not be
able to fund adaptive changes to HCPs and therefore not commit
the government to these future actions it has little hope of being
able to achieve.
The 4(d) rule, in contrast, better facilitates the flexibility neces-
sary to adjust the direction of a comprehensive, area-wide plan for
recovery. The Services may revise the basic criteria for approving
state/local plans and call for adjustments as new information
arises. The call for modification of state plans is routine in the
Clean Air Act SIP program and other pollution control programs
employing cooperative federalism. While not popular with the
states, the federal flexibility to require program changes is not fa-
tal to the incentives for the states to participate in the program.
The Administrative Procedure Act's notice and comment rule-
550. KAREIVA, supra note 525, at 3-4.
551. Id. at 4.
552. Id. at 5. While the FWS disagreed with the report's conclusions about the lack of
biological information, it has recently amended its HCP handbook to provide for
measurable biological objectives, incorporate adaptive management, and develop better
monitoring. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's Response to
AIBS/NCEAS's Study Using Science in Habitat Conservation Plans, at
http://endangered.fws.gov/hcp/response.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2001); Notice of Avail-
ability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and Inci-
dental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242 (June 1, 2000).
553. See, e.g., John Kostyack, The Need for HCP Reform: Five Points of Consensus, 16
ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE No. 3, at 47, 50-51 (1999); John Kostyack, Surprise!, ENVTL. F.,
Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 19; Parenteau, supra note 131, at 293-301; Sheldon, supra note 131, at 319-
320.
554. Noss ET AL., supra note 15, at 63.
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making procedures15 would restrain the Services from making
frequent, great, destabilizing changes. Most adaptive manage-
ment modifications will be incremental adjustments. The litera-
ture on adaptive management stresses continuous or continual ad-
justment.55 6 Although this will likely create the need for more
frequent modification of 4(d) criteria for state programs than oc-
curs for most regulations, the changes will usually be gradual ad-
justments based on the feedback from monitoring existing pro-
grams, which serve as experiments.55 7 This is not very different
from the long-standing administrative management principle of
"muddling through."558 The gnatcatcher 4(d) rule requires semi-
annual reviews of state guidelines to determine whether modifica-
tions are necessary. 5 9 Periodic review of MRCI development
programs under the salmon 4(d) rule occur annually through re-
porting, with evaluations "at intervals not to exceed five years." 56 °
States and local jurisdictions implementing permit programs
under a 4(d) rule to authorize activities that would not be consid-
ered a take, should look to the pollution control model for terms
that allow for a flexible response to new information and changed
circumstances. Unlike the incidental take permits excusing a Sec-
tion 9 violation, the state 4(d) permit programs should employ
"reopener" clauses and other conditions that permittees have ac-
cepted for decades in the pollution control context. A reopener
clause allows a permitting authority, usually a state, to suspend a
permit until an agreement can be reached about how to modify
activities in response to a supervening federal standard or some
555. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
556. See, e.g., Alan Haney & Rebecca L. Power, Adaptive Management for Sound Ecosystem
Management, 20 ENVTL. MGMT. 879 (Nov. 1996); Rebecca J. McLain & Robert G. Lee, Adap-
tive Management: Promises and Pitfalls, 20 ENvTL. MGMT. 437 (July 1996).
557. Rebecca J. McLain & Robert G. Lee, Adaptive Management: Promises and Pitfalls, 20
ENVTL. MGMT. 437 (July 1996). Some experiments, however, may be large in scale, abrupt,
and infrequent. For instance, the flood release from the Glen Canyon Dam has been de-
scribed as an adaptive management experiment. Vicky J. Meretsky, David L Wegner, &
Lawrence E. Stevens, Balancing Endangered Species and Ecosystems: A Case Study of Adaptive
Management in Grand Canyon, 25 ENvTL. MGMT. 579 (June 2000). In the case of salmon re-
covery, breaching a dam (or dams) on the Snake River would constitute such an experi-
ment. However, the local programs authorized under a 4(d) rule will generally involve
continual monitoring and incremental adjustment of ongoing programs of planning, regu-
lation, and maintenance.
558. Charles Lindblom, Science of "Muddling Through", 19 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 79 (1959);
Charles Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 9 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 517 (1979).
559. 50 C.F.R. § 17.41(b)(4) (2001).
560. 50 C.F.R. § 223.203(b)(12)(iii) (2001).
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other recent development. Although the permitting authority has
the power to suspend the permitted activity, the clause generally
operates to bring the permittee to the negotiating table rather than
to stop the permitted activity. Particularly since the duration of
permits under a 4(d) program for development activities would
likely be much longer than the duration of pollution control per-
mits,-6' the ability to reopen and adjust conditions will be critical
to the success of recovery efforts.
Flexibility in management design, though it sacrifices some of
the assurances that provide incentives for landowners to partici-
pate, can nonetheless offer strong incentives. The EPA's Project
XL (which stands for "Excellence in Leadership") allows partici-
pating polluters to dodge some of the more onerous burdens of
pollution control programs in exchange for a comprehensive envi-
ronmental improvement plan yielding superior environmental
performance. 62 The EPA then monitors and evaluates the results
561. While pollution control permits typically expire after five to ten years, HCPs for
development activities may be 50-100 years in duration. Frances James, Lessons Learnedfrom
a Study of Habitat Conservation Planning, 49 BIOSCIENCE 871, 873 (1999). This puts incidental
take permits in a category with federal permits to operate hydroelectric facilities, which
may last 50 years. 16 U.S.C. § 799 (1994). The hydroelectric permits also contain a "no sur-
prises" clause that prohibits the government from unilaterally changing in the terms of the
permit This guarantee is designed "to protect the licensee's investment and ensure eco-
nomic viability and project profitability." Charles R. Sensiba, Who's in Charge Here? The
Shrinking Role of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in Hydropower Relicensing, 70 U.
CoLO. L. REv. 603, 617 (1999) (citing Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. FERC, 116 F.3d 507, 513
(D.C. Cir. 1997)). One reason for the HCP's affinity with hydroelectric licenses and differ-
ence from pollution permits is that the incidental take often involves a habitat disturbance
(such as building a residential subdivision) at the start of the permit that endures for the
long-term. In contrast, the activity usually authorized by a pollution control permit is on-
going and causes adverse modifications to the environment that dissipate relatively quickly
after the activity abates. Patrick Parenteau recommends that the no surprises clause be re-
placed with shorter-term permits (not to exceed ten years) and "permit shield" provisions,
like the ones found in pollution control statutes, that would protect from enforcement per-
mittees complying with their permit. Parenteau, supra note 131, at 309. Clean Water Act
Section 404 permits to discharge dredge or fill material often involve habitat losses (and
mitigation) in wetlands similar to losses (and mitigation) that occur in incidental take per-
mits. However, Section 404 permits typically involve an activity, the filling of a wetland,
that occurs at one time and then is finished. Incidental take permits, sometimes fit that
model but other times involve ongoing activities (such as forest management) that need a
permit extending over many years. One enforcement concern with mitigation in Section
404 permits is that the permitted activity often finishes long before the permittee satisfies
mitigation commitments.
562. The EPA explained that Project XL is designed "to give regulated sources the flexi-
bility to develop alternative strategies that will replace or modify specific regulatory re-
quirements on the condition that they produce greater environmental benefits." Regula-
tory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282, 27,282 (May 23,1995). See generally,
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of the improvement plan to guide further regulatory reform.s63
Though most commentators agree that Project XL has not realized
its promise,564 it is an important, ongoing attempt to apply adap-
tive management in a regulatory context.5 65 The Services should
design their 4(d) programs to incorporate the experimentation of
adaptive management into their regulations.
Another incentive in the comprehensive 4(d) rule that will coun-
terbalance the loss of some of the assurances to participating
landowners is the promise of "one-stop shopping."56 6 Instead of
applying for both local land use permits and a federal HCP per-
mit, landowners under a 4(d) rule will be able to concentrate on
the single, integrated process under the local jurisdiction's Ser-
vice-approved plan. In this way, the principle of cooperative fed-
eralism streamlines the procedure from the perspective of the
permittee.5 67
5. The 4(d) Rule Can Assure Open Public Participation
A common criticism of the HCPs is that they "are negotiated
behind closed doors, and receive only superficial, after-the-fact
Dennis D. Hirsch, Bill and Al's XL-ent Adventure: An Analysis of the EPA's Legal Authority to
Implement the Clinton Administration's Project XL, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 129 (1998).
563. Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,872, 19,873 (Apr. 23,
1997); Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282, 27,283 (May 23,
1995); Lawrence E. Susskind & Joshua Secunda, "Improving" Project XL: Helping Adaptive
Management to Work within EPA, 17 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 155,155 (1998-99) [hereinaf-
ter "Improving" Project XL]; Lawrence E. Susskind & Joshua Secunda, The Risks and the Ad-
vantages of Agency Discretion: Evidence from EPA's Project XL, 17 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
67, 86 (1998-99) [hereinafter The Risks and the Advantages]; Browner Legacy May be Changes in
Attitude at EPA Rather Than Rules, INSIDE EPA, Oct 6,2000, at 1, 12
564. Susskind & Secunda, "Improving" Project XL; Susskind and Secunda, The Risks and
the Advantages; Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey
from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L REV. 103 (1998); Rena I. Steinzor, Regula-
tory Reinvention and Project XL: Does the Emperor Have Any Clothes?, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (EnvtL
L. Inst.) 10527 (1996). Some critics go so far as to call the program environmentally un-
sound. Agency Staff Criticize Project XL as Environmentally Unsound, 21 INSIDE EPA, Oct. 20,
2000, at 1. See generally, Joel A. Mintz, Whither Environmental Reform?: Some Thoughts on a
Recent AALS Debate, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)10,719 (2001).
565. Susskind & Secunda, "Improving" Project XL, supra note 564, at 157; and Susskind &
Secunda, The Risks and the Advantages, supra note 564, at 67. Another example of the current
interest in adaptive management of federal pollution control is the Second Generation of
Environmental Improvement Act of 1999, considered in the 106th Congress as H.R. 3448,
and likely to be introduced again. See Dennis D. Hirsch, Symposium Introduction: Second
Generation Policy and the New Economy, 29 CAPrTAL U. L. REv. 1,10 (2001).
566. NOSS Er AL., supra note 15, at 40.
567. Id. (describing one of the incentives for private landowners in HCPs as "guarantees
of streamlined regulations").
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
public comment."5 68 Permit applicants are understandably resis-
tant to complicating and extending the negotiations for an HCP by
including citizen representatives in the discussion. And, the Ser-
vices require little more of the HCP development process than a
statutorily mandated period for the public to comment on a notice
in the Federal Register indicating that a permit application has
been made. 69 Because the framework, and frequently the details,
of the HCP are worked out before the permit application is made,
public comment occurs too late to be useful.5 70 By the time the
Services publish notice of the application with the draft HCP, Ser-
vice staff and the applicants have already invested too much time,
money, and political capital to be receptive to major changes.571
In the most comprehensive analysis of public participation in
habitat conservation planning, a University of Michigan study
found that groups representing environmental, Native American,
and commodity interests were involved in only sixty percent of
large HCPs.Y2 And, when they were involved, the late timing of
their involvement reduced their influence.5 73 Of course, it is in the
large HCPs where public participation is most critical to the suc-
cess of the program. Without public support, it would be difficult
to incorporate habitat conservation commitments into land use
policies.5 74 In addition, the Michigan study notes that the terms of
a large-scale plan are improved through early public participation
because outside stakeholders bring to the negotiations key infor-
mation and creative ideas for compromise.5 75
The 4(d) rule can and should widen public participation. The
568. Parenteau, supra note 131, at 309. See also Holly Doremus, Preserving Citizen Partici-
pation in the Era of Reinvention: The Endangered Species Act Example, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707,
713-715 (1999).
569. 16 U.S.C.§ 1539(c) (1994). Typically, this comment period is used to meet NEPA re-
quirements as well as the ESA mandate. David Bidwell et al., Process Components in Devel-
oping Habitat Conservation Plans, 16 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE 90, 93 (1999). See Notice
of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning
and Incidental Take Permitting Process 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242,35,256 (June 1, 2000) (extending
the duration of the public comment period but not expanding opportunities for public par-
ticipation).
570. ANDERSON & YAFFEE, supra note 459, at 4, 17; Doremus, supra note 568, at 713; Kost-
yack, The Need for HCP Reform, supra note 553, at 52.
571. ANDERSON & YAFFEE, supra note 459, at 21-26; Doremus, supra note 568, at 713.
572. ANDERSON & YAFFEE, supra note 459, at 17.
573. Id. at 17.
574. Id. at 12-16.
575. Id. at 12-16. See also Doremus, supra note 568, at 715.
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criteria in 4(d) rules to determine the adequacy of state and local
plans can address procedure, as well as substance. Indeed, coop-
erative federalism programs in the pollution control field fre-
quently mandate that states put in place certain procedures for
public involvement, as well as minimum pollution standards. The
EPA requires state-authorized permitting processes, for instance,
to include opportunities for public notice, comment, and (some-
times) hearings.5 76 The NCCP process guidelines provide for pub-
lic participation in plan development but neither the salmon nor
the gnatcatcher 4(d) rules require state or local governments to in-
clude the public in permit issuance.
The Services can improve on the tools that the EPA uses to
promote greater and more fair citizen participation in state plan-
ning and permitting. Public notice, comment, and hearings tend
to limit citizens to reacting to proposals already developed. Col-
laborative decision-making, or interactive participation, which in-
cludes stakeholders in "face-to-face problem solving,"5 77 offers
greater opportunities for creative public involement.578 This is
particularly true in planning, where panels or working groups
may meet periodically to identify information needs, raise issues,
propose new approaches, or monitor progress.
Another tool to assure open public participation that the Ser-
vices should introduce into 4(d) rules is mandated information
disclosure. As Professor Markell has discussed in the context of
improving cooperative federalism for pollution control, a public
scorecard and/or periodic reports on measures of performance
576. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 70.7(h) (2000) (public notice, comment, and hearings for state
Title V permitting under the Clean Air Act); and 40 C.F.R. § 124.10(a) (2000) (public notice,
comment and review of draft permits for state pollution discharge elimination system
permits under the Clean Water Act). The EPA revises these standards it imposes on states
to provide public participation in order to improve citizen involvement. See, e.g. Amend-
ments to Streamline the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program Regula-
tions: Round Two, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,899-890 (May 15, 2000) (establishing informal adjudica-
tory procedural standards in order to promote more public participation by "minimizing
the activities for which legal counsel is required and expediting the permit review process
such that citizen groups need commit fewer resources for shorter duration").
577. O'CONNER CENTER FOR THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN WEST, UNIV. OF MONTANA &
INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, UNIV. OF WYOMING, RECLAIMING
NEPA's POTENTIAL: CAN COLLABORATIVE PROCESSES IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION
MAKING? 23 (2000).
578. See Tim W. Clark & Garry D. Brewer, Introduction, in DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE
MANAGEMENT POLICY FOR THE NATIONAL ELK REFUGE, WYOMING 9, 15 (Tim W. Clark
et al. eds., 2000) (Bulletin Series No. 104), available at
http://www.yale.edu/enviroment/publications.
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may invite greater public interest and, ultimately, involvement.5 79
The internet, already used extensively in the Tri-County Initiative
and Model development to disseminate information and encour-
age public participation, is an excellent platform for establishing
this public accountability.
The notice and comment rulemaking process through which the
Services establish 4(d) standards provides a good opportunity for
stakeholders to discuss their concerns and make suggestions.
Many stakeholders and their interest groups have limited re-
sources that prevent them from participating in every permit ne-
gotiation.%s However, the comprehensive rule that will guide the
state permit program is a good, early bottleneck in the administra-
tive process to secure terms that protect citizens' interests. In-
deed, interest groups often make the implicit trade-off of accept-
ing limitations on their ability to intervene in permitting decisions
in exchange for clear, strict, regulatory standards that must bind
all permittees.5 81
A 4(d) rule offers an inherent advantage for citizen opportuni-
ties to shape the conservation program. Unlike a 10(a) permit,
where outside groups are limited to commenting on the permit
application, in the 4(d) setting such groups will have a double op-
portunity to influence the Service to strengthen protections. First,
groups can comment on the 4(d) rule itself to advocate for specific,
measurable standards. If the Service fails to respond adequately,
the groups may seek judicial review. This is what the Washington
Environmental Council has done with respect to the MRCI devel-
opment considerations in the salmon 4(d) rule.582 Then, citizen
groups have a second opportunity to influence the program
through the Service when a local jurisdiction submits a proposal
to qualify under the 4(d) rule. Citizen groups may then lobby the
Service to apply strictly the standards in the 4(d) rule in evaluat-
ing the local package of controls. Again, judicial review would be
579. Markell, supra note 166, at 99-108.
580. Doremus, supra note 568, at 713, notes that "decentralization of permit decisions"
makes public participation difficult.
581. James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law,
53 STAN. L. REv. 607, 684 (2000) ("Environmental permitting regimes have been premised
on a fundamental tradeoff in this respect: In return for the security of prescribed ex ante
permitting standards (developed by the agency through public notice and comment rule-
making and applied to each applicant in a permitting proceeding), the public has yielded
an equal seat at the permit negotiating table.").
582 See supra note 370 and accompanying text for a description of the suit.
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available to ensure that the Service meets its statutory and regula-
tory obligations for conservation. Of course, there are limits to
how effectively citizens can compel strict Service implementation
of ESA standards. We deal with that problem at V(B)(5).
6. The 4(d) Rule Clarifies What Activities the ESA Prohibits
As illustrated in Section I(C) of this article, discussing the defi-
nition of harm and the role of causation in takes, there remains
great uncertainty in applying the prohibitions of ESA Section 9.583
Certainly, future litigation will resolve some of this ambiguity.
However, policy making through the courts is itself an unpredict-
able and nonuniform exercise. The 4(d) rule offers an opportunity
to specify for a particular area exactly what kinds of habitat modi-
fication will trigger liability.
The Services have agreed by policy since 1994 to identify activi-
ties that likely will, and will not, result in a take.584 However, this
policy has proven difficult to implement for species with large
ranges.585 Also, Service attention is often focused on other issues
at the time of listing. Since a 4(d) rule will apply only to a single
(or related suite of) species in a particular region, the Services
should be able to clarify considerably what local activities will be
prohibited. Rather than leave landowners wondering whether a
particular habitat modification is foreseeable, whether it is "sig-
nificant," whether it "actually" injures the species, or whether it
"significantly" impairs the essential behavioral patterns,58 6 a 4(d)
rule could specify activities, performance measures, and locations
that require limitations to recover the species. Some 4(d) rules al-
ready do this.5 87 In addition, a 4(d) rule could clarify the indirect
583. See supra notes 83-108 and accompanying text.
584. Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy for Endangered Species Act Section 9
Prohibitions, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,272 (July 1, 1994).
585. For some other species, the Services have made greater progress in recent years to
delimit the boundaries of take. See, e.g., Final Rule to List the Barton Springs Salamander as
Endangered, 62 Fed. Reg. 23,377, 23,391 (Apr. 30, 1997), cited in J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Con-
gress? An Agenda for Administrative Reform of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
368, 390 (1998). See also 50 C.F.R. § 223.206-.207 (2000) (setting out conditions under which
no take liability will be incurred for incidental capture of threatened sea turtles with the use
of turtle excluder devices).
586. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2000) (defining harm).
587. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. §223.202(a)(2) (2000) (specifying the exact distance a vessel or per-
son must stay away from a Steller sea lion or rookery site). The NMFS' Citizen's Guide de-
scribes types of activities that may result in salmon takes, but does not draw a precise line
defining the limits. National Marine Fisheries Service, supra note 369, at 5-6.
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liability that courts are now just beginning to explore.588 Imple-
mentation of a 4(d) program will make the Services' 1994 policy
more central to the success of the overall ESA program because
local interests persuaded of the threat of Section 9 liability will
have greater inducements to develop land use plans that qualify
for a 4(d) limitation on take.
A 4(d) rule that employs cooperative federalism to approve
state/local land use plans will create even greater certainty. Once
the Service approves a state/local plan as complying with the 4(d)
rule, then any activity conducted in compliance with the plan will
be shielded from ESA Section 9 liability. Of course, some uncer-
tainties may remain about what compliance with the plan entails.
But, particularly for activities permitted under the state/local
plan, there will be governmental approvals that will shield land-
owners from liability.
B. Objections to the Expanded Use of the 4(d) Rule
Of course, no program is perfect. The Section 4(d) tool certainly
has its weaknesses, particularly in areas where there is no local
administrative infrastructure to support land use controls that will
conserve habitat. However, many of the objections to the use of
the 4(d) rule can be overcome by selective use of the vehicle for
recovery through cooperative federalism. We expect 4(d) to be-
come the most important program over the next decade of ESA
implementation, but we recognize that there will be circumstances
where other programs, such as incidental take permitting, will be
more appropriate. This section explores some general objections
to and limitations on the widespread application of rule 4(d) to
the problem of species recovery.
1. The 4(d) Rule Is Limited to Threatened Species
Though the 4(d) rule will never be available as a recovery tool
for all species, there are sufficient threatened animal species to
make the 4(d) rule an important and useful tool. Twenty-seven
percent of listed animal species in the United States are threat-
ened.589 The 4(d) rule, of course, is limited to that fraction of the
588. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(g) (1994); see also supra notes 188-200; 207-217 and accompany-
ing text
589. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Threatened and Endangered Species System Boxscore, at
http://ecos.fws.gov/tess/hbnl/boxscore.html (information as of Oct. 31, 2001) (last visited
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list. Nonetheless, the fraction represents 136 species, a large num-
ber in and of itself. In that group of 136, there are likely many
species (including thirty-nine percent of listed fishes and sixty-one
percent of listed reptiles) 590 that need the kind of comprehensive
habitat conservation planning that a 4(d) rule would promote.
The decision whether to list a species as threatened or endan-
gered is a difficult one to make given the continuum of relative
risk of extinction. Although some listed species are misclassified,
in general, endangered animals have smaller populations upon
listing than threatened ones.591 One objection to extensive use of
the 4(d) rule is that it might create an incentive for the Services to
list or downlist a species as threatened in situations where the cor-
rect prognosis is endangered.
There are two responses to this objection. First, it is not at all
clear that there is less protection available for a species listed as
threatened even though it might meet the definition of endan-
gered. 92 Both categories of listed species are treated identically
under the Section 7 duties. It is only under the Section 9 prohibi-
tions that the Act distinguishes between the two categories. If the
Services use the flexibility afforded by the Act in tailoring prohibi-
tions for threatened species through comprehensive 4(d) rules,
then there may be no disadvantage at all for a species to be listed
as threatened. Though there is some question whether 4(d) protec-
tions may go beyond the scope of Section 9 prohibitions, they
must meet the statutory requirement to promote recovery.5 93 And,
the effectiveness of using cooperative federalism to plan for re-
covery may result in greater conservation success for threatened
species.
Second, a strong incentive for the Services to list species as
threatened may operate to get species listed earlier, while they are
Nov. 19, 2001). This figure counts as threatened eight species that are listed both as threat-
ened and endangered, over different parts of their range: 136 threatened animals out of a
total of 509 listed animals in the U.S. Because regulation of destruction of plants on private
property is rare in the United States, we focus on animal species for the use of 4(d) rules. If
we include plant species, twenty-two percent of listed species in the U.S. are threatened. Id.
The cooperative federalism under Section 4(d) is applicable only to the United States, so
we exclude foreign species from these figures.
590. Id.
591. Wilcove, supra note 32, at 9Z
592. Under the Act, an endangered species is "in danger of extinction throughout all or a
significant portion of its range" and a threatened species is likely to become endangered
within the foreseeable future. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6), (20) (1994).
593. See supra notes 500-511 and accompanying text.
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less imperiled, rather than waiting until populations decline and
habitat degrades to the very precipice of extinction.5 94 David Wil-
cove explains the poor record of recovering listed species by ob-
serving that the Services are not listing species soon enough: "If
rare and declining species.., were listed before they reached such
low numbers, prospects for successful recovery would im-
prove."5gs The Services' austere funding levels for listing cur-
rently make earlier listing of species unlikely, as the Services' are
overwhelmed with a backlog of extremely imperiled species.5 96
But, successful 4(d) pilot programs may make the listing program
more attractive to Congressional appropriation committees. If
more funding for listing created more flexibility in private land
habitat management (through early threatened listings leading to
comprehensive 4(d) rules), then listing may become a more popu-
lar budget item. Also, because states have shown a willingness to
develop conservation plans in order to avoid an endangerment
listing,597 they may be expected to pressure the Services for earlier
listing and the Congress for the appropriations to get it accom-
plished.
2. The 4(d) Rule Will Make Listing More Burdensome
The 4(d) rule that promotes recovery through cooperative fed-
eralism is a much more complex regulation than the conventional,
typically brief, 4(d) rule that sets out prohibited activities for
threatened species. Cooperative federalism 4(d) rules will require
an investment of additional federal funding. However, these
monies will leverage far more resources to aid the Services' efforts
to recovery species. Unlike many Section 4(f) recovery plans, the
4(d) rules will create mechanisms for implementation through ex-
isting state and local programs. And, developing a blueprint in a
4(d) rule for a cooperative agreement will channel money to state
institutions, which is typically more popular in Congress than
funding federal agency actions.
Moreover, it is important to note that the Services need not
594. See notes 532-541 and accompanying text
595. Wilcove et al., supra note 32, at 92.
596. See, e.g., DOI and House Republicans Agree on ESA Listing/Habitat Cap, PUBLIC LANDS
NEWS, June 9, 2000, at 6; Babbitt, supra note 39.
597. See, e.g. Blumm & Corbin, supra note 17, at 545-548 (describing Oregon's plan to con-
serve Coho salmon); supra Subpart V(2)(b) (describing Washington's efforts to conserve
salmon).
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promulgate 4(d) rules concurrently with listing. 98 So, a policy
emphasizing 4(d) programs would not delay the initial step estab-
lishing ESA protection for a species qualified as threatened. In-
deed, for species listed by the FWS, initial listing of a threatened
species without a 4(d) rule will typically establish more stringent
prohibitions than a comprehensive 4(d) plan. This is because the
FWS has a blanket rule extending all Section 9 prohibitions for
endangered species to threatened species unless otherwise noted
by regulation.5 99 Therefore, landowners and local governments
controlling habitat of threatened species have an incentive to work
with the Service to get funding and negotiate a 4(d) rule that will
clarify and apply just those more finely tuned restrictions neces-
sary for recovery. The NMFS should join the FWS by promulgat-
ing a blanket rule extending the endangered species prohibitions
in Section 9 to threatened species in the absence of a special 4(d)
rule.
3. The 4(d) Rule Abandons a Substantial Investment in HCPs
The Clinton Administration made a substantial commitment to
building a strong administrative foundation for the development
of HCPs. It trained Service personnel, invested political capital,
developed regulations and a Handbook, and litigated cases all for
the goal of establishing the HCP/incidental take permit as the
flagship ESA program. Why resist this momentum and detour to
a new program based on rule 4(d)?
Comprehensive 4(d) rules and HCPs are not mutually exclusive.
There are many situations, such as endangered species conserva-
tion and rural area habitats where the HCP will be a more appro-
priate tool. Even for areas and species covered by a comprehen-
sive 4(d) rule for recovery through cooperative federalism, there
will be unanticipated circumstances calling for an exception to the
approved state plan. The Services may have to limit the circum-
stances under which they will consider an incidental take permit
to those situations where an applicant demonstrates that comply-
ing with a plan adopted under a 4(d) rule is not feasible. None-
theless, the HCP will remain a vehicle for landowners in extraor-
598. Oregon Natural Res. Council v. Brown, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11286, at *8 (N.D. Cal.
July 29,1997).
599. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.31 (for animals), 17.71 (for plants) (2000). See supra note 86 and ac-
companying text.
164 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 27:45
dinary situations to opt out of the system.
Still, though, many of the features of progressive 4(d) planning
could be incorporated in HCPs. Though a less elegant vehicle, the
HCP could, through administrative reform, incorporate aspects of
cooperative federalism and mandates for recovery. However, re-
form seems unlikely considering how vehemently the Services
have defended the current shape of the HCP program.600 Addi-
tionally, other weaknesses of HCPs, such as the limited Service
control of the timing, size, and location of applications, are inher-
ent in the statutory structure of Section 10.
4. The 4(d) Rule Fails to Promote Multi-Species Conservation
Certainly, long-term maintenance of biological diversity re-
quires a systemic, landscape-level effort to conserve whole assem-
blages of species that interact in an ecosystem. Although the pur-
pose statement of the ESA refers to the conservation of
"ecosystems," the term appears nowhere else in the Act.601 The
fact of the matter is that the ESA concerns itself with just one as-
pect of the biodiversity crisis, the emergency care of the most
frayed edges of the biological web. It is unrealistic to expect the
ESA to shoulder the entire burden of biodiversity conservation in
the United States. So, while the objection is a legitimate concern, it
is one that applies to all aspects of the ESA program.
There will be some opportunities to develop 4(d) rules that in-
corporate recovery programs for multiple species. However, the
opportunities will be limited to situations where the overlaps be-
tween habitats, local jurisdictions, and land use challenges corre-
spond closely. These conditions have been scarce in the experi-
ence with HCPs.602 We expect that these circumstances will be
similarly rare for 4(d) rules. Nonetheless, California's experience
with the Coastal Sage Scrub NCCP illustrates how a 4(d) rule can
spur area-wide multi-species conservation.
However, the 4(d) rule we are proposing at least offers the ad-
vantage of starting a plan for a single species and then updating it
to include other species. The relative flexibility of the 4(d) rule to
600. See, e.g., supra notes 517-520 and accompanying text. See also Notice of Availability
of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental
Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242 (June 1, 2000).
601. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
602. BEATLEY, supra note 454, at 202-203; NOSS ET AL., supra note 15, at 41.
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modify plans and commitments to adapt to new conditions allows
for growth into multi-species planning. It is better to develop an
acceptable comprehensive plan for a single species and then ex-
pand it incrementally to more species than to load down the nego-
tiations initially with a large number of species. The 4(d) rule
should start with the easy species and expand when it can.
5. The 4(d) Rule Is Vulnerable to Weak Service
Implementation
The most serious objection to the investment in an expanded
cooperative 4(d) program is that it is vulnerable to the same basic
weakness as the 10(a) permit program: lax Service implementa-
tion. Just as the Services have implemented the incidental take
permits in a way that minimizes political resistance from property
rights advocates and commodity interests, so we can expect the
Services to respond in the same way to pressures in the 4(d) pro-
gram. 603 Like 10(a) implementation, 4(d) involves a great deal of
scientific judgment and discretion, in which the Services have a
great deal of latitude. Their track record in exercising that latitude
reflects the caution of an agency with little political weight to re-
sist economic pressures.6 4
Skeptics will charge that 4(d) rules with few specific, measur-
able, objective standards for state program approvals will bend to
the will of the state/local interests. Why should we expect the
Services to insist on stringent conservation measures in program
approvals under the 4(d) rules when the Services have failed to
insist on stringent conservation measures in HCP approvals? This
skepticism is particularly well founded given the common origins
of both statutory provisions as release valves to prevent political
pressure from destroying the Act in reaction to inflexible require-
ments.
603. Certainly, the EPA's implementation of cooperative federalism in pollution control
suffers from the very deferential treatment of many aspects of state programs, especially
permitting and enforcement. This is partly a consequence of the EPA's financial and politi-
cal weaknesses in mounting a credible threat of withdrawing federal authorization of a
state program. MarkeU, supra note 166. Nonetheless, we think it is fair to say that the fed-
eral oversight role has tended to bolster state environmental protection. See Esty, supra
note 172
604. See JEANNE NIENABER CLARKE & DANIEL C. MCCOOL, STAKING OUT THE TERRAIN:
POWER AND PERFORMANCE AMONG NATURAL RESOURCE AGENCIES 107-125 (2d ed. 1996)
(describing the weak political position of the FWS relative to other federal natural re-
sources agencies).
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Any response to this weakness must acknowledge that the Ser-
vices are relatively weak players within the Beltway; certainly,
they have not proven to be the zealous conservation advocates
some supporters had hoped they would be. 5 Nonetheless, the
Act does confine lax administrative discretion. Section 4(d)'s re-
covery mandate establishes a higher floor for protection of species
than does Section 10(a). Moreover, because Section 4(d) requires
the Services to proceed via rulemaking to establish species- and
location-specific standards to determine what state/local pro-
grams will qualify, there is an additional opportunity for public
and judicial scrutiny that does not exist for Section 10(a) per-
mits.606 Just as courts have remanded inadequate recovery
plans,60 7 courts could be expected to remand gnatcatcher-like rules
that fail to require progress toward recovery.
One prerequisite for strong implementation of a cooperative,
comprehensive, conservation 4(d) rule is good-faith participation
from states and local jurisdictions. As we have noted throughout
the paper, in many land use settings, the causative connection be-
tween development and habitat degradation actually injuring
wildlife is so attenuated as to raise only a trivial threat of liabil-
ity.608 Though the Services seldom prosecute such cases, they can
spur conservation in some instances by threatening suits. Citizen
plaintiffs seeking to enforce the take prohibition face difficult bur-
dens of proof without the deference enjoyed by expert Service de-
terminations of what level of habitat alteration constitutes harm
for a particular species. Nonetheless, as the Strahan case illus-
trates, 6 9 citizen suits can impose indirect liability on states. Also,
a well written 4(d) rule will clarify what activities will likely cause
takes.610 This step alone will provide a firmer basis for citizen
suits and may alert some local governments that would not oth-
605. Id.
606. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. The Clinton Administration's abandon-
ment of its ill-conceived Proposed Rule Exempting Certain Small Landowners and Low-
Impact Activities from Endangered Species Act Requirements for Threatened Species, 60
Fed. Reg. 37,419 (July 20, 1995), suggests that the 4(d) process is not simply an open door
for biological compromise on politically unpopular restrictions.
607. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
608. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1999). See discussion supra at IV(B)(2); V(B)(2)(a); V(B)(2)(c) and
accompanying text.
609. Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997); see also supra notes 188-199 and accom-
panying text.
610. See supra note 217.
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erwise be concerned about habitat modification to the problems
posed by inadequate land use controls.
More generally, there are three reasons why, despite some
vulnerability to weak implementation, the cooperative 4(d) rules
we promote offer a promising new development. First, though
connecting habitat alteration through land use to prohibited take
is difficult under any circumstance, it is less difficult to establish in
the aggregate than at the margins.61' Individual, piecemeal reduc-
tion in habitat quality, for instance, may be difficult to connect to
falling populations. However, within a drainage, which might fall
inside a political jurisdiction, the overall habitat available for, say,
breeding can be linked directly to a species well-being. The 4(d)
focus on local governments with regulatory (especially permit-
ting) systems already in place over a significant portion of a
threatened species range allows the 4(d) rule to draw a boundary
line around an area that will facilitate monitoring. 612
Second, for local governments that are interested in planning for
water quality, park networks (often inaptly called "greenways"),
or even species protection, a 4(d) program would provide political
cover. These jurisdictions (which might include Austin, Texas;
Pima County, Arizona; and King County, Washington) can justify
improvements to their regulatory regime by blaming the ESA for
requiring better planning and land use controls.613 After all, com-
prehensive planning is good for conservation of a wide range of
resources local governments care about, not just listed species.
And, local land use plans operated in cooperation with a federal
program are more likely to receive federal grants.
Third, individual landowners, where they must secure local
permits anyway, might support the added security of protection
from potential, though unlikely, federal liability. The cooperative
4(d) rule enables those local permits to provide a safe harbor from
611. See generally Brian Czech et al., Economic Associations Among Causes of Species Endan-
germent in the United States, 50 BIOSCIENCE 593 (2000) (finding sprawl development, gener-
ally, to be an important threat to biological diversity).
612. It is this advantage of comprehensive conservation (see discussion supra at VI(A)(3))
that allows the West Coast salmon 4(d) rule to employ the "properly functioning condi-
tions" (PFC) measures to monitor conservation status. See supra note 358 and accompany-
ing text.
613. John Kostyack argues that conserving listed species may lead to "more and better
regional planning" that would also abate suburban sprawl and its attendant problems,
such as traffic. John Kostyack, NWF v. Babbitt: Victory for Smart Growth and Imperiled Wild-
life, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,712,10,718 (2001).
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Section 9 liability. Enough Section 10(a) permits have been issued
to developers to demonstrate the existence of some incentive in
the private sector to seek greater certainty of protection from fed-
eral liability. These private developers, who, under the current
regime, apply for Section 10 permits, would benefit when their lo-
cal governments receive authorization under a 4(d) rule that
would streamline the development process. Instead of applying
for both a local and a federal 10(a) permit, a developer in a juris-
diction running a program authorized under a 4(d) rule would
need to apply only for the local permit.
VII. CONCLUSION
In comparing Section 4(d) to Section 10(a), we do not mean to
suggest that the 4(d) strengths argue for the elimination of the
10(a) permit program any more than the advent of the 10(a) pro-
gram led to the abandonment of the interagency coordination
(consultation) that was the hallmark of the first era of ESA imple-
mentation. Rather, the strengths of the 4(d) rule position it to be
the next flagship ESA program to further the goals of species re-
covery and biodiversity conservation.
Section 10(a) incidental take permits will remain important, es-
pecially for endangered species, which cannot be covered by a
4(d) rule. Even for threatened species, there will always be situa-
tions where fairness or effectiveness demand an exception to the
general rules set out under a 4(d) protective regulation. However,
the Services should shift from trying to use 10(a) as a vehicle for
comprehensive conservation planning where they can instead
employ comprehensive plans promulgated through a 4(d) rule.
To realize the full potential of Section 4(d) to promote recovery
through cooperative federalism, the Services must carefully de-
velop 4(d) rules in accordance with several principles. The most
obvious principle that grows out of this study is that recovery, not
"no jeopardy," must be the standard for approving 4(d) limita-
tions on take. Furthermore, state and local programs that will
qualify for the 4(d) take limitation should cover large areas that
constitute significant portions of the threatened species' habitat.
Without these two elements, the cooperative 4(d) approach offers
little that the current incidental take permit program lacks.
The Services should, as clearly as possible, define what will or
will not constitute a take. The more specific the Services can make
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their descriptions, the more certainty property owners and local
jurisdictions receive in exchange for their cooperation in the 4(d)
program. The NMFS's Citizen's Guide, accompanying the final
salmon 4(d) rule, takes a first step in this direction. It lists sixteen
categories of activities, such as "constructing or maintaining struc-
tures like culverts, berms, or dams that eliminate or impede a
listed species' ability to migrate or gain access to habitat," that are
likely to constitute a take.614 The salmon rule also describes activi-
ties that, though they may harm individual salmon, are not likely
to incur take liability. These activities are controlled under envi-
ronmental programs, such as pesticide regulation and effluent
discharge permitting, already receiving Service scrutiny.615
Though this scrutiny falls short of the mark of recovery criteria,
the framework providing a description of activities not likely to
take under the 4(d) rule counterbalances the list of activities likely
to take and forces the Service to set priorities.
The Services should encourage local jurisdictions to adapt land
use controls to the needs of threatened species. Offsets and buffer
areas are two versatile tools that the federal government ought to
promote. The San Diego County subarea plan's mitigation re-
quirements to offset habitat degradation are an example of local
land use control that is both protective of habitat and specific in
detailing what is expected of property owners. Also, the county's
buffer zone restrictions on landscaping, structures, lighting, and
fencing for land adjacent to preserves, respond well to the lessons
of conservation biology. Permitting pursuant to state and local
programs approved under a 4(d) rule with specific requirements
such as these provides private landowners with a simpler path to
compliance. Specific restrictions also establish an enforceable
floor to ensure that development does not frustrate recovery.
The Services should, as clearly as possible, define the conditions
for approval and revision of local plans under a 4(d) rule. The
gnatcatcher rule abdicated this federal responsibility to state offi-
cials. Furthermore, while the gnatcatcher rule allows for modifi-
cation of the state guidelines if they do not make progress toward
the state objectives, the Service did not define what state objec-
tives would be acceptable.616 In contrast, the salmon rule's use of
614. National Marine Fisheries Service, supra note 369, at 5-6.
615. Final Rule Governing Take of 14 Threatened Salmon and Steelhead Evolutionary
Significant Units (ESUs), 65 Fed. Reg. 42,422, 42,473.
616. 50 C.F.R. § 17.41(b)(4) (2000); Special Rule Concerning Take of the Threatened
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the PFC (properly functioning condition) system to measure the
natural habitat-forming processes necessary for recovery is an at-
tempt to provide an objective benchmark for evaluating local
plans.617 Coupled with the other MRCI criteria, the salmon rule
better defines substantive standards for approval and revision of
local plans.
However, the Services can improve the application of substan-
tive standards in 4(d) rules. For instance, the MRCI development
considerations should be binding. Also, when local plans are
tiered to regional programs, such as the Tri-County Model or the
CSS Regional Guidelines, the Services should condition approval
of the regional programs on review of local ordinances to ensure
that on-the-ground implementation actually fulfills the promise of
the regional program. Defining approval and revision standards is
a delicate task. The Services must balance the need for specific cri-
teria to bind local jurisdictions (and the Services) to the absolute
requirement of recovery with the need for flexibility to allow local
jurisdictions to adapt conservation criteria to local circumstances.
The MRCI development criteria come closest to striking this bal-
ance than any other 4(d) provision.618 Still, there is ample poten-
tial for improving future 4(d) rules.
The Services should ensure that local jurisdictions seeking to
implement programs under a cooperative 4(d) rule have the ad-
ministrative resources to do so fairly and effectively. The Services
should require local governments to have sufficient enforcement
authority, an enforcement program, opportunities for public in-
tervention, and sufficient agency staff and funding. Neither the
salmon nor the gnatcatcher rule directed sufficient attention to
this area, which is critical in transforming a good paper plan into
real changes in behavior. The Seattle response to the salmon list-
ing illustrates the kind of commitments the Services should re-
quire of states and local governments. 619 However, Congress will
need to provide greater federal funding for state and local gov-
ernments to help them meet their administrative burdens. With-
out federal monies commensurate with those provided to states to
Coastal California Gnatcatcher, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,088, 65,094 (Dec. 10, 1993).
617. See Final Rule Governing Take of 14 Threatened Salmon and Steelhead Evolutionary
Significant Units (ESUs), 65 Fed. Reg. 42,422, 42,431-32, 42,479 (July 10, 2000) (to be codified
at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223).
618. See supra notes 358-365 and accompanying text.
619. See supra notes 442-446 and accompanying text.
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administer pollution control programs, cooperative federalism
will not work as well in the species conservation arena.
Adaptive management, which requires establishing measures of
progress, monitoring those measures, and periodically revising
plans accordingly, has become the Services' standard for handling
the inherent uncertainties in conservation biology. The Services
should continue to refine this experimental approach, which de-
mands their continued vigilance in supervising local implementa-
tion. Promised monitoring in environmental law often fails to ma-
terialize as new programs and initial approvals preoccupy scarce
agency resources. Therefore, monitoring must be a key require-
ment, enforceable by citizen suits. Service authority to require re-
vision of state programs in response to changed circumstances or
new information must be matched with local authority to reopen
permits to adjust to revised plans.
The Services should ensure that the public has an opportunity to
shape local plans. To some extent, this is built into the notice and
comment requirements of promulgating a 4(d) rule. However, be-
cause the 4(d) rules will often leave key aspects of the conserva-
tion program to the discretion of local jurisdictions seeking to tai-
lor measures to local circumstances, the Services must require
local program development to include opportunities for meaning-
ful public participation.
The Services should ensure that local jurisdictions have access to
the same level of good science that the Services employ in devel-
oping 4(d) rules. The NCCP Scientific Review Panel established a
firm foundation for the coastal sage scrub Conservation Guide-
lines, which shaped the comprehensive plans for habitat protec-
tion.620 In addition to the development of plans, scientific exper-
tise should be deployed in other aspects of the cooperative
scheme. The Washington Salmon Recovery Funding Board's use
of a technical review team to help set funding priorities is a good
example of the use of scientific expertise in an ongoing process.621
The ESA program has outgrown the traditional conservation
law tools of federal interagency coordination and impact analysis.
These tasks remain essential. However, the emergence of inciden-
tal take permitting in the 1990s marked an important shift toward
620. How the NCCP Pilot Program Began, supra note 281; WeIner, supra note 252, at 344;
Conservation Guidelines, supra note 275, at Introduction.
621. See supra notes 389-397 and accompanying text.
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the regulatory tools of pollution control law. It is time to foster
further transformation in the ESA program to take better advan-
tage of the full range of tools developed in the pollution control
area.
Cooperative federalism, despite its flaws, offers a tremendous
opportunity for the Services to make significant progress toward
recovery. The conservation imperative of comprehensive plan-
ning requires the Services to enlist the help of state and local ju-
risdictions with the authority, experience, and desire to incorpo-
rate species recovery needs into land use controls. The initial
experiments with plans for the coastal California gnatcatcher and
the Puget Sound salmon establish a basis for improving the
framework for 4(d) rules. State and local governments, facing
both the danger of indirect liability and the prospect of greater lo-
cal tailoring of regulation, are eager for partnership with the Ser-
vices.
